The Role of Skolkovo as a Top Priority Initiative of  the Russian Innovation Policy by Schulze, Alexandra
 UNIVERSITY OF VAASA 
 
Faculty of Philosophy 
 
ICS-programme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alexandra Schulze 
 
The Role of Skolkovo as a Top Priority Initiative of  
the Russian Innovation Policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Master’s Thesis 
 
Vaasa 2014 
 1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
1 INTRODUCTION           7 
 1.1 The Aim of the Study         10 
 1.2 Materials and Method         12 
 1.3 Structure of the Study         13 
 
2 INNOVATION AS CONCEPT AND SYSTEM      15 
 2.1 The Concept of Innovation        15 
  2.1.1 Nature of Innovation        18 
2.1.2 Taxonomy of Innovations       20 
2.1.3 Incremental vs. Radical Innovations     21 
 2.2 Theory of National Innovation Systems (NIS)     23 
2.2.1 The Concept of NIS: Its Definition and Development  23 
2.2.2 Main Actors of NIS and Their Functions     28 
2.2.3 The Role of Government in Promoting Innovations   29 
2.2.4 Assessment and Measurement of NIS     31 
2.3 Innovation Communication and Its Role in Innovation Systems  35 
 
3 INNOVATION POLICY OF RUSSIA        39 
 3.1 Russian National Innovation System: Recent Trends and    
       Path-Dependencies          39 
  3.1.1 Societal Aspects of Innovations in Russia    44 
  3.1.2 Historical Preconditions and Stages of Innovation  
   Policy Development        47 
  3.1.3 Legal Aspects of Policy Regulation     49 
 3.2 The System of Innovation Policy Governance     52 
3.3 Current Initiatives and Strategic Policy Documents    56 
3.3.1 Policy Framework of Science and Technology Development  
 of the Russian Federation up to the Year 2010 and Beyond  56 
 2 
3.3.2 Strategy 2020         58 
3.3.2.1 Three Possible Scenarios of Innovative Development 60 
3.3.2.2 Conclusions and Recommendations    64 
3.3.3 Go Russia!          65 
 
4 THE SKOLKOVO INNOVATION CENTRE AS A KEY INITIATIVE OF THE 
   RUSSIAN INNOVATION POLICY        67 
 4.1 The Preconditions of Skolkovo Creation      67 
4.2 Skolkovo Overview         69 
4.2.1 Skolkovo Mission        71 
4.2.2 Skolkovo’s Unique Legal Status      72 
4.2.3 Funding Sources         73 
4.2.4 Research Grants Policy        76 
4.3 Skolkovo Ecosystem         78 
4.3.1 Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology     81 
4.3.2 Technopark         83 
4.3.3 Research Clusters in Skolkovo       84 
 4.3.3.1 Cluster of Energy Efficient Technologies   85 
 4.3.3.2 Cluster of Nuclear Technologies     87 
 4.3.3.3 Cluster of Space Technologies and Communication 88 
 4.3.3.4 Cluster of Biomedical Technologies    90 
 4.3.3.5 Cluster of Information Technologies     91 
4.3.4 Innocity          92 
4.4 People of Skolkovo         94 
4.5 Skolkovo Communication Strategy        97 
4.6 Socio-Political Disputes around Skolkovo      100 
4.7 Overall Appraisal of the Skolkovo Innovation Centre    105 
 
5 CONCLUSION           113 
 
WORKS CITED            118 
 
 3 
APPENDICES          
Appendix 1. Russian Economy Profile        134 
Appendix 2. Innovation policy: types of regulation and concrete measures  135 
Appendix 3. Russian innovation policy stages of development    138 
Appendix 4. Key measures to promote science and innovations    139 
Appendix 5. Geography of the Skolkovo Participants     142 
 
FIGURES  
Figure 1. Categories of innovations        20 
Figure 2. Four categories of factors influencing NIS      33 
Figure 3. Percentage of innovative industrial enterprises engaged in  
selected types of innovation supporting activity in 2008 in Russia   42 
Figure 4. Innovation Governance in Russia       54 
Figure 5. Infographic of the Skolkovo Innovation Centre     70 
Figure 6. Grant policy of the Skolkovo Foundation      78 
Figure 7. Key Elements of the Skolkovo Innovation Centre    79 
Figure 8. Participants of research clusters in the Skolkovo Innovation Centre 84 
Figure 9. Skolkovo Foundation Administration Chart     95 
 
TABLES 
Table 1. Interconnection between science, technology and innovation policies 40 
Table 2. Progressive scenario         61 
Table 3. Moderate scenario          62 
Table 4. Inertial scenario          63 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF VAASA 
Faculty of Philosophy 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In the face of the ever growing global technological competition and increasing 
dependency on exports of natural resources, the government of the Russian Federation 
has recently declared knowledge-driven growth as its key policy objective. Under the 
Presidency of Dmitry Medvedev economic modernization and innovative development 
became top priorities of Russia’s political agenda. Thanks to the enthusiasm and 
personal engagement of Medvedev, a number of strategic initiatives, mainly aimed at 
overcoming the technological inferiority of Russia, were implemented. The Skolkovo 
Innovation Centre is one of the most significant of them. It is a technology hub and a 
research complex being built outside Moscow, often referred to as Russian Silicon 
Valley. 
 
The aim of this research is to analyse the complex of strategic objectives of the newly 
created Centre, its role in the Russian innovation policy and its current, as well as 
potential impact on Russia’s overall innovative performance and global 
competitiveness. The analysis is based on the theoretical framework of national systems 
of innovation and is complemented by the innovation communication approach, 
underlining the key role of communication in success of an innovative ecosystem. The 
study shows that Skolkovo can be considered as one of the most successful innovation 
communication projects in modern Russia. Skolkovo has managed to draw attention to 
the numerous problems related to Russia’s technological backwardness and initiated a 
public discussion about the imperative of the country’s modernization through 
innovation-driven model of development. However, it is argued that the project has 
inherited structural disbalances and path dependencies of the Russian innovation 
system, which the country owes to the Soviet past and its leadership culture. Therefore, 
unless the Russian government improves the general investment climate, promotes the 
rule of law, eradicates corruption and fosters fare business competition, Skolkovo risks 
to be seen as a pure image promotion governmental endeavour rather than a powerful 
agent of change to boost Russia’s modernization. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
“Innovation is no longer about money, it's about the climate: are 
individuals allowed to flourish and take risks?” 
William Weldon, Chairman of Johnson & Johnson  
(The Economist 2007) 
 
At present, innovations constitute the cornerstone of competitiveness and sustainable 
growth of world economies. As Michael Porter sagaciously asserted it more than twenty 
years ago: “National prosperity is created, not inherited… A nation’s competitiveness 
depends on the capacity of its industry to innovate and upgrade.” (Porter 1990: 73) The 
title of the 20th century leader in innovations can be rightfully attributed to the United 
States of America, which have managed to create a unique innovation ecosystem 
uniting academy, government and business initiatives in Silicon Valley. Currently, 
innovations have been raised to the highest level in national agendas of numerous 
countries across the globe. John Kao singles out four main tendencies characteristic of 
the current era of global innovation: “the rise of innovation as a currency of global 
competition, the global war for talent, innovation as a national agenda and the power of 
networks” (quoted in Luoma-aho, Uskali & Weinstein 2009: 3). 
 
Countries differ from each other by their innovative performance not only in a 
quantitative manner (number of registered patents, new products and processes 
developed), but also in a qualitative one (sphere of innovation). The differences in 
innovation output used to be directly related to the input factors such as investment in 
research and development (R&D), venture capital, availability of skilled labour, and so 
on. This assumption has been put under question by the fact that while public R&D 
expenditures have been changing over time in various countries, their sectorial 
specializations have remained almost invariable. (Casper & van Waarden 2005; Porter 
1990) 
 
This contradiction has been discussed in the works of a number of researchers 
(Archibugi & Pianta 1994; Patel & Pavitt 1994; Casper & van Waarden 2005: 3–7), in 
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which they are trying to answer one main question: why are some countries more 
innovative than the others? It has been concluded that “nation-specific factors”, and 
national institutions and organizations above all, have a great influence on a country’s 
innovative performance. They are responsible for providing incentives and creating 
environment, which can stimulate, but also hamper innovativeness of firms and 
economy in total. This assumption has been further acknowledged in the works of 
Freeman (1987), Nelson (1993), Porter (1990), Lundvall (1992) and Edquist (1997), 
who have adopted the concept of a National Innovation System (NIS) to characterize 
such “an institutional environment”. (Casper & van Waarden 2005: 8) At present, NIS 
has been recognised as the underlying principle, which enables analysis of the activities 
of particular agencies, companies and organisations that largely influence the way of 
national economic and innovative development. (Niosi 2002: 300) 
 
As claimed by The Global Competitiveness Report 2011–2012 (The World Economic 
Forum 2011: 8–10), which draws a comparison between the countries based on the 
indicators of their “micro- and macroeconomic foundations of national 
competitiveness”, all countries as well as their economies can be classified by three 
phases of development. In the first phase, the economy is factor-driven, and countries 
compete with each other “based on their factor endowments”, which are primarily 
unqualified work force and natural resources; low productivity of economy is mainly 
reflected in low salaries. After that, the countries advance to the efficiency-driven phase 
of development, where they are challenged to improve their “production processes” and 
“increase product quality”. During this phase, competitiveness can be enhanced through 
improvement of educational standards, “efficient and developed goods”, “labour and 
financial markets”, taking benefits of the technological knowledge that is already 
available for use and increasing the country’s economic activities in trade on the 
national and international level. Eventually, as the countries enter the innovation-driven 
phase, they start to procure higher salaries and higher living standards, which they 
manage to sustain only if their businesses succeed in competing through creation of 
unique products, sophisticating their production processes and innovating new ones. 
(The World Economic Forum 2011: 8–10) 
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The Global Competitiveness Report 2011–2012 defines Russia to be in a phase of 
transition from an efficiency-driven to an innovation-driven development stage. The 
country is ranked the 66th among 142 countries. Such a low rank (Finland 3rd, China 
26th, Poland 41st, Brazil 53rd) indicates that the country’s macroeconomic stability
is outbalanced by the aggravating situation in such areas as “quality of institutions, 
labour market efficiency, business sophistication, and innovation”. (The World 
Economic Forum 2011: 27) The Report reveals that the enforcement of the 
independence of the judiciary, the rule of law, fight against corruption, as well as 
development of an adequate system of protecting the intellectual property
rights would considerably contribute to the boosting of Russia’s economic activities and 
overall competiveness. In addition to the weak institutional framework, such factors as 
low efficiency of the goods market, unstable banking sector, over-regulation of 
domestic and foreign markets constitute the main obstacles that Russia needs to clear 
away from its way, if it wants to make use of its “high innovation potential” (38th place 
globaly), its “large and growing market size” (8th), and its “solid performance in higher 
education and training” (27th). (The World Economic Forum 2011: 27, 306) 
 
When speaking about innovations, it is necessary to underline the role of national 
governments, which are “to encourage – or even push – companies to raise their 
aspirations and move to higher levels of competitive performance.” (Porter 1990: 87) 
Concurrently, governments all over the world tend to protect particular markets or get 
involved in regulating the structure of an industry, disregarding the fact that 
“competitive time for companies and political time for governments are fundamentally 
at odds.” (Porter 1990: 87) To gain a competitive edge and secure its positions 
internationally, an industry needs to invest more than a decade in its personnel 
development, in modernization of manufacturing flows, and in accessing foreign 
markets. Whereas in politics, “a decade is an eternity.” (Porter 1990: 87) As a 
consequence, many governments pursue policies targeted at short-term foreseeable 
advantages (for instance, markets regulating, protecting industries from competition, 
granting subsidies), therefore, consciously or unconsciously, hampering innovation.  
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1.1 The Aim of the Study 
 
The global economic crisis of 2008, which severely affected Russia, exposed a number 
of deficiencies of the country’s economy, among them the aggravating dependency of 
national GDP on natural resources exports and deteriorating rate of the country’s global 
competitiveness. That is why maintaining the country’s technological competitiveness 
and keeping up with the leading global economies have become the main objectives of 
the current Russia’s innovation policy. (OECD 2011: 180–181)  
 
In the face of these geopolitical and economic challenges, technological modernization 
has been recognized as the key policy imperative, and innovation-based growth has 
been proclaimed as “the only possible development model”. (Gokhberg 2010: 37; 
Gokhberg & Roud 2012: 121) With this respect, Russia faces a big challenge of 
elaborating such a policy that would foster an innovation-based economy and change 
the traditional focus of Russian R&D strategy from new knowledge creation to the 
practical implementation of new knowledge. The complexity of this challenge requires 
not only changes in the public conscience and common perceptions, it equally demands 
the engagement of various economical and political institutions in order to consolidate 
and facilitate close cooperation between government, education and business actors of 
the system. (Ivanov et al. 2006: 13)  
 
At present, the Russian government is struggling to develop new and more effective 
initiatives to improve the outcome of its innovation policy. Recent years have witnessed 
a number of significant changes in innovation policy of Russia: Coordination 
Committees, headed by President and Prime Minister, were established; a network of 
development institutions (Technology Fund, Russian Venture Company, Development 
Bank) was initiated. Besides, several strategic programs, designed to increase financial 
support to science and technology, stimulate integration between science and 
universities, enforce innovative activities in state corporations, and to provide 
organizational, legal and economic incentives for innovative activities were adopted. 
 
One of the most significant in terms of financial investment and legislative endorsement 
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initiatives of the Russian government is the creation of the Skolkovo Innovation Centre. 
The project was initiated in 2009 by then President Dmitry Medvedev with an aim to 
make the Centre a leading international innovation hub, oriented to promote the 
development and commercialization of new technologies and help transform Russian 
raw-material economy into innovation or knowledge-based one.  
 
The country’s societal and political developments mentioned above demonstrate the 
topicality of the thesis, which overall aim is to provide a complex analysis of the 
Skolkovo Project in the light of national innovation systems approach and within the 
context of constant structural transformations of the Russian innovation policy during 
the last 20 years. Specifically it aims to 1) analyse the structure of the Skolkovo 
innovative ecosystem to see how its elements are integrated and complement each other 
2) examine the communication strategy of Skolkovo and the attitudes of the Russian 
population towards the project in contrast with the official rhetoric; 3) provide the 
SWOT analysis of the project, identifying its potential opportunities and the ways of 
further development. Pursuing these aims, the thesis is trying to estimate how Skolkovo 
responds to the challenges laying ahead of Russia’s innovation system development. 
This requires a thorough examination of the main characteristics of the Russian 
innovation policy, its short and long-term goals as well as the key elements of the 
Russian national innovation system. Historical, political and economical preconditions 
that have led to the current stage of the system development also constitute an important 
part of the analysis.  
 
The thesis is based upon two theoretical perspectives. The first perspective reflects on 
the concept of National Innovation Systems (NIS), because of its focus on nation 
specific factors and their influence in country’s innovativeness (Freeman 1987, Nelson 
1993, Porter 1990, Lundvall 1992 and Edquist 1997). The second perspective uses the 
innovation communication theory approach (Mast, Claudia, Simone Huck & Ansgar 
Zerfass 2005; Nordfors 2004, 2006; Luoma-aho and Halonen 2010), which defines 
communication as the key factor of an innovative ecosystem success. 
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1.2 The Materials and Method 
 
The thesis is based on the documentary research method of materials qualitative 
analysis, which uses a case study of Skolkovo Innovation Centre to illustrate and 
evaluate the transformations of the Russian innovation policy. It has been argued that 
the documentary research constitutes one of the three primary types of social research, 
along with surveys and ethnography. Although it has been often overlooked in 
comparison with other social science methods, the researches agree that the 
documentary research method is reliable and precise, and even more “cost effective than 
social surveys, in-depth interviews or participant observation”. (Mogalakwe 2006: 221)  
 
The method implies the analysis of the documents relevant to the research topic. Within 
the documentary research method a special attention is paid to the quality of the 
documentary sources, in particular to the authenticity, credibility, meaning and 
representativeness of the documents. (Scott 1990) The range of document types is wide 
and comprises all forms (paper, electronic) of materials such as newspaper articles, 
consultancy reports, governmental decrees, ministerial reports, interviews, 
presentations, official speeches, including video and image analysis. (Mogalakwe 2006: 
223) 
 
The research materials used in the thesis include the analytical report on Russia’s 
innovation policy produced by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy: Russian Federation 2011), which 
is one of the most notable proponents of the NIS concept, and has adopted it as a 
leading analytical tool. Besides, the OECD was the first organization to acknowledge 
“the importance of technology for economic change” on international level and to draw 
attention of policy-makers to the responsibility of government and private sector for 
stimulating development of new technologies. (Lundvall 2010: 5) 
 
Another source of the research materials is the World Economic Forum, which reports 
The Global Competitiveness Report 2011–2012 and The Global Information 
Technology Report 2012 have also been used for the analysis. Moreover, The Global 
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Innovation Index 2013, produced in collaboration of Cornell University, INSEAD 
Business School and World Intellectual Property Organisation, as well as the databases 
on innovative performance of the European benchmarking tools (INNO Policy 
TrendChart, ERAWATCH) have been chose as sources of reliable data as well. The 
research materials also include the surveys of the Russian national statistics agencies, 
the academic articles written by the Russian and foreign researches on innovative policy 
developments, presentations and newsarticles retrieved from the official webpage of the 
Skolkovo Foundation, as well as of the elements of Skolkovo ecosystem, and the 
official webpage of the President of Russia.  
 
 
1.3 The Structure of the Study 
 
The thesis is organised in 5 chapters, including the first introductory one. Chapter two 
on theoretical background gives a literature overview on the basic concepts related to 
innovations and various approaches to their classification and analysis. The chapter also 
examines in depth the theory of National Innovation System, its actors and their 
functions. It analyses how much government should be involved in promoting 
innovations, which is reflected in the structure of innovations governance and control 
system. Further on, the chapter examines the concept of innovation communication and 
the role that communication plays in building trust, reputation and in enabling 
knowledge exchange and effective interaction among the actors of the innovation 
ecosystem.  
 
Chapter three focuses on the distinctive features of the Russian innovation policy and 
discusses the implications of historical preconditions and path dependencies inherited 
from Soviet times on the current structure of the national innovation system. An in-
depth analysis of core strategic policy documents, including the analysis of three 
possible development scenarios, provides a forward looking approach and helps 
understanding future patterns of the policy measures and the country’s potential growth.  
 
Chapter four is dedicated to the analysis of the Skolkovo Innovation Centre ecosystem 
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based on content analysis of the articles from the official Skolkovo Foundation webpage
official governmental addresses, news articles covering Skolkovo activities and 
speeches and interviews of political leasers. Skolkovo’s image of a main initiative of 
innovative development and a long awaited agent of change reflected in its 
communication narratives is discussed as well. The chapter concludes with a SWOT 
analysis of the project, examining its strong and weak sides and presenting 
opportunities for a bigger impact on Russian innovativeness and the culture of 
innovative entrepreneurship. 
 
The summary of research findings is presented in the chapter five which reviews the 
key elements of the theoretical approaches applied and presents the results of Skolkovo 
case study.  
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2. INNOVATION AS CONCEPT AND SYSTEM 
 
This chapter provides a clarification on the theoretical foundations and the main 
concepts of the thesis. Thus, it defines what is the innovation, its nature and categories, 
as well as how its notion has been changing during the last century. Further on it 
elaborates on the theoretical arguments about the national innovation system approach 
and its interpretation in the works of various scholars. The theory of innovation 
communication, which focuses on the role of communication and importance of social 
connections for a success of the innovation ecosystem, also constitutes a part of the 
analysis. 
 
 
2.1 The Concept of Innovation 
 
For a long time, invention, creativity and imagination were associated with the notions 
of evolution and progress, and the features of a true human genius. Gradually with the 
growing role of organizations in the twentieth century those values were modified. (Farr 
1989: 25 as quoted in Godin 2008: 45) “If there was to be increasing economic 
efficiency, there had to be innovation – through organizations and the mobilization of 
their employees’ creative abilities” (Godin 2008: 45).  
 
The concept of innovation has never been referred to one single discipline, but is 
currently being studied in the fields ranging from economics to anthropology. 
Innovation enjoys a strong positive conceptual connotation. It is traditionally associated 
with efficiency, progress and growth, and even when perceived as purely technological 
change it is predominantly aligned with improvement. Innovation has become the 
central concept of the modern times, a part of the popular imaginary; it is present in the 
media and in public policy where it is often seen as a panacea against global economic 
and social problems. (Godin 2008: 5) 
 
Traditionally Joseph Schumpeter, Austrian-American economist, is the main author to 
be referred to when speaking about innovation. During the great economic recession in 
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1930s, Schumpeter focused on the effects that market changes have on the capitalist 
system. In his book Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy first published in 1943, he 
portrayed a process of “creative destruction” where: 
 
“The opening up of new markets, foreign or domestic, and the 
organizational development <…> illustrate the same process of 
industrial mutation, that incessantly revolutionizes the economic 
structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly 
creating a new one” (Schumpeter 1939: 83).  
 
“In Schumpeter’s view, “radical” innovations create major disruptive changes, whereas 
“incremental” innovations continuously advance the process of change”. (OECD 2005: 
29) Seen as the main propelling force of economic change, innovation as argued by 
Schumpeter can emerge as new products, new methods of production, new sources of 
supply for raw materials, new forms of organization and new markets. (Lundvall 2007: 
101; OECD 2005: 29)  
 
It can also be summarized that Schumpeter in his reasoning makes innovation equal to 
“New Combinations”: 
 
“Recalling that production in the economic sense is nothing but 
combining productive services, we may express the same thing by 
saying that innovation combines factors in a new way, or that it 
consists in carrying out New Combinations” (Schumpeter 1939: 87– 
88).  
 
Besides, Schumpeter was among the first theorists to distinguish innovation from 
invention. To Schumpeter, invention is a simple act of intellectual creativity, which “is 
without importance to economic analysis” (Schumpeter 1939: 85). Whereas innovation, 
on the contrary, is regarded as “an economic decision”, when a company decides to 
apply or adopt an invention. (Schumpeter 1939: 85) 
 
Although Schumpeter pioneered with the concept of innovation, it had taken long time 
until the term became widely accepted. In the early 1960s the category was still not 
generally recognized. As Machlup pointed out, “we shall do better without the word 
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innovation” (Machlup 1962: 179, quoted in Godin 2008: 35). To others, the category 
appeared to be too general, as it “has come to mean all things to all men” (Ames 1961: 
371, quoted in Godin 2008: 35). For a long period of time, innovations had been 
referred to as “invention, technological change and its variants: technical advance and 
technical progress”. (Godin 2008: 36) Over time economists developed conceptual 
frameworks of technological innovations, defined as a dynamic process from invention 
to diffusion with the final goal of commercialization. Since mid-1950s, these 
frameworks were further elaborated by researchers Carter and Williams (1957, 1958, 
1959, quoted in Godin 2008: 37) and later by “evolutionary” economists such as 
Freeman (1971), as well as Nelson and Winter (1982). (Godin 2008: 32–35, 37) 
 
There is a large number of various definitions of innovations, which vary considerably 
depending on the type of scientific approach applied. The evolutionary approach, for 
instance, considers innovation as “a path-dependent process whereby knowledge and 
technology are developed through interaction between various actors and other factors”. 
The efficiency of these interactions has a considerable influence on the future of 
economic development. (OECD 2005: 32) 
 
Closely connected to the evolutionary approach is the concept, which regards 
innovation as a system. The systems of innovation approach (Lundvall 1992, Nelson 
1993, quoted in OECD 2005: 33) focus on the impact of institutions on the innovative 
performance of firms and other actors. Special emphasis is placed on the role of the 
transfer, diffusion and application of ideas, skills, knowledge and information. The 
networks, which facilitate the exchange of information, are integrated within the social, 
political and cultural context, which in its turn determines and limits the innovative 
performance of economy. The systemic approach pays special attention to conditions 
and policies, in which the markets function and to the role of governments in 
monitoring and regulating this overall structure. Innovation is hence perceived as “a 
dynamic process in which knowledge is accumulated through learning and interaction”. 
Depending on the focus of the systems of innovation approach, it can be equally applied 
at regional, national and international levels. (OECD 2005: 32–33) 
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Additionally, Lundvall (2005: 9) distinguishes two modes of innovation: 1) science-
based innovations, which are mainly focused on promotion of R&D, exploiting and 
accessing the explicit codified knowledge (databases, documents etc.); this knowledge 
is easily stored and retrieved, and is sometimes referred to as know-what; 2) experience-
based innovations are referred to learning by doing, using and interacting. Experience-
based innovations are attribute to organizational frameworks and relationships among 
staff members, who share implicit or tacit knowledge (which is mainly intuitive and 
hard to be defined), thus promoting interactive learning.   
 
2.1.1 Nature of Innovation  
 
Innovations as such are often associated with the notions of newness and the unknown 
which include several characteristics (Zerfass 2004, Zerfass & Mast 2005, quoted in 
Maisch et al. 2011: 4):  
• Innovations are novel and represent previously unknown combinations. Due to this, 
innovations can potentially provoke anxiety and resentment towards their adoption. 
• Innovations are complex. The more advanced innovation is, the more abstract the 
new product is found by the target groups. Competitive advantages of an abstract 
product are not very distinctive to potential customers and are therefore hard to 
communicate. 
• Innovations are unprecedented. As innovations have little connectivity and are new 
by nature, the target groups are unable to rely on their previous experience or 
existing evidence. 
• Innovations are characterized by high level of uncertainty. All previously mentioned 
aspects of innovations add up to giving rise to disbelief and doubts among the target 
audience. Uncertainty about the potential of an innovation and anxiety about its 
possible failures risk leading to dislike and refusal. 
 
Lundvall (2010: 9) refers to innovation as a “ubiquitous” and “cumulative” 
phenomenon, which emerges not as a single shot, but rather as a process. He suggests 
that future innovation is determined by the past and can be called as “a new use of pre-
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existing possibilities and components”. Lundvall’s idea of continuity confronts 
Schumpeter’s assumption of “creative destruction” when the results of an innovation 
process appear to devalue the previous knowledge. However, both Schumpeter and 
Lundvall agree that collective entrepreneurship and interactive learning constitute the 
essential activities of innovation.  
 
Alongside, Lundvall (2005: 9) points at the fact that innovation cannot be predicted. He 
claims that an innovation process is fundamentally uncertain and disruptive. Moreover, 
it is sometimes “not possible to distinguish innovation as an event from its diffusion and 
use”. (2005: 9) On this basis, Lundvall attributes to the concept of innovation the 
following characteristics: 1) “discontinuity in the technical characteristics or in the use 
of a new product or process”, and 2) “introduction, diffusion and adaptation of the new 
artefact”. 
 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which for 
several decades has been providing comprehensive reports on national innovation 
strategies, proposes the following features of innovation: 
a) Innovation entails uncertainty over the result of innovation endeavours.  
b) Innovation requires investment. 
c) Innovation is subject to spillovers, when externalities of economic activities affect the 
parties not directly involved in them. An inventing company seldom fully enjoys profits 
of its creative innovation, as the companies, which acquire the innovation also gain 
from “knowledge spillovers or from the use of the original innovation”.  
d) Innovation comprises the exploit of “new knowledge or a new combination of 
existing knowledge”. New knowledge can be both generated internally through the 
series of extended R&D activities or obtained from external bodies through acquisition 
of new equipment and technologies. 
e) Innovation objective is to increase a firm’s performance by attaining a competitive 
advantage or simply preserving its competitiveness on the market. (OECD 2005: 34–35) 
 
It might be worth mentioning that for the professionals, directly involved in innovative 
activities and who contributed to the report Fostering Innovation-led Clusters: A Review 
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of Leading Global Practices (The Economist 2011), innovation is mainly associated 
with change and tolerance for different views and opinions. “If everybody agrees, 
there’s no innovation. It’s when somebody says, ‘I disagree with the status quo and I 
want to change it’”. However, if in a country, due to some political reasons or cultural 
grounds, change is not tolerated, innovations have very few chances to succeed. (The 
Economist 2011: 11) 
 
2.1.2 Taxonomy of Innovations 
 
Charles Edquist (2001) underlines that innovations differ from each other with respect 
to their determinants. According to these determinants, innovations can be classified 
into two categories. Primarily, Edquist distinguishes product innovations, which can be 
both goods and services, and process innovations, which include technological and 
organizational innovations (see Figure 1 below).  
 
In this taxonomy, technological and goods innovations have mainly material value, 
while organizational and services innovations are of intangible character. All categories 
of innovation are equally important for economic growth and development. That is why 
only a sound balance of tangible and intangible innovations, without any type of them 
prevailing over another, can guarantee the well functioning of the system. (Edquist 
2001: 7-8) 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Categories of innovations (Edquist 2001: 7) 
 21 
Edquist’s taxonomy was developed further on by the OECD researches, who enlarged it 
to differentiate four categories of innovations: “product innovations, process 
innovations, marketing innovations and organizational innovations”. (OECD 2005: 47) 
Thus, a product innovation is “the introduction of goods or service that is new or 
significantly improved with respect to its characteristics or intended uses” (OECD 2005: 
48). The notion comprises major improvements in primarily functional characteristics, 
technical provisions, machineries, resources, computer programmes, and easiness of 
usage. Process innovations entail the usage of a new or considerably upgraded 
manufacturing or distribution scheme that comprises considerable modifications in 
technological processes, machinery or software. (OECD 2005: 49) 
 
Marketing innovations encompass the introduction of a new marketing approach 
engaging substantial transformations in “product design or packaging, product 
placement, product promotion or pricing”. The main objective of marketing innovations 
includes general increase in sales, increase of clients’ satisfaction of the services or 
“accessing new markets”. (OECD 2005: 49) 
 
Through organizational innovations companies implement “a new organizational 
method” in their operating procedures, “workplace organization or external relations”. 
Organizational innovations mainly aim at improvement of a company’s efficiency by 
decreasing the expenses on the staff members, operating expenditures, improving the 
wellbeing of the employees and increasing their work output, getting admission to 
external information etc. (OECD 2005: 51) 
 
2.1.3 Incremental vs. Radical Innovations 
 
Companies can be divided into two big categories in terms of the way they innovate, 
incrementally or radically (Dewar & Dutton 1986, Gersick 1991, Pennings 1988, 
Tushman & Romanelli 1985, quoted in Orlikowski 1991: 5). Incremental innovations 
are linear, cumulative modifications of a process or a product, which result in a low 
scale upgrading or modifications in order to adapt to the up-to-date technology. They 
entail improvements within a given frame of solutions (i.e., “doing better what we 
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already do”). (Norman & Verganti 2014: 82) Through incremental innovations 
organisations improve and elaborate on the already established processes or products 
without significant changes in their basic activity patterns. Whereas radical innovations 
undermine existing assumptions and imply “nonlinear, paradigmatic changes 
representing significant departures from existing practice or knowledge” (Orlikowski 
1991: 5). Norman and Verganti (2014: 82) define them as a change of frame (i.e., 
“doing what we did not do before”). Both categories are meant “as ends of a 
continuum” to characterize the new knowledge, which innovation embodies. Yet, as 
Dewar and Dutton (1986: 1423, quoted in Orlikowski 1991: 5) argue: "the middle 
values of this continuum are difficult to interpret". 
 
Norman and Verganti (2014: 82) see the major distinction between the two categories in 
the perception of innovation, whether it is recognized “as a continuous modification of 
previously accepted practices” or whether it is “new, unique, and discontinuous”.  
Radical innovations entail many more risks and complications as compared to 
incremental ones, as they request to diverge from the established norms, rules and 
methods. The main obstacle on the way of radical innovations is not the risks, and 
uncertainty that they entail, but the fact that most companies and institutions are prone 
to stability and unwilling to change their status quo (Starbuck 1983, quoted in 
Orlikowski 1991: 6).  
 
Despite the fact that radical innovations are highly valued thanks to their substantial 
capacity to differentiate, they are notably rare. Most radical innovations take 
considerable time to become accepted. Apart from that it is quite challenging to create 
anything completely new at present time: “all new ideas have predecessors”, they are 
often generated on the basis of a new combination of already existent ideas. Norman 
and Verganti (2014: 82–84) argue that the majority of successful products are subjected 
to constant incremental innovations, aimed at reducing their operational expenses and 
maximizing their efficiency. Complexity, limitations in aptitude and usual high costs of 
radical innovations make them difficult to “live up to their potential when they are first 
introduced”.  
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Both types of innovation are equally necessary. Radical innovations are the source of 
major changes; they introduce breakthrough fields and crucially new frameworks. 
While incremental innovations transform them into an adequate form suitable for the 
consumers. “Without radical innovation, incremental innovation reaches a limit. 
Without incremental innovation, the potential enabled by radical change is not 
captured.” (Norman & Verganti 2014: 82–84) 
 
 
2.2 Theory of National Innovation Systems (NIS) 
 
The end of the XX century saw the emergence of numerous innovation system 
approaches, which despite their similarities emphasize conceptual differences and are 
focused on different actors. Based on the analysis of literature on innovation systems 
several concepts can be enumerated such as “regional innovation systems (Asheim & 
Isaksen 1997; Cooke et al. 1997), sectoral systems of innovation and production (Bresci 
& Malerba 1997), technological systems (Carlsson & Stankiewicz 1991)” (Bergek et al 
2008: 4). The list can be continued by the concept of national systems of innovation 
described in the works of Freeman (1987), Lundvall (1992, 2005), Nelson & Rosenberg 
(1993). Some ideas of the innovation system approach can be found in Michael Porter’s 
concept of national competitive advantage and Etzkowitz-Leydesdorff’s Triple Helix 
concept. (Lundvall 2004: 3; Edquist 1997) 
 
2.2.1 The Concept of NIS: Its Definition and Development 
 
The National Innovation System (NIS) concept emerged in the mid-1980s as a result of 
the discussions initiated by the European governments with regard to the future of their 
industrial policies. As Naubahar Sharif (2006: 749, 761) points it out, the emergence of 
the NIS concept was determined by a number of specific socio-political circumstances. 
One of the most significant among them was the accelerating economic globalization 
and increasing international competition among both companies and countries. After the 
World War II the predominant approach among the scientific circles, including 
government advisers on science, was a linear model of development (research – 
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technology transfer – implementation) and “technology push”. Christopher Freeman 
(1995: 9 as quoted in Feinson 2003:14) describes this as a “chain reaction” approach on 
the example of the nuclear bombe development: “basic physics => large-scale 
development in big labs => applications and innovations (whether military or civil)”. 
However, in 1950s and 1960s it became apparent that regardless of considerable 
investments in R&D “technological change and economic growth depend more on 
efficient diffusion than on being first in the world with radical innovations” (Freeman 
1995: 10, quoted in Feinson 2003: 14).  
 
This awakening was reinforced by the two geopolitical events: skyrocketing 
technological and economic success of first Japan and then South Korea, in contrast to 
the downfall of the USSR and the socialist economies. Thus, linear model development 
approach coupled with the macroeconomic theory, dominating the policy making in the 
US and most of industrialized countries, failed to provide explanations to the factors of 
international competitiveness and the growing differences in pace of technological and 
economical advance among the countries. (Feinson 2003: 14) 
 
An accelerating economic growth of Japan interested Christopher Freeman, who in 
1987 published an entire book dedicated to the Japanese competition culture. Freeman 
explains that Japan’s economic achievements are mainly due to “long-term policies, 
pursued over many decades, rather than to any short-term manipulation of currency 
exchange rates, or exploitation of relative factor-cost advantages” (Freeman 1982: 21, 
quoted in Sharif 2006: 761). 
 
In the face of the growing necessity to compete with Japan to retain global economic 
positions, European countries and particularly Scandinavia were much more vigorous in 
adoption of the NIS concept in comparison with the United States. This can be 
explained by the fact that “smaller, highly international and globally connected 
economies”, such as Scandinavia and Northern Europe, are more susceptible to similar 
threats. Thus, the first country, where the NIS approach was applied as a fundamental 
basis of its science and technology policy, was Finland. Hit by a severe economic 
recession of 1993, Finland adopted NIS approach as a development and recovery 
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strategy, which allowed the country to eventually increase its competitiveness through 
focus on knowledge-intensive areas, along with a heavy investment in education and 
research and development. (Sharif 2006: 745–752) 
 
It has not yet been finally defined whether the concept of NIS originated in academia or 
in policymaking institutions, namely in the OECD’s Directorate for Science, 
Technology and Industry, which used to be responsible for providing recommendations 
to the countries concerning their technology and innovation strategies. As argued by 
Sharif, the concept was developed simultaneously, since many of the founders and 
supporters of the NIS approach worked both for academia and policymaking 
institutions. One of the proponents of the concept, Bengt-Åke Lundvall, argues that it 
appeared owing to the two major contributions, the book “Technical Change and 
Economic Theory” edited by Giovanni Dosi, Christopher Freeman, Richard Nelson, 
Gerald Silverberg and Luc Soete, and published in 1988 and a report “Technology and 
The Economy: The Key Relationships” issued by the OECD in 1992. (Sharif 2006: 750) 
 
Although the concept of NIS has been there for more than 30 years by now, even today 
it features an astonishing variety of interpretations. The definitions range from narrow 
(focusing mainly on research organizations) to broad (including basically all institutions 
that affect learning). (Johnson 1998: 4) “Academics and practitioners embrace varying 
conceptions of the approach’s domain of reference”. (Sharif 2006: 756)  
 
According to Richard Nelson (1993: 4), a national innovation system is “a set of 
institutions, whose interactions determine the innovative performance of national 
firms”. One of the earliest authors elaborating on NIS, Christopher Freeman (1987: 1), 
describes it as “the network of institutions in the public- and private-sectors whose 
activities and interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies”. Stan 
Metcalfe (1995, quoted in Sharif 2006: 745) broadens the definition by putting an 
additional focus on the role of institutions and their frameworks, within which 
“governments form and implement policies to influence the innovation process”. He 
also underlines that the system of interconnected institutions is responsible for the 
creation, storage and further transfer of the skills and knowledge, indispensable for new 
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technologies.   
Bengt-Åke Lundvall has extended the boundaries of the concept, which he claims 
should include “the elements and relationships which interact in the production, 
diffusion and use of new, and economically useful knowledge and are either located 
within or rooted inside the borders of a nation state” (Lundvall 2010: 2). By the 
interacting elements he understands companies, R&D institutions, educational sector, 
financial organizations and governmental regulatory bodies. Often these elements either 
reinforce each other or appear to be the main reason impeding the processes of learning 
and innovation. 
 
According to Lundvall (2010: 1–2), the NIS approach is based on two underlying 
principles. The first one defines knowledge as “the most fundamental resource in 
modern economy” and learning as “the most important process” in contemporary 
society, being the key element responsible for the system’s dynamic and connectivity of 
all its elements. The second principle relies on the idea of learning as an “interactive” 
and “socially embedded process”, which can be understood only within the institutional, 
sociocultural and historical conditions particular to every nation state. Meanwhile a 
nation state is recognized as the main propulsion source of learning process and 
industrialization surge: 
 
“National systems play an important role in supporting and directing 
processes of innovation and learning. The uncertainties involved in 
innovation and the importance of learning imply <…> a complex 
communication between the parties involved. When the parties 
involved originate in the same national environment – sharing its 
norms and culturally based system of interpretation – interactive 
learning and innovation will be easier to develop.” (Lundvall 2010: 4) 
 
This recognition also implies “national-cultural” aspects, which are different in every 
country, because of variable levels of “cultural homogeneity” and “political 
centralization”. Beyond that, Lundvall proposes to acknowledge NIS as an evolutionary 
concept with strategic mission to create and reproduce knowledge through processes of 
learning and innovation. From this perspective, historical transformations of national 
innovation systems can be understood only through an analysis of co-evolution of 
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production structure, technology and institutions. (Lundvall 2005: 3, 10–11) 
However, innovations seldom stay within the borders of a country. Faced with 
increasing internationalization and modernization of national production systems, 
development of foreign trade between the countries, employment of foreign specialists 
and import of foreign technologies, national systems of innovation remain open and 
heterogeneous. Considering the above-mentioned factors, Lundvall also distinguishes 
national, regional and global levels of values attributed to NIS. The national level goals 
are dominated by the two top priorities, commonly dominating public discourse, such as 
“international competitiveness” and “national economic growth”. On the level of 
international organizations, like OECD and European Community, the goals tend to 
focus on regional prosperity and preventing potential conflicts inside the community 
territory. On the global level, represented by United Nations organisations and global 
environmental organisations, it has finally become obvious that only through 
“ecological sustainability” and “reduction of social inequality” it is possible to maintain 
the global economy and human wellbeing. The potential danger lies in the situation 
when national short-term economic growth goals disregard the long-term global 
objectives aimed at sustainability and equality. (Lundvall 2010: 5–7) 
 
In summary it can be concluded that most of the approaches defining the concept of NIS 
acknowledge the following common tendencies (Ivanov 2006: 29): 
1) traditional linear model of development is replaced by a nonlinear one, which 
implies a close cooperation among all elements of the innovation process and its 
market orientation; 
2) every NIS is particular and nation specific; there is no unique or “the best” 
model of a NIS, since evolutionary factors affect the economic, social and 
political development of a country; 
3) NIS concept is an analytical tool, which should be applied by national 
governments while elaborating innovation policies, but should not be used as a 
“ready-made solution” in organising of the national innovation process. 
 
The growing number of academic articles dedicated to NIS demonstrates the increasing 
impact of the concept (Freeman 1987, Nelson 1993, Lundvall 1992, Edquist 1997, 
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Malerba 2004 etc.). The concept is widely accepted as an academic and policymaking 
tool. At present, the NIS approach is used by various supra-national organizations such 
as the European Union (EU), the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), in a less degree the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund. (Sharif 2006: 745)  
 
2.2.2 Main Actors of NIS and Their Functions  
 
The NIS concept indicates that national economies differ in their production systems 
and institutional set up, which is generally conditioned by various historical trajectories 
of development, language and cultural heritage. This disparity is reflected in the 
functional patterns of the NIS elements, represented by business and public sector 
institutions, responsible for research, education and training. (Lundvall 2010: 14) 
 
Regardless of the considerable differences between national economies and intricacies 
within the concept of NIS itself, OECD has proposed to divide the key innovation 
actors into five main categories (institutions and policies directly involved in scientific 
and technological innovation):  
• Governments (local, regional, national with different weights by country) that play 
the key role in setting broad policy directions;  
• Bridging institutions, such as research councils and research associations, which act 
as intermediaries between governments and the performance of research; 
• Private enterprises and the research institutes of finance;  
• Universities and related institutions that provide key knowledge and skills; 
• Other public and private organizations that play a role in the national innovation 
system (public laboratories, technology transfer organizations, joint research 
institutes, patent offices, training organizations and so on). (Feinson 2003: 26) 
 
The broader perspective of the system includes all elements of the social, cultural and 
political environment of a country. To these elements belong institutions, affecting 
learning and exploring activities, financial institutions and their money policies, labor 
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market and pre-university education system. The NIS interconnections, which can be 
regarded as an indicator of an absorptive capacity of the system, give evidence of 
effectiveness of the transfer of knowledge and resources between all the elements of a 
system. (Feinson 2003: 26)  
 
The predominant function of NIS and its actors can be formulated as production, 
diffusion and usage of innovations. In line with this assumption, Xielin Liu and Steven 
White (2000: 6–7, quoted in Edquist 2001: 9) propose to distinguish the following five 
fundamental areas, which are at the core of any NIS: 
1. research (basic, developmental, engineering) 
2. implementation (manufacturing) 
3. end-use (customers of the product or process outputs) 
4. linkage (bringing together complementary knowledge), and 
5. education 
 
Charles Edquist (1997) proposes to make a distinction between organizations’ and 
system activities, which affect innovations. Instead of defining the system as constituted 
by organisations, he argues that system should be defined by its primary activities: 
research and development; competence building; formation of new product markets; 
articulation of user needs; creation and change of organisations; networking around 
knowledge; creating and changing institutions; incubating activities; financing 
innovation; consultancy services. 
 
2.2.3 The Role of Government in Promoting Innovations 
 
The main motivation of governments to pursue their innovation policies is not 
technological progress itself, but “the assumption that innovation is a key element in 
national economic growth” (Lundvall 2010: 6). The idea that technological change and 
innovation process constitute the main determinants of national economy’s prosperity 
has been globally recognized. Some national governments acknowledged it earlier; 
some countries recognized it later. As Freeman and Perez point out, not all countries 
equally succeed in the technological race. (Lundvall 2010: 5)  
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The power of influence that the governments have on the efficiency and 
competitiveness of their national innovation systems is often underestimated. Apart 
from the maintenance of R&D system, a large number of public policies need to be 
implemented, comprising such diversified fields as “education and training, competition 
and trade, and industrial and regional development”. (OECD 2011: 179) The main 
sectors of governmental responsibility comprise procuring the availability of well-
educated working force; adjusting state scientific organizations to the requirements of 
the national business and current global technological standards; stimulating investment 
of the private sector in R&D activities; supporting and encouraging the creation of 
“competitive innovation-oriented industries”; ensuring infrastructural assistance to start-
up companies; establishing “global opportunities through international cooperation”; 
and strengthening and promoting “regional innovation potential”. The efficiency and 
consistency of these complex measures matter the most for policy makers. (OECD 
2011: 179) 
 
The above-mentioned mix of actions composes the innovation policy, through which 
the state regulates the performance of its NIS. Edquist (2001: 19–20) argues that an 
imitation mechanism has become an integral part of policy-making in many countries. 
The imitation produces a copycat effect, which is visible for instance in numerous 
national technological development programmes, especially in the fields of “IT, new 
materials or biotechnology”. As a result of blind copying, the nation specific NIS 
features are often disregarded. (Edquist 1997: 38) 
 
The concept of national system of innovation emphasizes the importance of such 
aspects as institutional efficiency and performance for the national economic growth 
and sustainability in a long perspective. (Niosi 2002: 300) Proper understanding of how 
other systems of innovation operate could help promote a cross border “institutional 
learning” and prevent blind copying of foreign strategies. A weakness of Eastern 
European economies in comparison with the Western ones lies in the problem of 
“understanding of the workings of the ‘real market economies’ in relation to 
innovation”. (Lundvall 2010: 5) 
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2.2.4 Assessment and Measurement of NIS 
 
National systems of innovation are often subjects to measurements and comparisons. 
Initially the analysis of efficiency of policies and technology performance across OECD 
member countries was based on measuring inputs (such as R&D expenditure and the 
number of researches) and outputs (as patents, for instance). Apart from OECD, such 
organizations as Eurostat and the National Science Board also applied the number of 
population and the amount of GDP (Gross domestic product) to calculate the national 
wealth, correlation of GDP to GERD (Gross Expenditure on Research and 
Development) to find out the country’s R&D intensity, and the quantity of scientific 
articles and citations to measure the scientific impact. Through measuring inputs, 
outputs and processes, common for the system, performance indicators were 
constructed. They are often used to rank actors of an innovation system and to inform 
decision makers. (Katz 2006: 893–894)  
 
After a while the weaknesses of such an approach became obvious. Although these 
tangible criteria offer useful information about the content and direction of 
technological development, they cannot be applied to evaluate how efficiently 
“economically useful knowledge” is produced, diffused and exploited within a national 
system of innovation. Moreover, these quantitative indicators tend to overlook the 
fundamental determinants of NIS, to which belongs a seamless transfer of knowledge 
and information among the actors of a system, as well as their constant interaction at 
various stages of an innovation process. (Lundvall 2010: 6, OECD 1997: 9) 
 
Eventually, as a result of transformations in the character and environment of 
innovations, it became obvious that new indicators were needed to reflect these 
transformations and place the appropriate “tools of analysis” at policy makers’ disposal. 
(OECD 2005: 3) A significant amount of research was performed between the 1980s 
and 1990s to create models and establish analytical frameworks for the study of 
innovation. Following various surveys and attempts to interpret their outcomes, and 
driven by the need for a coherent set of analytic tools and concepts, OECD (1992) 
issued the first edition of Oslo Manual (full title “The Measurement of Scientific and 
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Technological Activities, Proposed Guidelines for Collecting and Interpreting 
Technological Innovation Data”), built around the concept of technological product and 
process (TPP) innovation in manufacturing.  
 
In the second edition in 1996, Oslo Manual updated the scope of concepts, definitions 
and methodology to improve the understanding of innovation process and to cover a 
wider range of industries. Besides a new conceptual framework to collect data on NIS 
performance was elaborated. It identified four categories of factors primarily related to 
innovations. These four categories can be pictured as a map (see Figure 2 below) that 
indicates the areas with the greater advantage for the business sector, but also 
problematic areas, which are to be considered by governments when shaping policy 
initiatives. (OECD 1996: 18–19) 
 
The biggest category of factors influencing innovation forms a part of framework 
conditions. The higher the quality of framework conditions is, the stronger is innovation 
performance that a country displays. These conditions comprise macroeconomic 
stability, basic educational system for the general population, some aspects of the 
legislation such as taxation, intellectual property rights, patent law, access to venture 
markets, communications infrastructure, openness to international trade and foreign 
direct investment. It is these framework conditions that encourage the private sector 
actors to take risks engaging into innovative activities, which have a potential to result 
in considerable profits and benefit society at large. (OECD 1996: 19; OECD 2011: 24) 
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Figure 2. Four categories of factors influencing NIS (OECD 1996: 19) 
 
 
The category of science and engineering base represents the accumulated knowledge 
and S&T institutions that sustain private sector’s innovative activities by providing 
technological training and scientific knowledge. It covers specialized technical training 
and university systems, support system for basic research, public R&D activities, R&D 
in generic technologies. (OECD 1996: 20–21) 
 
The transfer factors are responsible for the quality of formal and informal linkages 
between enterprises, regulatory bodies and institutions; personal networks which 
facilitate the flows of information, cooperation with international experts; personnel 
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mobility; ethics, trust and openness that have impact on the way networks, linkages and 
other channels of communication function; knowledge and skills transmission between 
and within organizations. These factors are highly dependent on the social and cultural 
values of the population. (OECD 1996: 21–22) 
 
The innovation dynamo can be determined as a multi component structure of elements, 
which shape innovation activities at the company level. It includes “dynamic factors 
within or immediately external to the firm and very directly impinging on its 
innovativeness”. (OECD 1996: 22) To these belongs the quality of labour force as a key 
asset for an innovative firm, as well as its specific structural characteristics (How active 
are firm’s competitors on the market? How does a firm manage its finances? Does it 
cooperate with other companies or firms or educational institutions? What internal 
organisational structure does it have?). (OECD 1996: 22) 
 
Defects in any of these categories may hamper policy incentives and produce a 
retroactive effect of the policy instruments. Therefore, in case a country suffers from 
widespread corrupt practices, it can be a very demotivating factor, which makes 
governments unwilling to give direct subsidies to private enterprises. Cumulatively, 
“flawed framework conditions can lead to distorted policy responses”. (OECD 2011: 
24) 
 
Several years later, in 2005, OECD issued the third edition of Oslo Manual. It 
introduced the expanded framework of innovation measurement: greater emphasis was 
placed on “the role of linkages” between companies and organisations, which constitute 
a part of the innovation system. Moreover, it highlighted that innovative activities 
should be fostered not only in high-tech sectors, but also in services and low-technology 
manufacturing. At present the OECD Oslo Manual has been worldwide accepted as the 
key guideline for assessing country’s innovative development. (OECD 2005: 10–11)  
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2.3 Innovation Communication and Its Role in Innovation Systems 
 
To date innovation has been universally recognized as the key factor for economic 
growth, organizational reforms, societal progress and the main source of 
competitiveness. (Ackermann 2013, Nordfors 2009, Porter 2002, Mast, Huck & Zerfass 
2005). Innovations are often referred to as “ecosystems of dynamic multichannel 
networks” of different stakeholders, representatives of academia, business and 
government “where the dynamic process of innovation creation and experimentation 
takes place”. (Luoma-aho & Halonen 2010: 4) The term “ecosystem” builds upon the 
notion of “interconnectedness” between all the players of a system, which enables 
exchange, interaction and crosspollinations of ideas. Innovation does not exist without 
social connections, seamless circulation of information and communication. Without 
these intangible assets innovation ecosystem cannot thrive and flourish. (Jansen et al. 
2006, Ruppel & Harington 200, quoted in Luoma-aho & Halonen 2010: 4) 
 
Numerous studies on innovation cover its various attributes and classifications; provide 
analysis of best practices and framework conditions. However, such important aspect of 
innovation as communication of innovative products and services has until recently 
been disregarded. Innovation communication as a field of academic research first drew 
the attention of the German scientific community. (Zerfass & Huck 2007, Brem et al. 
2010, Eberl 2009, Vetter 2007, quoted in Ackermann 2013: 3) Alongside German 
scientists, the importance of innovation communication has been acknowledged and 
analysed in the articles of David Nordfors and his colleagues from VINNOVA Stanford 
Research Center of Innovation Journalism, including several Finnish researches such as 
Vilma Luoma-aho and Saara Halonen from the University of Jyväskylä. (Luoma-aho & 
Halonen 2010)  
 
In the articles of the above mentioned researches, innovation communication is defined 
as “systemically planned, executed and evaluated communication of innovations” with 
an objective to promote a better understanding of the complex issues of innovations, 
build trust towards them and organizations from where innovations originate. (Mast, 
Huck & Zerfass 2005: 3) Being a “bridging activity” among the various actors of an 
 36 
innovation ecosystem, communication “co-creates social meanings and facilitates 
cooperation”. (Grunig 2006, Health 2006, quoted in Luoma-aho & Halonen 2010: 10) 
Apart from being an instrument of sharing and spreading of new information, 
innovation communication has been proven to be responsible for creating the image of 
the innovation as well. (Mast, Huck & Zerfass 2005: 5) 
 
On a company level innovation communication fulfils different functions. For internal 
stakeholders it is the main instrument to raise general awareness of innovation and 
promote an innovation culture (Zerfass & Huck 2007, Benner & Tushman 2003, quoted 
in Ackermann 2013: 4), enhance personnel motivation, loyalty and retention (Greg 
2012, Scott 2001 as quoted in Ackermann 2013: 4), as well as “cross-pollinates ideas” 
throughout different stages of innovation process. (Estrin 2009 as quoted in Ackermann 
2013: 4) External innovation communication is focused on creation of a favourable and 
innovative image of an organization (Zboralski & Gemünden 2009, quoted in 
Ackermann 2013: 4) and building confidence among all the actors involved on 
individual and organizational level to scale down anxiety and gain confidence of the 
external parties (Luoma-aho & Halonen 2010; Zerfass & Huck 2007, quoted in 
Ackermann 2013: 4).  
 
Given the complex nature of innovations (novel, complex and have low degree of 
connectivity), their introduction often entails high level of uncertainty and lack of trust. 
As negative emotions tend to overcome the feelings of curiosity and interest about the 
novelty, the overarching goal of innovation communication is to “build trust in the 
innovation” and to dispel doubts of potential risks and negative effects. (Zerfass et al., 
2004, quoted in Maisch et al. 2011: 3, 21) Communication facilitates establishing trust-
based relations on both levels: between individual actors of the system and between 
institutions and industries. (Luoma-aho & Halonen 2010: 10) The earlier building of a 
trusting relationship with target groups and stakeholders is established, the higher are 
chances of innovation communication to be effective and the innovation to succeed. At 
the same time a successful communication strategy should transcend the product and 
relationship levels, and develop an active approach of building trust on a bigger scale, in 
relation to both the company as a trusted innovator and the innovation sector in general. 
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(Maisch et al. 2011: 21)  
 
Flawless interaction and shared knowledge between all members of an innovation 
ecosystem ensure its overall success. This can be achieved only if information on 
innovations is spread not only among the specialist community, but also within broader 
social groups. (Mast, Huck & Zerfass 2005: 3) Outreach activities to inform on 
innovations are impossible outside the media channels. Since media is a major source 
and producer of information within all spheres of modern life, it has significantly gained 
on influence in setting the “public agenda” and defining the major topics of the day. 
“The media cannot tell you what to think, but they can affect what you think”. (Sandred 
2005: 7) Therefore it is the media that set “a standard for public discussion” and create 
shared knowledge between different sectors and organizations within the innovation 
system. (Nordfors 2004: 3)  
 
Considering the challenges that innovations per se present, the way they should be 
communicated differs significantly from general topics coverage. There is a consensus 
opinion among journalists and communication experts about several criteria of 
successful presentation of innovations. Above all, innovations should be put into a 
context of current situation, which can be applied as a frame of reference to it. 
Technical aspects of innovations are interesting only for a narrow circle of specialists 
and hardly for a wide audience that is why innovations should be illustrated by means 
of “easy-to-grasp” concrete examples, which help to reduce innovation complexity. 
These examples can include specific impacts and benefits that an innovation brings to 
its target audiences. Apart from connecting innovations to the context and illustrating 
their applications and advantages, innovations should also be „packaged“ into a story, 
which highlights their human or emotional links. The goal here is to personalise and 
visualise an innovation through connecting it to a certain image, sharing an interesting 
story about innovation’s inventor, its origin, or a way the adoption of a concrete 
innovation influenced company development. When summarized, “the keys to 
successful innovation communication are topicality, reduction of complexity, and 
presentation of benefits”. (Mast, Huck & Zerfass 2005: 9, 10–11)  
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It has been argued that due to digitalization of the mass media and the increasing 
influence of Internet on socio-political tendencies across the world, our societies have 
undergone major transformations and have entered the era of “attention economy” 
where attention becomes the object of consumption replacing traditional products and 
services, and “understanding and managing attention is now the single most important 
determinant of business success” (Davenport & Beck 2001, quoted in Luoma-aho, 
Uskali & Weinstein 2009: 4). Attention economy is particularly difficult for innovators 
“as the survival and success of their innovations is influenced ever more by what 
publics and stakeholders perceive it to be”. (Troshani & Doolin 2007, quoted in Luoma-
aho & Halonen 2010: 7)  
 
As attention becomes a limited and treasured asset, the role of “attention workers” 
(journalists, PR and marketing managers, advertisers, lobbyists) and their influence 
increase. Attention workers, who generate and broker information on a professional 
basis, are primarily responsible for creating ties between different actors of the 
innovation system, “cultivating an innovation-friendly culture” along with setting the 
agenda for innovations. (Nordfors 2006, quoted in Luoma-aho & Halonen 2010: 5) 
Since reputation in innovation systems is often a decisive benchmark, which determines 
social relations and transactions, it is within responsibilities of attention workers to 
create and sustain their good reputation and the reputation of an innovation they 
represent. (Luoma-aho & Halonen 2010: 5)  
 
Innovation communication is fundamentally to pave the way for an unhindered 
research, development and implementation of innovative processes, services and 
products. As any other object of communication, innovations are to be introduced “as 
concrete, comprehensible and oriented towards the stakeholders as possible”. Due to the 
particular nature of innovations, their complexity, novelty and therefore inability to 
present proven impacts and applications, they require a different communicative 
approach. This approach through mechanisms of personalization and visualisation 
displays particular advantages of innovations for potential users and presents them in “a 
way that they can be experienced and felt”. (Mast, Huck & Zerfass 2005: 10–11) 
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3. INNOVATION POLICY OF RUSSIA 
 
This chapter is dedicated to the particularities of the innovation policy of Russia, which 
are analysed from the point of view of NIS approach. Thus, the stages of the system 
development and its current trends are examined from the perspective of its national 
distinctive features and the historical preconditions, which are also reflected in the 
policy governance structure and the Russian population attitudes towards the 
innovations per se. A particular focus is put on the strategic policy documents, both 
long and short term oriented, which proposes various scenarios of the country’s 
innovation-driven development up to 2020 (Strategy-2020) as well as concrete 
innovative projects, which have already been launched (Go Russia!). 
 
 
3.1 The Russian National Innovation System: Current Trends and Path-Dependencies 
 
Innovation policy is a relatively new instrument of governmental “interventions in 
favour of R&D, new technologies, and the diffusion of new products and processes” 
(Rammer 2006: 265). The role of innovation policy cannot be underestimated as, if 
designed properly, it is the primary and determinant resource of a sustainable 
technological performance of a country. It is also responsible for attracting and 
detaining international investments in the country’s R&D sector. A successful 
innovation policy is characterized by its capacity to respond duly to the changes in the 
political, institutional and business environment within the country as well as to the 
outside global challenges. Thus it includes “all governmental activities aiming at 
promoting and accelerating technical progress, creating and disseminating new findings, 
technologies and skills […] and effectively using them in economy and society”. (Jaffe 
et al. 2002, Laredo & Mustar 2001, quoted in Rammer 2006: 266) 
 
In the age of continuous aggravation of globalized competition and struggle for markets, 
Russian government is pursuing a vision that the primary objective of the Russian 
innovation policy is to provide efficient instruments to foster technological 
modernization of all branches of industry and services sector. (Innovative development: 
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National Report 2008: 59–60) In a more comprehensive sense, Russian innovation 
policy represents a cross-sectoral mergence, uniting several sectorial policies such as 
science, technology and innovation policies (see Table 1.).  
 
 
Table 1. Interconnection between science, technology and innovation policies          
          (Innovative Development: National Report 2008: 61) 
 
 
Interconnection between science, technology and innovation policies 
 
Science Policy 
Objective: generation of scientific knowledge 
Instruments: competitive grants, state institutes, tax incentives for companies, 
intellectual property rights (IPR) protection 
 
Technology Policy 
Objective: development of industrial technology trends 
Instruments: public procurement, subsidies, cooperation, standards, foresight, HR 
 
Innovation Policy 
Objective: upgrading the level and results of innovative activity  
Instruments: competition policy, corporate legislation, regional and sectoral clusters, 
consumer protection, environmental regulation, foresight  
 
 
 
Only a well-balanced comprehensive set of measures within these “three policies”, 
determined by the present-day socio-economical objectives, can guarantee perceptible 
improvement of the situation and successful outcome. In view of the current challenges 
the focus of government regulation measures is shifted towards the technology (or 
industrial) policy. (Innovative Development: National Report 2008: 61) 
 
In terms of instruments the present Russian innovation policy incorporates “competent 
actors” (small and big companies, research universities, public research institutes) and 
“supporting institutions and measures”, among which some are “insufficiently co-
ordinated”, “some are still experimental, and others lack critical mass”. (OECD 2011: 
14) Recent institutional changes in the policy governance may play a role of a 
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development trigger, especially, if those changes are endorsed by “efforts to break with 
the top-down tradition in policy implementation and to build more distributed, co-
ordinated and adaptive governance structures at lower policy levels”. (OECD 2011: 14) 
 
Despite the new instruments of innovation policy (market incentives, the modern 
technical and financial innovation infrastructure, progress in legal environment) the 
current Russian innovation system still comprises the elements of the Soviet centrally 
planned system. This includes large government sector of science, predominant federal 
support for R&D, top-down decision-making and governance. (Dezhina 2011: 92)  
 
According to statistics, in 2008 governmental R&D agencies and institutions carried out 
74% of all R&D activities in Russia, while only 14% of R&D was performed by private 
sector. As to be compared with the data of the EU countries: the same year public R&D 
organizations conducted only 8% of R&D in the United Kingdom, 11% in the United 
States, and 16% in France. (Dezhina 2011: 92) 
 
In 2008, Russia’s gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) accounted for 1,03% of 
the country’s GDP, as compared to 2%, during the late Soviet period and 1,28%, during 
the prosperous year 2003 (see Appendix 1). Today Russia ranks on the 29th place for its 
GERD/GPD ratio in the Global Innovation Index 2013 (where Israel ranks the 1st, 
Finland the 2nd, China the 25th and Brazil the 34th). This can be explained by two facts. 
First of all, Russian economy is still in an emerging stage of development as compared 
to the knowledge-based economies, which have a tendency to spend more on R&D to 
keep pace with technological progress. Secondly, Russian economy is characterized by 
its industrial structure with dominating extracting industries, which have traditionally 
low R&D incentives. (OECD 2011: 101–102) 
 
Another important aspect to be mentioned is a low innovative activity of the Russian 
business sector. In 2009 only 8% of the companies were involved in technological 
innovation, while in Germany the respective share was 64%, in Finland 47%, and in the 
Czech Republic 39%. (Dezhina 2011: 92) Russian enterprises show little interest and 
motivation to invest in innovations. They mainly focused on the local market, which is 
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characterized by lower risks of competition, easier entry barriers in comparison with the 
international markets, which attract only 2–3% of Russian industry. Such business 
model fails to stimulate long-term investments in science and technology. Subsequently, 
innovation activities of the majority of Russian enterprises (66,7%) are limited to 
purchasing of machinery and equipment, which provides access to adoption of new 
technologies (see Figure 3 below). (Dezhina 2011: 92) 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Percentage of innovative industrial enterprises engaged in selected types of  
                innovation supporting activity in 2008 in Russia (OECD 2011: 134)  
 
 
Moreover, the innovation intensity in percentage of total sales, as well as financial 
results of investments in innovations in Russia remains on a very low level (1,9% in 
Russia as compared with 5,5% in Sweden and 4,6% in Germany). During the period 
1995–2009 innovation products constitute only 5–6% of total sales. (Gokhberg & Roud 
2012: 122) 
 
At the same time, a low level of investments in technological innovations of Russian 
companies can also be explained by the inability of Russian R&D organizations to offer 
to business the required technological solutions at the necessary standards of quality, 
novelty and competitiveness. All these factors have led to a decrease of business share 
in Russian GERD from 33% to 27% during the last decade, while for the OECD 
countries these indicators remain on average at 65%. Finally, the follow-up model of 
technological development has resulted in deterioration of the linkages among the actors 
of Russia NIS, leading to the scarce number of “new-to-market innovative products” 
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(0,8% of the total industry sales compared to 6,3% in Finland). (Gokhberg & Roud 
2012: 122) 
 
 The efficiency of an innovation policy can be evaluated by the diversity of the system 
regulation measures and correlation of direct regulation instruments (such as public 
subsidies, for instance) with indirect incentives for private businesses, involved in high-
risk innovation projects. As it is shown in the Appendix 2, the types of regulation 
instruments, implemented by the Russian government, cover a wide spectrum of policy 
aspects and fully correspond to the best world practices and recommendations. 
However, the closer analysis shows that these instruments are considerably outweighed 
by the direct state financial support instead of indirect incentives, which are considered 
to be more effective for fostering business innovation activity. (Innovative 
development: National Report 2008: 81–82) 
 
Structural disbalance and technological underdevelopment of the economy, low 
innovation capacities of companies, and insufficient output of the R&D sector threaten 
to undermine Russia’s global positions. The current problems and bottlenecks of the 
national innovation system are of systemic nature and require a comprehensive program 
of reforms. (Innovative development: National Report 2008: 83–84) 
 
Lots of innovation strategies have been elaborated to change the situation. The 
government has already made available a number of modern policy instruments, 
including tax allowances, new schemes of financing innovations through development 
institutions, and infrastructural projects, technoparks, special economic zones. Despite 
the high number, their output is insignificant. This is mainly due to the continuing 
inconsistent policy of the Russian government, which seldom supports its numerous 
initiatives for a long time. The initiative to create centres of transfer at regional 
universities, for instance, has kept federal financing and attention only for three years. 
Similar situation happened to technoparks and IT-parks initiatives. (OECD 2011: 180) 
 
In 2009 Federal Target Programmes (FTPs), viewed as the main financial instrument of 
public funds allocation and state regulation in the field of science and innovation, were 
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initiated. However, it turned out that FTP performance indicators were inconsistent with 
the desired goals. Among the major reasons for this were unsteady public funding, low 
rates of return on investments, excessive bureaucratization of the decision-making 
process, and as a result marginal participation of private companies in co-financing and 
usage of FTP’s findings. In 2010–2011 the Government shifted its attention to a new 
initiative of Technological Platforms; one year later than the investments were sharply 
redirected to the project of Innovative Clusters. (Innovative development: National 
Report 2008: 71–75) 
 
According to the national analysts, the low output of the most of governmental 
initiatives in the field of innovation and economic development has been largely due to 
the lack of coordination among the governmental ministries and agencies as 
commissioners of the programs. The complicated interministerial structure of the 
majority of the programs is the main factor, which impedes the success of their 
implementation. 
 
Besides that, the priorities of the Russian innovation policy change almost every second 
year. Meanwhile, innovation projects usually take up to 5–7 years to bring the first 
results. As a result of short-term initiatives, many projects remain uncompleted and 
investments lost. (Innovative development: National Report 2008: 70–77, OECD 2011: 
180–181) 
 
3.1.1 Societal Aspects of Innovations in Russia  
 
The progressive word “modernization” has taken hold of the Russian political discourse 
since September 2009, when then President Dmitry Medvedev entered the office and 
asked rhetorically: “Should we drag a primitive economy based on raw materials and 
endemic corruption into the future?” The definite answer “No!” as well as his views on 
the future development of Russia followed in the program article “Go, Russia!” and 
later in November 2009 in his Address to the Federal Assembly. (Krawatzek 2011: 26) 
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The growing impact of this innovative political discourse becomes evident through the 
contextual analysis of the Russian press. According to Jukka Pietiläinen (2011: 27), 
who is researching on the nature of the Russian modernisation process, “modernization 
was mentioned over 300 000 times in 2010 as compared to 200 000 times in 2009 or 
2008, or to merely 150 000 times in 2005”. In his article Pietiläinen draws parallels 
between a sudden popularity of the word modernisation with the revolutionary role that 
the words perestrojka (transformation) and glasnost (transparency) played in the Russia 
media the middle 1990s. 
 
The researcher Katri Pynnöniemi (2011: 25) compares the current innovation zeal with 
the “campaign for industrialization” in 1920s and modernisation processes, imposed by 
Peter the Great in the early XVIII century and the ardent debates of “Westernizers” and 
“Slavophiles” about a pro-European or unique Russian path of development for the 
country. Every period of Russian history has its particularities, and what unites them all 
when it comes to reforms is not the wellbeing of its citizens, but “first and foremost 
Russia’s prestige as a great power”. Despite substantial reserves of natural resources, 
the country’s leadership has realized that if Russia does not diversify its economy in the 
nearest future, it will find itself in “a weaker position that it may accept”. (Pynnöniemi 
2011: 25) 
 
While political elites are enthusiastically speaking about technological breakthroughs 
and industrial efficiency, Russian people understand modernization quite differently. In 
March 2008 the Russian Public Opinion Research Centre (further WCIOM) held an 
opinion poll addressed to the views of the Russians on innovations, their influence on 
the general well-being of the country and future prospects for Russia. Every second 
respondent (53 %) could not provide any answer. For the 27% of respondents 
innovations meant any kind of novelty, while 15% associated the introduction of 
modern technologies with them in the first place. Fewer were those who believed that 
innovations represent the usage of scientific achievements (3 %) or the investment in 
promising sectors of economy, or social changes and specific developments (each 
criterion by 1%). (WCIOM 2008) 
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However, more than a half of the respondents (55%) assumed that innovations could 
help to enhance economic development and improve social life in the country. Such an 
optimistic point of view was more characteristic of the young people than of the older 
generation (65% among 18–24 year-olds, 56–59% among 25–59 year-olds and 41% in 
the group of "60+"). There are also 16% of the pessimists in whose opinion innovations 
would not fundamentally improve their lives. 62% agreed that innovations are an 
essential prerequisite for the future prosperity of the country, with which 14% of the 
respondents cannot agree. There is a consensus of opinion of 60% of Russians that 
innovations require maximum investment at present, the gains will offset the 
investments, while 14% call it “a waste of money”. 56% of respondents believe that the 
role of innovations will increase, as they will be implemented in all sectors of economy 
(according to 16%, this tendency will not become a frequent practice). Innovations 
should be introduced in all sectors simultaneously, confirm 28% of respondents. Among 
the sectors, which are in need of innovations, the respondents named manufacturing 
industry (19%), agriculture (16%), medicine (14 %), science and education (10%). Such 
branches as social sector (4%), construction of housing and roads (3%), business (2%), 
energy, electronics and environmental protection (each 1%) require the least of 
innovations in the view of the Russians. (WCIOM 2008) 
 
Other surveys indicate that the Russians tend to associate modernization more with 
social and political reforms rather than with technological developments. Thus, 
modernization for the Russians is “equality before the law and observation of human 
rights” (41%), “fight against corruption” (38%), “social fairness and justice” (31%), 
“effective innovative economy” (24%), but also “renewal of Russian values and 
traditions” (14%) and “creating opportunities for free enterprise and market 
competitions (12%). (Pietiläinen 2011: 27) Medvedev’s campaign for modernization 
was subjected to a criticism on behalf of the scientific community, opposition members 
and Russian population, all united by the argument that the main prerequisite for 
innovation-driven economic development of Russia is drastic reforms of the current 
political and administrative regime of the country. (Pynnöniemi 2011: 25) That is why 
the elimination of corrupt bureaucratic practices, reinforcement of the democratic 
practices and policies as well as the instruments of free market economy are paramount 
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objectives to be attained in the first instance. Nonfulfillment of these requirements may 
lead to a failure of any attempt to modernize Russian economy. (Pynnöniemi 2011: 25) 
 
The divergent interpretation of modernization by Russian authorities and common 
people demonstrates that modernization from above, focused on financial support of 
specific industry sectors or “vertical modernization”, as Igor Yurgens defines it, is 
hardly able to “renew” Russian economy and ensure its sustainable development. Only 
through “horizontal modernization”, which implies systemic modernization of all public 
and state institutions, together with deep transformation of political culture, the 
government can achieve long-term objectives of economic and social welfare in Russia. 
(Yurgens 2011: 24)  
 
3.1.2 Historical Preconditions and Stages of Development  
 
Despite the similarity of core principles and objectives, every country demonstrates its 
own distinctive approaches in elaborating its innovation policy. These distinctions are 
essentially conditioned by particular historical inheritance and its influence on country’s 
economic, social and political systems. In case of Russia, with its specific geopolitical 
position, distinctive cultural character and strong allegiance to the Soviet system, this 
pattern is especially relevant. (OECD 2011: 180) 
 
After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, where science and technology policy was 
mainly built around military industry, the country has undergone radical 
transformations of its constitutive systems. At present Russia is struggling to overcome 
the legacy of a central planned economy and to adjust to the standards of an innovation-
oriented market economy. This transition is particularly challenging, given the fact that 
during the 1990s Russian authorities, preoccupied with the harsh socio-economic 
difficulties, failed to include innovation policy and economic modernization to the list 
of the national priorities. Due to the increased oil prices and economic upturn in early 
2000s, the government could finally switch its S&T policy “from a survival to a 
consolidation/renewal mode, with an effort to concentrate new resources on selected 
institutions, sectors, technologies and sites.” (OECD 2011: 180) 
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The first attempts to formulate Russian innovation policy were made in 1997–1998, 
although at that time the State Duma (Russian Parliament) did not accept the draft 
concept and declined it a status of an official document. Nevertheless, some steps to 
support the innovative potential of the country were made much earlier in response to 
the considerable political and economic changes of Perestroika and a drastic decrease of 
the public funding for scientific research.  (Ivanov et al. 2006: 126, 130) 
 
According to the recent OECD Review of Innovation Policy of the Russian Federation 
(2011: 182–184), Russian science, technology and innovation policies have undergone 
three fundamental stages of development (for more details see Appendix 3): 
 
1. “Turbulent restructuring, with early experimentation of new innovation policy 
approaches” (1991–1998). The period of rescuing the scientific heritage of the Soviet 
system under the conditions of sharp economic recession and countrywide brain drain 
of S&T specialists. The most successful initiatives included the creation of competitive 
funding organisations: the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (RFBR) and the 
Foundation for the Assistance to Small Innovative Enterprises (FASIE). Regional 
authorities took first steps to develop technology centers and business incubators.  
 
2. “Stabilisation, with significant additions to the innovation policy framework” (1999– 
2003). Improvement of economic situation with a growth of R&D budget by 7% (in 
1999) contributed considerably to the development of new legal frameworks, 
stimulating innovative activities and to the implementation of a large-scale programme 
“Mega Projects”. This programme was aimed at mobilizing Russian scientific 
community to cooperate together with the business sector and to carry out joint projects 
in developing and manufacturing breakthrough technologies.  
 
3. “Consolidation and expansion of the innovation policy framework” (2004 – present 
day). This phase is characterized by adoption of a number of long-term development 
strategies and legislative documents such as the updated Patent Law, part of the Civil 
Code on Intellectual Property Rights. It also includes the implementation of a number of 
Federal Target Programmes (FTPs), administrative restructuring within the Ministries 
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responsible for development and implementation of the innovation policy, measures to 
promote innovative activities among high education institutions, creation of a series of 
large state-owned technology-oriented corporations (ROSNANO, ROSCOSMOS) to 
support Russian new technologies on the global markets. In order to stimulate 
participation of universities in research and innovation, the government has established 
a network of Federal Universities. Since 2009, innovation has become a new 
“buzzword” in the political rhetoric of Russian leadership. Every Ministry involved in 
implementation of the innovation policy has elaborated its own strategy of 
modernization. A considerable financial support was allocated to create new centres of 
excellence, technoparks, Special Economic Zones and Technological Platforms.  
 
However, considering the amount of financial investments and administrative support 
from the government, Skolkovo Innovation Centre, which will be discussed in more 
details in Chapter 4, has become the flagship project of the modern Russian innovation 
policy. 
 
3.1.3 Legal Aspects of Policy Regulation 
 
During the Soviet times all relations in the field of science were managed by the special 
regulatory acts and normative regulatory acts within the general legislation. The first 
cornerstone of the basis of the Russian scientific legislation was laid in 1996 with the 
enactment of the Federal Law N 127-FZ “On Science and State Scientific and Technical 
Policy”. At that time innovations were not considered as the priority area of the national 
interests that is why the Law was focused on regulation of the relations between the 
subjects of scientific and technological activities, leaving out such aspects as practical 
application of the scientific findings as well as their commercialization. In 1999 the 
Federation Council prepared and approved a draft of the Federal Law “On Innovative 
Activities and State Innovation Policy”, which was rejected by the President in January 
2000. Until recently, the Russian system of laws and regulations disposed no general 
law regulating innovative activities on the federal level. However, many regions and 
municipal entities have adopted their own laws, for instance the Law “On Innovation 
Activities in Tomsk Region” adopted in 2008, the Law “On Innovative Activities in 
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Lipetsk Region” adopted in 2011. Yet these laws have no common methodological 
basis and differ from each other conceptually, which leads to terminological confusion 
and inconsistency with the international standards. (Ivanov & Ivanova 2011: 55, 85) 
 
Since the famous speech of Dmitry Medvedev during his budget message in June 2010, 
in which he announced the development of innovations in Russia as one of the main 
objectives of its fiscal policy, support for innovations has become a priority in 
determining the vector of the state policy. This emphasis contributed significantly to the 
improvement of the legal instruments of the regulation in the sector of R&D and 
innovations. (Kuzmina 2011:68) 
 
Thus, the Federal Law N 254-FZ “On Amending the Federal Law “On Science and 
State Scientific and Technical Policy”” dated 21.07.2011 has finally formalized in 
legislation the conceptual framework of the innovation activities. According to the 
amendments, the Federal Law N 127-FZ dated 23.08.1996 “On Science and State 
Scientific and Technical Policy” has been revised to include the Chapter IV on the state 
measures of support for the innovative activities and to introduce in the Article 2 such 
key categories as: 
 
“Commercialization of scientific and (or) R&D findings - activity to 
involve scientific and (or) R&D findings into economic turnover. 
 
Innovation is a new or a significantly improved product (goods, 
services) or a process, a new sales method or a new organizational 
method introduced in business practice, workplace organization or 
external relations. 
 
Innovative project is complex of activities aimed to achieve an 
economic profit through implementation of innovations, including the 
commercialization of scientific and (or) R&D findings. 
 
Innovative infrastructure is a complex of organizations that contribute 
to the implementation of innovative projects, including the provision 
of administrative, material, technical, financial, informative, HR and 
organizational consulting services. 
 
Innovative activities are the activities (including scientific, 
technological, organizational, financial and commercial activities) 
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aimed at implementation of innovative projects, as well as at creation 
of an innovative infrastructure and its operating.” (Federal Law of the 
Russian Federation dated 21 July 2011 N 254-FZ “On Amending the 
Federal Law “On Science and State Scientific and Technical Policy”” 
2011: 3) 
 
The definitions have drawn certain criticism on behalf of the researchers and policy-
makers. For instance, Elena Kuzmina (2011) claims that it is inaccurate to include the 
activities “aimed at creation of an innovative infrastructure” in the term of “innovative 
activities”, since the activities to develop innovations are carried out under totally 
different legal basis and by different parties, than the activities to support innovations. 
In case the activities to support innovations are considered as innovative activities, it 
may facilitate financial misapplications and encourage corrupt practices. Moreover, the 
researcher criticizes the concept of “innovation project” as unnecessary, as it duplicates 
the meaning of “innovative activities”, which are aimed at developing innovations and 
receiving profit from their commercialization. The term innovative project should be 
understood not as activities, but rather as a program of their implementation, a set of 
project documents to be submitted for governmental support. Another weak point of the 
amendments is a definition of innovation itself, given that it acknowledges only one of 
its characteristics, which is the novelty. (Kuzmina 2011: 68–70) As to be compared with 
the definition given in Finland’s National Innovation Strategy, which is much more 
precise and reflects in a more comprehensive way the intangible nature of innovations 
and innovative activities: 
 
“Innovation refers to a utilised competence-based competitive 
advantage. A competence-based competitive advantage can emerge 
from scientific research, technology, business models, service 
solutions, design, brands or methods of organising work and 
production. <…> Capitalised as innovations, competence based 
competitive advantages promote the advancement of businesses, 
society and wellbeing.” (Government’s Communication on Finland’s 
National Innovation Strategy to the Parliament 2009: 4)  
 
While European Commission glossary provides a definition, which is quite similar to 
the Russian variant: 
“An innovation is the implementation of a new or significantly 
improved product (good or service), or process, a new marketing 
 52 
method, or a new organisational method in business practices, 
workplace organisation or external relation. The minimum 
requirement for an innovation is that the product, process, marketing 
method or organisational method must be new (or significantly 
improved) to the firm.” (Glossary of the European Commission). 
 
Although the amended federal law "On Science and State Scientific and Technical 
Policy" regulates all relations in the sector of innovations and public support measures, 
it strangely omits such important terms as “innovation policy” and “innovation system”. 
One of the most important amendments of the Law is the Chapter IV. It provides the 
definition of the term “Government support for innovation” and enlists possible support 
measures, which conform to the legislation of the Russian Federation. (Federal Law of 
the Russian Federation dated 21 July 2011 N 254-FZ “On Amending the Federal Law 
‘On Science and State Scientific and Technical Policy’” 2011: 5–6) 
 
Despite a number of terminological inconsistencies, the amended Federal Law “On 
Science and State Scientific and Technical Policy” has contributed to the legislative 
consolidation of the main terms related to innovative activities, which is an important 
step that Russian government made to fulfil its commitment to improve innovative 
environment in the country. (Kuzmina 2011: 70). 
 
 
3.2 The System of Innovation Policy Governance 
 
Based on the results of the analysis conducted by OECD experts, an efficient system of 
innovation policy governance should exhibit the following characteristics: “legitimacy, 
coherence, stability, adaptability, and ability to steer and give direction” (OECD 2011: 
195). Since late 2000s, when innovation became a top-level priority of the national 
political agenda, the legitimacy of innovation policy has been associated with the direct 
interference of the “highest” governmental authorities, specifically of the president or 
prime minister. Such “a top-down approach” is logically expected to provide a better 
coherence and “ability to steer and give direction” to the policy. However, due to the 
inconsistency of the activities of the relevant ministries and agencies, it has resulted in 
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“multiple and partly competing strategic visions” and “overlapping initiatives”. (OECD 
2011: 195). 
 
The state system of management of scientific and innovative activities evolved during 
2002–2010 and it is still the subject to regular transformations. The system comprises 
(see Figure 4) policy, operational and research levels. On the policy level: the President 
and Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, on the executive side, legislative 
authorities of the Russian Parliament (the State Duma and the Council of Federation), 
which are responsible for the “overall policy guidance and supervision”, and executive 
bodies (federal ministries, agencies and services, regional authorities) that are in charge 
of “detailed policy formulation and implementation”. (OECD 2011: 185) The 
corresponding departments of the Presidential Administration and the Executive Office 
of the Government supervise and coordinate the work of legislative and executive 
bodies. (Ivanov & Ivanova 2011: 53)  
 
The key Ministries responsible for the elaboration of the state innovation policies and 
control over their implementation are the Ministry of Economic Development, the 
Ministry of Education and Science and the Ministry of Industry and Trade. The 
Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Energy also play an 
active role in R&D and innovation policy-making. As a result of a number of re-
centralisation reforms within the system in 2010, the state agencies responsible for 
policy implementation were dissolved and reorganized: the functions of the Federal 
Agency for Science and Innovation (in charge of top priority Federal Targeted 
Programs and federal scientific facilities) as well as the Federal Agency for Education 
were delegated to the Ministry of Education and Science; the functions of the Agency 
for Information Technologies were assumed by the Ministry of Communications and 
Mass Media, and the Federal Agency for the Administration of Special Economic Zones 
adjoined the Ministry of Economic Development. (Mini Country Report/ Russian 
Federation 2011: 2). 
 
The operational level (as indicated in the Figure 4) of the system is composed of several 
funding organizations, the most relevant of which are the Russian Fund of 
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Technological Development (RFTR), the Foundation for Assistance to Small Innovative 
Enterprises (FASIE), the State Corporation for Nanotechnologies (RUSNANO) and the 
Russian Venture Company (RVC). An important input in innovation policy analysis and 
evaluation is attributed to the think-tanks (for instance, the State University – Higher 
School of Economics) and innovation stimulation organizations (like ROSNANO – 
Russian Corporation for Nanotechnologies). (Ivanov & Ivanova 2011: 53–55)  
 
 
 
Abbreviations:  
RFFI – Russian Foundation for Basic Research                   RVC – Russian Venture Company 
RGNF – Russian Foundation for Humanities                       RAN – Russian Academy of Science (RAS) 
RFTR – Russian Fund for Technological Development      NIZ – National Research Centres 
FASIE – Foundation to Assistance to Small Innovative      ROSATOM – State Corporation of Nuclear           
Enterprises                                                                                          Energy 
RUSNANO – Russian Corporation of Nanotechnologies   UAC – United Aircraft Corporation  
 
Figure 4. Innovation Governance in Russia (Mini Country Report/Russian Federation 
         2011: 3) 
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On the level of research performers, the Russian Academy of Science (Rossijskaya 
Akademiya Nauk (RAN)) occupies the leading position. RAN is “a prestigious learning 
society” and a strong R&D institution with its own regional offices: the Urals, Siberian 
and Far Eastern branches. 15% of civil R&D budget is places at RAN disposal. (OECD 
2011: 191).  
 
In summer 2012, the organizational structure underwent several transformations again. 
The two main presidential consultative bodies were reintegrated: the Council for 
Science, Technologies and Education was reorganized into the Council for Science and 
Education, the Presidential Commission for Modernization and Technological 
Development as well as the Governmental Commission on High Technologies and 
Innovations were dissolved and reorganized into one body, the presidential Council for 
Economic Modernization and Innovative Development (Official website of the 
President of Russia 2013). The Governmental Commission, headed by Vladimir Putin 
from 2010 until its reorganization in August 2012, has played an important role as a 
managerial instrument of the legislative authorities. Thus, in March 2012 it made a 
resolution which required government-owned companies to pay 1% of their innovative 
development expenses for the account of the Skolkovo Centre Endowment Fund (as 
expected 30 billion RUB or 766 million USD in 3 years). (FORBES.RU 2012; The 
Governmental Commission on High Technologies and Innovations has been dissolved 
2012) 
 
Due to the constant staff reshuffle as well as organizational transformations, the system 
of management and control over the innovative policy in Russia fails to provide timely 
and responsive managerial decisions and follow up on them. The rigidity of the 
organisational structure obstructs significantly the feedback communication between the 
governmental authorities and the subjects of the policies that they exercise. While 
analytical centres successfully apply the foresight approach to back up the policy-
making initiatives, such tool as policies output evaluation has not been yet fully 
implemented. Additionally, the lack of regular monitoring procedures accounts for the 
insufficiency of information flow about the actual state of affairs on the operational 
level. It equally impedes the assessment of efficiency of the implemented state 
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initiatives and policies. (Ivanov & Ivanova 2011: 53–54; Mini Country Report/Russian 
Federation 2011: 3)   
 
 
3.3 Current Initiatives and Strategic Policy Documents 
 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the major imperative of the Russian 
innovation policy was to preserve the scientific heritage, which was left. After two 
decades of constant transformations in accordance with the criterion of market-oriented 
economy, the country’s innovation policy has been reformulated. Its present-day goals, 
formalized in a number of fundamental documents, constitute a part of our analysis and 
are presented in the following subchapters. 
 
3.3.1 Policy Framework of Science and Technology Development of The Russian 
 Federation up to The Year 2010 and Beyond 
 
Approved in March 2002 by the President of the Russian Federation at a joint meeting 
of the Security Council, the State Council and the Presidential Council for Science and 
High Technology, the Policy framework of science and technology development 
became the fundamental document of the past decade to define the priority research 
areas of the entire science and technology sector. (Ivanov & Ivanova 2011: 15) 
 
The document determined the transition to the innovation-based development as the 
main goal of the Policy and the progress of national science and technology sector as 
one of the top national priorities. In view of the stated goal, the following objectives 
were outlined: 
• Development of basic sciences and applied R&D; 
• Improvement of the governmental regulation system in the field of science and 
technology; 
• Formation of the national innovation system; 
• More efficient application of the results of scientific and technical activities; 
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• Human resources development and retaining within the science and technology 
sector; 
• Integration of science and education; 
• Development of international scientific and technological cooperation. (Policy 
framework of science and technology development of the Russian Federation up to 
the year 2010 and beyond 2002). 
 
Moreover, the provisions of the Policy set up the system of prioritizing, where “focus 
areas in basic sciences are defined by the academic community, and the priority sectors 
in technology and R&D by the President upon recommendations of the Government” 
(Ivanov & Ivanova 2011: 16).  
 
Nevertheless, the progressive ideas of the Policy had not been realized by the 
announced deadlines due to the several policy divergences, which occurred in the years 
2004–2006. The first important policy transformation affected the sector of research and 
development activities, which suffered from considerable restructuring. These reforms, 
aimed at optimizing budget spending on science, resulted mainly in downsizing the 
number of scientists and researchers, as well as the institutes within the Academy of 
Science. The second reform was based on the determination to implement the best 
practices of the developed countries where scientific research is mainly conducted in 
universities. According to that assumption, the Ministry of Science and Education of 
Russia issued the decrees reducing drastically the number of State scientific institutions 
and their property complex, and transferred academic institutions under the jurisdiction 
of universities. All these drastic measures were taken despite the fact that favourable 
situation on the markets of natural resources at that moment was allowing a 
considerable upgrade of R&D sector in order to attain the Policy’s main objective and 
transit to the innovation-driven economy stage. (Ivanov & Ivanova 2011: 49–50).  
 
Being focused on structural reforms, the Government disregarded earlier stated goals, 
among them the formation of a national innovation system and industrial policy, 
elaborating innovation development regional policies. As a result, sub-federal units of 
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the Russian Federation were deprived from contributing to the prepapration and 
implementation of the state scientific and technical policy, which partly demotivated 
regional administrations and businesses from investing in innovative scientific 
programs and projects. The transformations of the Policy resulted in a substantial 
degradation of the performance indicators in the science and technology sector and a 
deterioration of the positive results of the previous period. (Ivanov & Ivanova 2011: 51–
52) 
 
3.3.2 Strategy 2020 
 
In July 2006 back then President Vladimir Putin assigned the Ministry of Economic 
Development to elaborate the Concept of long-term socio-economic development of the 
Russian Federation for the period up to the year 2020. The main objective of the 
Concept was to “define the measures to ensure in a long-term perspective (2008–2020) 
the sustainable increase of welfare of the Russian citizens, national security, dynamic 
economic development, strengthening of Russia's positions in the world community”. 
(Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation 2008: 3) 
 
In November 2008 the Russian Government finally approved the Concept, which 
intrinsically became outdated at the moment of its ratification as the global economic 
crisis badly weakened the Russian economy. Two major factors made it obvious that the 
Concept required a second edition, adapted to the new realities. First of all, the crisis 
caused an abrupt decline of economic indicators and made it impossible to achieve the 
majority of the announced benchmarks that were to be realized in the first period 2007 – 
2012. (Naumov 2011: A6) For instance, during the first stage it was planned to achieve 
some of the following macroeconomic indicators (in 2012 as compared to 2007): 137–
138% of GDP growth, 180–185% of growth of investments in fixed assets, 153–154% 
of growth of population income, 5–6,5% of inflation decline etc. (Ministry of Economic 
Development of the Russian Federation 2008: 27)  
 
Secondly, while the Concept stated the quantitative targets to be achieved by 2020, it 
was considerably lacking a deep analysis of future challenges and deficiencies of the 
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Russian economy and society (especially tax policies and pension reforms). 
Furthermore, the ways to achieve those ambitious economic indicators were formulated 
only declaratively. (Naumov 2011: A6) 
 
The second variant or adaptation of the Concept was initiated in December 2010 by the 
Russian government (with Vladimir Putin as Head of the Government 2008–2012). The 
document, which received a new title “Strategy 2020”, has been prepared by more than 
a thousand of Russian and foreign experts under the guidance of the State University - 
Higher School of Economics and the Russian Presidential Academy of National 
Economy and Public Administration. During less than a year 21 expert groups, each 
responsible of a specific aspect of the socio-economic development of the country, 
reached a conclusion that the only way for Russia to succeed in future was to change its 
economy model and apply a new social policy approach. (Strategiya-2020: Novaya 
model rosta – novaya socialnaya politika 2012)  
 
According to the authors of the Strategy-2020, the economic crisis 2008–2009 
demonstrated that “the previous model of economic growth, which was predominantly 
based on quick expansion of the domestic demand has largely exhausted its potential”. 
The authors claimed that Russia was at the threshold of a new age of finding its own 
way to achieve sustainable and balanced growth, transit to the innovation stage of 
economic development and update its infrastructure to the level of post-industrial 
societies. The country could no longer rely only on the profits from exports of its 
natural resources, as it would condemn it for technological and institutional 
marginalization in global competition. (Strategiya-2020: Novaya model rosta – novaya 
socialnaya politika 2012: 3) 
 
The new 864 pages long Strategy-2020 is a roadmap for modernization of the country’s 
economic, social, political and scientific spheres. The new program has revealed to be 
similar in its goals and objectives to the European Strategy 2020, which obliges 
Member States of the EU to increase investment in R&D up to 3% of GDP and urges to 
recognize innovation policy as a top-priority in the political agenda. (European 
Commission 2010) The Russian Strategy-2020 appeals foremost for activating such 
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element of competitiveness as high quality human capital assets and scientific potential, 
which was omitted in the earlier version. It also proposes a new social policy oriented to 
the interests of the social classes with high potential of innovation-driven growth. 
(Strategiya-2020: Novaya model rosta – novaya socialnaya politika 2012: 3) 
 
The new development model introduces the measures to “remove institutional barriers 
to economic growth”. This model includes improvement of the business and investment 
climate, development of fair competitiveness; eliminating inefficient state regulations, 
fight against corruption and business hostile elements of law enforcement system. The 
authors of the Strategy-2020 take up the position that “only high level of competition 
may create a real demand for innovations, stimulates the economy to transform into 
innovation-driven one”. (Strategiya-2020: Novaya model rosta – novaya socialnaya 
politika 2012: 4) 
 
Innovations play a defining role in the concept of the Strategy-2020, being represented 
by the expert group entitled “Transition from fostering innovation to innovation-based 
growth” with Leonid Gokhberg, Vice-Principal of the State University - Higher School 
of Economics, as a head of it. As a result of numerous meetings with international 
counterparts, conferences and roundtables on the development of innovations in Russia, 
the group has concluded that the current innovation policy requires deep reforms to 
become more integrated and efficient. (Gokhberg 2011a) Along with this it was proven 
that a number of current political initiatives are obstructing the efficiency of innovations 
in Russia such as “bureaucratic administration of tax reductions, custom barriers, public 
procurement and funding of scientific institutions regardless their performance results” 
(Gokhberg 2011b).  
 
3.3.2.1 Three possible scenarios of innovative development 
 
The Concept 2020 presents three basic scenarios of possible development of innovation 
processes in Russia, taking into account estimated internal economic indicators and 
external technological changes. The most advisable among them is the progressive 
scenario that offers an accelerated integration into the global economy. It implies 
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extensive measures for developing and improving business environment, based on 
governmental subsidies along with an active market involvement (see Table 2).  
 
Despite the fact that the progressive scenario implies the highest budget expenditures 
(2,2 trillion RUB or 63 billion USD in 2015 and 3,7 trillion RUB or 105 billion USD in 
2020), it allows to achieve considerably higher target indicators than any other scenario. 
For instance, it enables to reach a triple increase of the volume of the innovation 
products by 2020 (from 5,3% in 2012 and 9,9% in 2015 up to 20,1% in 2020). As 
estimated, within the framework of progressive scenario, modern and effective 
incentive mechanisms would stimulate the growth of private business investments (up 
to 73% by 2020) in innovations and R&D activities. (The Concept 2020 2012: 85–86) 
 
 
Table 2. Progressive scenario (The Concept 2020 2012: 77–78) 
Innovations Comprehensive reforms aimed at development and 
introduction of the instruments to stimulate the demand 
for innovations and support the offer of them.  
Science Comprehensive reforms together with performance 
evaluation of scientific institutions, which should be 
differentiated according to the focus area of research 
activities. 
Manpower training for 
innovation-based economy 
Modernization of educational programs, scientific and 
engineering qualifications. Emphasis on premium 
technical education.    
Institutions, including 
legislation  
Considerable improvement of the institutional conditions: 
• Promotion of fair competition (elimination of corrupt 
practices and reduction of administrative burdens) 
• Increase of tax exemptions and tariff preferences in 
order to promote innovations and ensure long-term 
economic growth. 
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The second scenario envisages a moderate and gradual developing of innovations (see 
Table 3). The main advantage of the moderate scenario is that it requires the lowest 
level of budget expenditures on innovations (1,9 trillion RUB or 54 billion USD in 2015 
and 3 trillion RUB or 85 billion USD in 2020). However, it does not allow the country 
to make a necessary technological break-through and improve considerably its positions 
on the global innovation scale. The estimated proportion of innovation products in the 
total amount of goods and services production would increase moderately (from 5,2 % 
in 2012 up till 12% by 2020), which is insufficient to accomplish the ambitious goals of 
the government for social and economical development. (The Concept 2020 2012: 86) 
  
 
Table 3. Moderate scenario (The Concept 2020 2012: 78) 
Innovations  Employment of extra budgetary funds in innovations 
(forcing innovations in government companies, expulsion 
of old technologies and manufactures); support for 
creative class and favourable economic environment; 
large-scale innovation localization.   
Science • Targeted support for the best students; 
• Pre-emptive support for scientific research in 
academic institutions; 
• Stimulation of government companies to increase 
their investments in R&D activities;   
• Promotion of cooperation among the members of 
national innovation system.  
Manpower training for 
innovation-based economy 
Emphasis on training and retraining of available 
engineers, update of the training programs for engineers 
and researchers with involvement of foreign experts and 
successful Russian businessmen. 
Institutions, including 
legislation  
Gradual development of general economic environment 
and innovation infrastructure.  
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The least advisable is the inertial scenario, which implies maintaining the existing 
tendencies in economy dependent on natural resources and external markets (see Table 
4). It combines high level of government spending and low level of the target indicators, 
which is the result of keeping the ineffective mechanisms of achieving economic 
profitability from public investment in innovations. Thus, by 2020 the share of 
innovation products in the total amount of goods and services production would reach 
only half of the level of the progressive scenario indicators at only 10% difference of 
the overall budget costs (2,1 trillion RUB or 60 billion USD in 2015 and 3,3 trillion 
RUB or 94 billion USD in 2020). (The Concept 2020 2012: 86) 
 
 
Table 4. Inertial scenario (The Concept 2020 2012: 78–79) 
Innovations • Emphasis on situational decisions and soft 
reforms. 
• Adaptation of available technologies. 
Science  Preservation of basic scientific institutions. 
Manpower training for 
innovation-based economy 
Gradual realignment of training programs for 
professional personnel according to the occurring 
demands. 
Institutions, including 
legislation  
Manual control of economy and innovations; pinpoint 
solutions to improve innovation climate. Soft reforms of 
legislation within the framework of traditional law. 
 
 
Despite all complexities and challenges of the progressive scenario, it appears to be the 
most preferable as it allows the country to pull through the technological downfall by 
2020 and overcome budget limitations by substituting the direct governmental 
expenditures on innovations by indirect expenses and private investments. 
Concurrently, it is very unlikely that one of the two extreme scenarios will be 
implemented without combining elements from the moderate scenario, because of the 
high initial and accrued costs of the progressive scenario and the stagnating aspects of 
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the inertial one. It is expected that the governmental policies will be allocated within the 
frames of these three scenarios depending on the rationality of the support provided and 
efficiency of the institutional and systemic measures. (The Concept 2020 2012: 80–86). 
 
3.3.2.2 Conclusions and recommendations  
 
As a result of a yearlong cooperative analysis, the experts of the Innovation Group for 
the Strategy-2020 have ascertained that despite the available potential of human 
resources and scientific achievements, innovative development of Russia is inadequate. 
This inadequacy is reflected in the low rate of innovative activities of Russian 
enterprises, small number of patents, path dependency of Russian science on soviet 
model, lack of cooperation between business and education, state support exclusively 
for high-tech industries instead of diffusion of innovations in all sectors of economy. 
Therefore, the government should primarily support those sectors of economy, which 
have potential or are already represented on the international market and successfully 
compete with other global players. Besides, it is highly recommended to develop the 
instruments of networking cooperation and engage transnational leaders into the 
Russian market of innovations. Another aspect to be improved is a currently low 
demand for innovations on behalf of Russian private sector. For this reason scientific 
and technological complex is to be restructured in order to strengthen its integration 
with business and education (academy). Moreover, the institutional measures to prevent 
the continuing brain drain and support the “creative class” of population through 
engaging a broader spectrum of society into innovative activities should also be 
enforced. (Strategiya-2020: Novaya model rosta – novaya socialnaya politica 2012) 
 
Apart from these general recommendations the expert group has produced a list of 
concrete proposals for the Russian government with regard to the future development of 
national system of innovations (see Appendix 4). The main conclusion that the experts 
have come to is that “transition to the knowledge economy stage of development is an 
absolute imperative for the development of Russia”. For that the country should shift 
from providing incentives for innovations towards the innovations-oriented growth. 
(Strategiya-2020: Novaya model rosta – novaya socialnaya politica 2012: 4) 
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3.3.3 Go Russia!  
 
Elected as the President of the Russian Federation in 2008, Dmitry Medvedev 
designated economic modernisation and diversification to be the highest priorities of his 
presidency. In compliance to his presidential agenda Medvedev in May 2009 founded 
the Presidential Commission on Modernization and Technological Development of the 
Russian economy, whose members became almost all ministers of the Russian 
government, leading businessmen and academics. (Official website of the Presidential 
Commission on Modernization and Technological Development 2013)  
 
In September 2009 in the article entitled “Go Russia!” and later on in his second 
address, Medvedev presented his programme of economic modernisation of Russia and 
outlined its five strategic areas. These key areas included: “energy efficiency and new 
fuels, medical technologies and pharmaceuticals, nuclear power engineering, 
information technologies, space and telecommunication”. (Medvedev 2009) 
 
In the article Medvedev rigorously criticized Russia’s “primitive economy”, “endemic 
corruption”, “paternalistic attitudes”, calling them the main “social ills” of the country 
that impede its progressive development. In comparison to the current situation, he 
referred to the cruelty and great human loss in the result of earlier attempts to modernize 
the country conducted by the Russian tsar Peter the Great and after the Revolution in 
1917 by the Bolsheviks. Medvedev pointed out that this time Russia should demonstrate 
that it is capable of developing “in a democratic way”, non-violently, providing benefits 
for all players of the system. He finally urged to discontinue “humiliating dependency 
on raw materials” and build a modern science-based economy. (Medvedev 2009) 
 
Except for the appeals for fundamental changes and criticism of the vicious heritage of 
the Soviet system, which in the opinion of some observes (The Economist 2009, Pabst 
2009) were neither new nor radical, Medvedev’s article appeared more like “a wish list, 
rather than a presentation of a policy programme”. (Eke 2009). 
 
Despite the common scepticism about the efficiency of the announced programme, in 
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September 2010 Arkady Dvorkovich, Chief Economic Advisor to Dmitry Medvedev, 
presented the projects already launched in the frameworks of the Go Russia! 
Programme. They include (Official webpage of the Presidential Committee on 
Economic Modernization and Innovative Development 2013): 
• Energy Efficient City and District: project, which aims at reducing the energy intensity 
in the housing sector and public institutions through usage of energy efficiency 
programmes. Considering the fact that energy intensity in Russia surpasses in 2,5 times 
the world average, Russian government set a goal of 40% decrease by 2020. 
• Pharm 2020: the main objective of the project is to attract local and foreign 
investments amounting to 6 billion USD in order to restore the Russian pharmaceutical 
industry.    
• New generation of nuclear energy technologies: 5,42 billion USD allocated to the 
series of projects, which aim to develop new technologies improving the efficiency of 
nuclear fuel usage and creation of secure and modern nuclear power stations. 
• Supercomputer education: project to develop a national system of supercomputer 
education.  
• Electronic government: recently created website www.gosuslugi.ru provides online 
access to public services, such as passport applications, property rights registration etc. 
It aims to create systems of regional e-document flows. 
• Space telecommunications as a part of broadband access: project to provide by 2015 
digital television and radio access for 90% of the Russian population and create the 
single information space for the whole Russian Federation. 
• Skolkovo Innovation Center: “a hub for high-technology research and business” to 
provide “home-grown innovations”. The aim of the conceived innovation center is to 
cover all five priorities announced in the modernization programme of Dmitry 
Medvedev. (Dvorkovich 2010 “Go Russia”: Progress One Year Later”) 
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4 SKOLKOVO INNOVATION CENTER AS A KEY INITIATIVE OF THE      
    RUSSIAN INNOVATION POLICY 
 
Chapter four provides a detailed description of the underlying reasons of the creation of 
Skolkovo Innovation Centre, the legal and financial advantages that the project has 
received on behalf of the Russian government, the project’s grant making policies, its 
organisational structure and the leading personalities involved in its creation and 
management. Such a descriptive approach is implemented with a purpose to provide a 
better assessment of the various aspects of the project using the SWOT analysis method 
to identify the available opportunities and possible threats to be considered. 
 
 
4.1 The Preconditions of Skolkovo Creation   
 
In November 2009 President Dmitri Medvedev declared publicly his new initiative “to 
create a unique innovation and technological centre in the country” (Khvostunova 
2013), the new ecosystem aimed at fostering Russia’s modernization (The Economist 
2013), “Russia’s own version of Silicon Valley” (Meyer 2013).  
 
As reference, the authorship of the term “Silicon Valley”, first mentioned in 1971, is 
attributed to the Californian entrepreneur Ralph Vaerst, who together with the journalist 
Don Hoefler used it to describe the spatial concentration of high-tech enterprises 
(involved in development of silicon semiconductors) in Northern California, near San 
Francisco Bay area (Wikipedia “Silicon Valley”). The success of Silicon Valley, 
characterized as “the confluence of venture capital, schools, lawyers” (Tobak 2008), is a 
result of more than 50 years of scientific research work and entrepreneurial efforts, due 
to which the Valley keeps its leading positions as a unique high-tech hub. This can be 
proved by the fact that among 10 top IT companies 6 of them (Cisco Systems, Google, 
Intel, Hewlett-Packard, Apple, and Oracle) are based there. (Tobak 2008) 
 
As Rosenberg notices, Silicon Valley has become “a symbol for the way forward…it is 
not enough to admire or envy Silicon Valley: countries that have any pretence of joining 
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the ranks of the world’s advanced economies have no choice but to imitate it” (quoted 
in Rowe 2013).  
 
The idea of creating a Russian version of Silicon Valley appeared back in the early 
1990s. Various locations were considered for its implementation, however the idea was 
not realized because of political instability and economical constraints of the post Soviet 
times. In mid 2000s dozens of technological parks started to appear in various parts of 
the country, mainly based around regional scientific institutions and industrial 
enterprises. Technoparks boom broke out in 2004 after the visit of then-President 
Vladimir Putin to the IT park Bangalore in India. At Putin’s initiative, about 7 billion 
RUB (202 million USD) were allocated for the establishment of three science parks in 
the field of information technologies: the West-Siberian Innovation Center in Tyumen 
region, the IT Park in the Tatarstan Republic and the Center of Technological Support 
for Innovation in Novosibirsk region. However, weak outputs of this initiative and low 
financial profitability of technoparks have provoked a rather sharp criticism in scientific 
circles and in Russian media. (LENTA.RU 2012) 
 
Although both Russian Presidents Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev have 
repeatedly highlighted the necessity of the country’s modernization and creation of a 
modern centre, focused on technological innovations, it was Dmitry Medvedev, who 
declared in November 2009 “the new course aimed at overcoming the general 
backwardness of Russia through its general modernization” (Kuzmin 2009). In 
December 2009, Medvedev formed a new working group to establish “a territorially 
separate complex for development of research and commercialization of new 
technologies” (Glikin 2009). The initiative was given an immediate top-priority status 
and already in March 2010 the village of Skolkovo (19 km from down-town of 
Moscow) was chosen as a construction site of the new project. According to the 
government, 85 billion RUB (2.5 billion USD) of the federal funds will be allocated for 
the construction of the project’s infrastructure until 2015, although the overall 
completion of the Center is expected by 2020 (buildings of the first priority are planned 
to be put in operation by the end 2014). (LENTA.RU 2012) 
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4.2 Skolkovo Overview 
 
The Foundation for Development of the Centre of Research and Commercializing of 
New Technologies Skolkovo (further Skolkovo Foundation) was founded in March 
2010 and is a non-profitable organization responsible for development and management 
of the Skolkovo Innovation Centre. (Skolkovo Foundation Annual Report 2011) The 
main underlying purpose of Skolkovo is to “bring start-ups, leading science and 
technology companies, research and education together at a new techno-park that will 
act as a catalyst for innovation across Russia”. (Gorst 2013) 
 
Thanks to Medvedev’s enthusiasm and direct involvement, the project has received an 
unprecedented political support. Thus, in September 2010 the State Duma adopted the 
new Federal Law No. 244FZ “On the Skolkovo Innovation Centre” introducing a 
special legal order on the territory of the Centre, offering favourable tax incentives, 
custom duties and migratory policies for Skolkovo participants and partners. The 
Federal Law also determined the key areas of R&D activities of the Centre, which are in 
line with the five “presidential” priorities for Russia’s modernization: 1) energy 
efficiency and energy saving (including the development of innovative energy 
technologies); 2) nuclear technologies; 3) space technologies, primarily in the field of 
telecommunications and navigation systems (including the creation of the relevant 
ground infrastructure); 4) medical technologies in the field of equipment and medication 
development; 5) strategic computer technologies and software. (Part 8 of article 10 
“Features of the Project Participants’ Activities” Federal Law No. 244FZ) 
Consequently, five research clusters (Energy, Biomedical, IT, Nuclear and Space) have 
been established to develop research of the chosen areas. The clusters’ activities include 
providing research grants and consulting support for start-ups and innovative enterprises 
from the moment of the idea generation up to the product development and 
commercialization. (Skolkovo Foundation Annual Report 2011: 44) 
 
Apart from research clusters, the Skolkovo ecosystem also comprises the following 
elements: Skolkovo Technopark, Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology 
(graduate institute), Intellectual Property Centre, Customs and Finance Company (TFK 
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Skolkovo) as well as R&D centres of the Key Partners (see Figure 5 below).  
 
 
 
Figure 5. Infographic of the Skolkovo Innovation Centre (RIANOVOSTI 2012) 
 
 
As Isabel Gorst (2013) rightfully remarks “Russia is famous for scientific talent, but not 
for entrepreneurial thinking that can turn bright ideas into profitable businesses”. With 
this respect Skolkovo is claiming to be the first Russian initiative to break this 
stereotype, bridging the gap between academia and research, innovators and investors. 
(Gorst 2013) Despite the fact that the Foundation has been in operation only for four 
years, it has provided financial and organizational support to a large number of 
innovative companies. According to the Annual Foundation Report of 2011, more than 
400 companies from all over Russian became Project Participants (see Appendix 5). By 
January 2013, Skolkovo Project Participants numbered 793 (with the competition of 5 
companies per seat). Cumulatively over the entire period of the operation, the 
Foundation has received 4,075 applications and provided 184 grants for 9 billion RUB 
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(260 million USD). (Skolkovo Foundation Objectives and Results 2013: 27) 
 
According to the official press releases of the Foundation, even though Skolkovo 
Innocity does not exist physically yet, it is already attracting scientists, students, 
investors and innovators. Project Partners of Skolkovo have become such major global 
and Russian corporations as Boeing, Lukoil, TATA, Astra Zeneca, Alstom, Cisco, 
EADS, Intel, Microsoft, Nokia, Siemens, Ericsson, TNK-BP, IBM, DOW, Johnson & 
Johnson, GE, ISS Reshetnev, RSC Energia, Sberbank, Rosatom (see Annex 4). By 2013 
the Project Partners have signed the agreements on establishing 24 R&D centers in 
Skolkovo. 49 venture funds have signed the agreements on accreditation for a total of 
19.6 billion RUB (567 million USD). 14 of them have co-invested the grants totalling 
1.1 billion RUB (31 million USD). (Skolkovo Foundation Objectives and Results 2013: 
7, 27)  
 
4.2.1 Skolkovo Mission  
 
Based on the analysis of various presentation materials and reports, the mission of 
Skolkovo Foundation comprises several elements. First of all, the Foundation is to: 
develop Russian human capital through research collaboration and teamwork with 
foreign specialists, foster the creation of “globally competitive products and services 
based on cutting-edge research” and accelerate the growth of Russian economy through 
innovations and integration of Russian technologies into the world economy. (First 
Steps. First Achievements 2010–2011: 6) 
 
Apart from economical and educational priorities of its activities, Skolkovo also seeks 
to introduce a new ideology to the Russian business and scientific community, “the 
ideology of innovative constructive endeavour”, which proclaims “innovative 
workmanship” as “prestigious, profitable, and important to the nation as a whole”. 
(Skolkovo Foundation Annual Report 2011: 12) 
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4.2.2 Skolkovo’s Unique Legal Status 
 
All activities of the Skolkovo Foundation as a management company of the Skolkovo 
Innovation Center are regulated by two federal laws, which were adopted on September 
28, 2010: Federal Law No. 244-FZ “On the ‘Skolkovo’ Center for Innovation” (further 
as “Skolkovo Law”) and the Federal Law No. 243-FZ “On Amending Certain Legal 
Acts of the Russian Federation in Connection With the Adoption of the Federal Law 
‘On the ‘Skolkovo’ Center for Innovation’” (further as “Law on Amendments”). 
(Korotkova 2011) 
 
These laws introduce “an unprecedented legal regime” for project participants and 
entrust the management company with an extraordinary organizational authority as a 
supervisor of the project implementation. (Korotkova 2011) The Skolkovo Law also 
specifies the conditions, under which companies are eligible to become project 
participants. A company should be a Russian legal entity, conducting research activities 
in the filed of one of Skolkovo’s scientific clusters (IT, Biomedical, Energy, Nuclear or 
Space & Communications). A company is also required to have an office physically 
located on the territory of Skolkovo (project participants are to relocate to Skolkovo 
upon the completion of construction works, preliminary after 2014). The status of a 
project participant is valid for a period of 10 years. (Federal Law of the Russian 
Federation N 254-FZ 2011; Korotkova 2011) 
 
Other significantly favourable provisions of the Skolkovo Law and the Law on 
Amendments include: exemption from VAT, property and corporate profits tax 
(provided that company’s profit is less then 10 million USD/year and turnover is under 
30 million USD/year) for a period of 10 years, reduced rate of mandatory pension 
insurance contributions for a period of 10 years, refund of import customs duties and of 
VAT expenses related to the import of goods necessary for construction of premises or 
for the implementation of research activities at the Centre. The residents of Skolkovo 
employing foreign specialists are also entitled to the simplified procedures of obtaining 
work permits and visas. Skolkovo Foundation in capacity of a Managing Company is 
responsible for all the paperwork and interaction with Russian migration 
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authorities. (Sitnikov 2010; Korotkova 2011) According to the Law, the Managing 
Company receives the land plot, buildings and structures within the boundaries of the 
project in its property, which will later be leased out to individual project participants. 
(Korotkova 2011; LENTA.RU 2012) 
 
Under the pretext of avoiding corrupt practices and excessive bureaucratization, the 
innovation city will be excluded from the jurisdiction of the municipal authorities, and 
all the administrative and maintenance issues will be attributed to the scope of the 
Managing Company (Foundation) responsibilities. These legislative limitations on the 
power and authority of local administration indicate that the Centre is entirely under the 
control of the federal government. This amendment on one hand is a factual recognition 
of the high level of priority of the Project, but on the other hand it contradicts the 
Article 131 of the Russian Constitution on general principles of the organization of 
local government. This risks not only to influence the governance system of the 
territory, but also the life of future Skolkovo citizens, who will be practically deprived 
from the Constitutional right to participate in resolving issues of the local level. 
(Didikin & Kruzhkova 2010; Gavrilov 2011) 
 
Unreasonably broad powers, delegated to the Managing Company (Foundation) under 
the Skolkovo Law, run contrary to the already existing Russian legal regulations and 
can create confusion and inconsistency in its application. As envisioned by the authors 
of the Law, the minimal interference of the public authorities in the activities of 
Skolkovo Innovation Centre was intended to decrease the administrative burden and 
bureaucratic barriers for the Project participants. However, a similar method of legal 
regulation has been largely unknown to the Russian legislation, which potentially 
jeopardizes the potency of the rule of law on Skolkovo territory. (Didikin & Kruzhkova 
2010) 
 
4.2.3 Funding Sources  
 
Initially the budgetary financing of Skolkovo has been scheduled through 2015. 
According to the reports on the implementation of federal budgets and the law on 
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federal budget in the period 2013 – 2015, Skolkovo is about to receive cumulatively 
109,49 billion RUB (3,41 billion USD). Despite the governmental commitment the 
public funding provided to Skolkovo is set to be gradually reduced in the coming years. 
(Papchenkova 2013a) “At a peak in 2012 the project received 26,6 billion RUB (803 
million USD), but this is set to decline to 9,9 billion RUB (299 million USD) by 2015”. 
(RIANOVOSTI 2013b) 
 
Soon after the re-election of Vladimir Putin as the President of Russia in March 2012, 
Skolkovo Foundation, “brainchild” of now Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, was 
struck by a series of misfortunes. In autumn 2012, the Accounts Chamber revealed 
financial violations with regard to transparency of the grant procedures. Several months 
later, the Investigative Committee opened criminal cases against two Skolkovo senior 
executives over the alleged embezzlement of 800 000 USD. (Papchenkova 2013b) 
Moreover, in May 2013 Vladislav Surkov, one of the founders and the official curator 
of Skolkovo, often referred to as “a powerful Kremlin ideologue” and Russia's “grey 
cardinal”, left his office of a deputy prime minister, withdrawing Skolkovo from his 
influential endorsement. His resignation followed the meeting with Vladimir Putin, who 
severely criticized the work of the Cabinet of ministers, of which Surkov was a 
member. (RIANOVOSTI 2013a) The decline of political support for Skolkovo after 
Surkov’s resignation was subsequently succeeded by the cut back of state financing. On 
top of that, in June 2013 President Putin cancelled the previously adopted Medvedev’s 
decree on compulsory contributions of the state corporations (in the amount of 1% 
of their innovation development budget) into the endowment fund of Skolkovo Institute 
of Science and Technology. (Moukine 2013b)  
 
Some experts argue that the recent troubles happening to Skolkovo can be interpreted as 
the rivalry between Vladimir Putin and his predecessor and the current Prime Minister 
Dmitry Medvedev. As the newspaper Vedomosti states it, Vladimir Putin, who has 
never visited Skolkovo construction site, “considers the project artificial and has always 
distanced himself from it” (Papchenkova 2013b). However, according to Putin’s 
spokesman Dmitry Peskov, the allegations that Skolkovo has been attacked “for 
political reasons” are groundless (Meyer 2013). Putin himself publicly asserts his belief 
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in the future of Skolkovo and the necessity to support it, alongside emphasizing that 
“the project, especially its financial part, should be carried out strictly within the limits 
of the law”. (Russia Beyond The Headlines 2013) 
 
The hard lines of Skolkovo were over in August 2013, when it was officially included 
in the state program “Economic Development and Innovation Economy”, which 
specifies the funding plan of 502 billion RUB (15,2 billion USD) throughout the year 
2020. Some political analysts explain it as a sign that the project has managed to regain 
the support of the government and President Putin above all. Even though Skolkovo has 
been initially financed in the format of private-public partnership, beginning from 2015 
the amount of state investments will be gradually reduced in comparison with the 
private ones (Voronina 2013). Therefore, by 2020 the Russian government has agreed 
to provide the Project only with 136,6 billion RUB (4,1 billion USD), while the 
Foundation will have to raise 366,4 billion RUB (11,1 billion USD) in private 
investments. The state program also proposes a stricter allocation of public funds than 
before. As anticipated, 32 billion RUB (972,5 million USD) will be spent on research 
grants to project participants, the Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology will 
receive 42 billion RUB (1,2 billion USD), the costs of infrastructure development will 
amount to approximately 37 billion RUB (1.1 billion USD), and another 57 billion RUB 
(1,7 billion USD) will be invested in the creation of the innovative environment. 
(Papchenkova 2013b; RIANOVOSTI 2013b)  
 
Yet, the President of the Foundation, Viktor Vekselberg, finds the challenge of raising 
367 billions RUB of private investments quite feasible. He anticipates Skolkovo to 
become a self consistent project by the year 2025. Moreover, Vekselberg expects that 
by the year 2020 Skolkovo’s aggregated investment in the Russian economy will reach 
213 billion RUB (6,2 billion USD), consequently surpassing the total amount of federal 
funding invested in the project. At the same time, the investment efficiency of the 
Project, as affirmed by the Management of Skolkovo, could be evaluated not earlier 
than by 2030, when the Innovation Center will start working at full operational capacity. 
(Voronina 2013)  
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Regardless the announced budget cuts, the privileged position of Skolkovo in the matter 
of state funding can be well illustrated through factual comparison of governmental 
support for other elements of the innovation system of Russia. According to the 
Ministry of Communications and Mass Media of the Russian Federation (2013), all 12 
Russian IT technoparks received in total 19,5 billion RUB (613 million USD) of 
investments in the period 2007 – 2011, from which 7 billion RUB were provided from 
the federal funds, 8,5 billion RUB from regional budgets and 4 billion RUB from 
private investments. 
 
4.2.4 Research Grants Policy 
 
The Skolkovo Foundation provides non-repayable and non-refundable grants to 
innovative companies that have already been selected as Skolkovo residents and 
become participants of one of its five research clusters. The Foundation does not engage 
in equity financing, nor does it lay claim to revenue share. The Foundation finances 
projects, which meet the following criteria: the Project is aimed at the global market; the 
Company intends to possess all of the intellectual property rights required for 
commercializing the product/technology of the Project without breaking third parties’ 
patent rights; the Company has long-term incentives. (Grant Policy 2011) 
 
Once qualified, the company may apply for a grant by submitting a grant proposal, 
which includes an investment memorandum, a project presentation, a roadmap (project 
fulfilment plan), a financing plan, a budget estimate and its rationality. The application 
first passes the expert review of the relative cluster, then it is forwarded for the 
evaluation of the Grant Committee. The Grant Committee is responsible for the due 
diligence procedures that involves quality assessment and verification of the 
information. Several Foundation departments such as security department, legal 
department and finance department are engaged in the checks of reputation risks and the 
validity of financial estimates. Once all of the departments and experts involved in the 
due diligence procedure have finished their analysis, the project evaluation scorecard is 
issued and together with the original materials is forwarded to the regular session of the 
Grant Committee. (Skolkovo Foundation Annual Report 2011: 115) 
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The Grant Committee consists of 9 members, among them 3 academicians of the 
Russian Academy of Science, 2 representatives of a development institution, 3 
employees of the foundation and 1 representative of the venture community. As of 
January 2013, 108 out of 156 grant applications have been approved amounting to 9 
billion RUB (260 million USD). Because of the efficient application review procedures, 
Skolkovo Foundation announces that it takes 29 days for a project approval and 96 days 
for grant obtaining (as compared to 150 days of application review at Russian Venture 
Company, 210 days at SBIR (Small Business Innovation Research in US)). (Skolkovo 
Foundation Objective and Results 2013)  
 
The transparency and objectivity of the granting process is achieved by compliance with 
the following regulations: 6 out of 9 members of the Grant Committee are independent 
experts; experts are non-employees of the Foundation, they are unknown both to 
applicants and to the employees of the Foundation, working with a grant applicant; all 
applicants may attend sessions of the Grant Committee; all decisions are made based on 
a simple majority vote and announced publicly; and there are strict observance of the 
guidelines to avoid conflicts of interest. (Skolkovo Foundation Objective and Results 
2013) 
 
The grant policy of the Skolkovo Foundation classifies projects by four stages of 
development (see Figure 6 below): pre-seed stage (concept stage), seed stage, early 
stage and advanced stage. Grant financing is mainly intended for a gradual development 
of the project from its current stage to the following one. The projects at a pre-seed 
stage are eligible for a mini-grant, which has gradually increased from 1,5 million in 
2011 to 5 million RUB (USD 153 000) in 2012. Mini-grants are provided for the teams, 
which already have an innovative idea and need financing to create a business plan, a 
research program and to conduct a preliminary search for an interested investor. The 
Cluster Directors are entitled to decide on mini-grants without any approval on behalf of 
the Grant Committee. (Petlevoj 2012; Grant Policy 2011)  
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Figure 6. Grant policy of the Skolkovo Foundation (Skolkovo Innovation Centre 2011: 
     38) 
 
 
At each further stage the projects have to meet specific requirements and follow various 
regulations. Moreover, the higher the requested amount of a grant is, the bigger share of 
external financing is required. Thus, the seed stage grant requires 25% of a third party 
investment, the early stage project needs 50% of a grant from a co-investor, 75 % of the 
advanced stage grant must be financed externally. (Grant Policy 2011) 
 
The financing is provided in tranches of various amounts depending on the roadmap of 
a project. Each consecutive tranche is provided only upon the receipt of the 
performance report, stating measurable results of the project. “The Foundation 
examines the reports of completion of the Project’s stages and with the help of external 
experts and auditors evaluates intermediate results and assures the proper use of funds.” 
(Skolkovo Foundation Annual Report 2011: 115) 
 
 
4.3 Skolkovo Ecosystem  
 
The Skolkovo Foundation is assigned to create “a physical and virtual ecosystem to 
attract great minds from all over the world” to work and live there (Moukine 2013a).  
The ecosystem encompasses several strategic elements (see Figure 7).  
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Figure 7. Key Elements of Skolkovo Innovation Centre (Skolkovo Foundation            
        Objective and Results, January 2013: 8) 
 
 
The cornerstone component of the educational and scientific unit of the innovation 
centre, according to the Foundation tops, should be the Skolkovo Institute of Science 
and Technology (further SkolTech), a graduate research university founded in 
cooperation with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). In the meantime, 
Open University Skolkovo (OpUS), launched in 2011, has been designed with an aim to 
create a social network of open innovation though distribution of most recent scientific 
and technological findings among talented young people, interested in Skolkovo 
activities. OpUs has equally become a source of prospective students for SkolTech 
programs, as well as interns for Skolkovo’s innovative companies. Network interaction 
is supported by regular on-line courses, seminars and lectures, held by prominent 
international and Russian experts and scientists. (Skolkovo Foundation Annual Report 
2011: 76, 84–87) 
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Technopark Skolkovo acts as the main provider of research facilities and necessary 
services for the Project participants of all five clusters. The Skolkovo Intellectual 
Property Rights Centre (Skolkovo IP), incorporated as a part of Technopark in 2011, 
offers services to Skolkovo companies without engaging third parties. “The services 
include consulting on patenting technologies in the territory of Russia and other 
countries <...> facilitation of conclusion of license agreements.” (Skolkovo Foundation 
Annual Report 2011: 31) Apart from consultancy services, Skolkovo IP performs as a 
representative of the interests of Project participants abroad through direct cooperation 
with foreign patent attorneys. As of January 2013, Skolkovo IP performed 62 patent 
investigations and assisted in preparation of 143 applications for IP registration (among 
them 36 trade mark registration applications). (Skolkovo Foundation Annual Report 
2011: 31) 
 
The Skolkovo ecosystem also comprises the Customs and Finance Company of the 
Skolkovo Innovation Centre (TFK Skolkovo). Established in 2011 it is responsible for 
refunding customs duties to Skolkovo participants, providing them with the legal 
assistance concerning import and customs clearance, and acting as their custom 
representative. (Skolkovo Foundation Annual Report 2011: 30) However, in February 
2013 the Investigation Committee of Russian Federation launched a criminal 
investigation on suspicion of misappropriation of 24 million RUB (USD 735 000) 
against Vladimir Khokhlov, the General Director of TFK Skolkovo and Kirill 
Lugovtsov, Director of the Finance Department of Skolkovo Foundation. Both 
managers were removed from the office. In addition, according to the Investigation 
Committee, for 2 years of its activity TFK Skolkovo, comprised of 10 employees with 
monthly salaries ranging from 300 000 to 600 000 RUB (from USD 9 187 to USD 18 
374) (while an average salary in Moscow in 2013 was 60 000 RUB or USD 1 837), has 
executed only one custom operation. (INTERFAX 2013) 
 
Another element of the Skolkovo ecosystem is venture funding, which refers to high-
risk investments in start-up companies at a seed or early stage of business development 
at the prospect of higher-than-average return on investments. (European Commission 
2014). Typical fields of venture capital investment are high technology industries, such 
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as biotechnology, IT and software. Venture capital is a type of private equity, which is a 
fundamental component of an innovative business environment. It is particularly 
attractive “for new companies that are too small and young to secure a bank loan or 
complete a debt offering” (Wikipedia definition). In return of high risks through 
investment in start-ups, venture capital funds acquire a considerable share of the 
company's ownership. As for January 2013, 49 venture funds, among which 19 are 
international, signed the agreement on cooperation resulting in accreditation agreements 
for 19,6 billion RUB (601 million USD) and 1,1 billion RUB (34 million USD) of co-
investment for grants. (Skolkovo Foundation Objective and Results, January 2013: 14) 
 
In 2011 Skolkovo signed 24 partnership agreements with the world leading industrial 
companies (among them Siemens, EADS, Nokia, Ericsson, GE, IBM, Intel, Sistema 
JSFC, SAP), which therefore assumed an obligation of creating corporate R&D Centres 
in the territory of the Innovation Centre with the agreed budget of 27 billion RUB (782 
million USD). International leading companies play an essential role in the formation of 
the Skolkovo ecosystem, as they are the main providers of intellectual, scientific and 
financial capital, as well as an advanced business culture. They are also expected to 
facilitate integration of the Centre into the international innovation environment. 
(Skolkovo Foundation Annual Report 2011: 73) 
 
4.3.1 Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology (SkolTech)  
 
Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology (SkolTech) is a private, innovations and 
research oriented graduate university, which offers degrees (MSc and Ph.D.) in natural 
science, engineering and technology. The president of SkolTech is Edward F. Crawley, 
former Executive Director of the Cambridge-MIT Institute and chairman of the NASA 
Technology and Commercialization Advisory Committee. (Official Webpage of 
Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology 2013) 
 
Founded in 2011, SkolTech is a result of collaboration of 9 leading Russian universities 
and scientific organisations: Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Tomsk 
Polytechnic University, Moscow School of Management Skolkovo, New Economic 
 82 
School, RUSNANO, Russian Venture Company (RVC), Bank for Development and 
Foreign Economic Affairs (Vnesheconombank), Foundation for the Assistance to Small 
Innovative Enterprises (FASIE), RAN Scientific Centre in Chernogolovka. (Official 
Webpage of Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology 2013) The launch of 
SkolTech has been enabled through direct supervision of the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT), which was contracted for it by the Skolkovo Foundation. Thus, MIT 
plays the main role of providing assistance in establishing administrative structure, 
faculty recruiting, degree programs designing, campus and laboratory planning. 
(Official webpage of Skolkovo Foundation 2013) 
 
According to the perspectives of the President of Skolkovo Foundation, Victor 
Vekselberg, SkolTech should become the main element to bridge the gap between basic 
research and commercialization. This vision is reflected in the Triple Helix principle of 
the Institute:  
 
“- Graduate educational programs organized around broad themes 
rather than traditional academic disciplines, integrating science and 
engineering.  
- Multi-university, multi-disciplinary research focused on important 
problem areas. 
- Industrial impact by integrating education, research, and practice in 
entrepreneurship, innovation and commercialization (my italics)."  
(quoted in presentation of Prof. Duane Boning on SkolTech/MIT 
Initiative available at the Official webpage of SkolTech 
http://www.skoltech.ru/mit) 
 
 
SkolTech undertakes a pioneering mission of creating “a university environment of 
innovation” through blurring “traditional disciplinary boundaries” and bringing together 
research, education and entrepreneurship, pursuing the objective to attract and retain 
talented researchers and scientists from Russia and abroad.  
 
With an influential Board of Trustees, which includes Vladislav Surkov, a former 
Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office and a Deputy Prime Minister 
and Herman Gref, President and CEO of Sberbank (the largest bank in Russia), 
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SkolTech plans to open its 200, 000 m2 high-tech campus (see Picture 1.) designed by 
the Swiss architectural bureau of Herzog de Meuron (famous for designing the Beijing 
Olympic Stadium) by 2018.  
 
The Institute intends to involve some 1200 students, 200 professors, 300 post-doctorate 
associates in its five primary education and research programs (providing Master’s and 
PhD’s degrees only), which correspond to the Skolkovo research clusters. Information, 
Energy Efficiency and Biomedical Science and Technology programmes are already 
available for student applications. Space and civilian Nuclear Science and Technology 
programmes are still being designed. (Official webpage of SkolTech 2013)  
 
4.3.2 Technopark  
 
Created one year earlier than SkolTech, Technopark is the main research facility of the 
Skolkovo ecosystem. Its role is to accommodate start-up teams, business incubators and 
tenant companies and provide them with state-of-art research infrastructure to facilitate 
development of new technologies and products. On its 146, 000 m2, the Technopark 
intends to be open for its residents by the end of 2014 and accommodate 10 Centres of 
Collective Use, 400 participant companies, thus creating 9 000 new jobs. (Nielsen 
2012) Technopark has already launched four out of ten Centres of Collective Use 
(CCU): Microanalysis (biomed, pharmacology, chemical industries), Optoelectronics, 
Prototyping (includes Engineering Laboratory, Laboratory of mechanical processing, 
Laboratory of Industrial Design and 3D Prototyping Laboratory). All CCUs are 
operated by the selected on competitive basis subcontracts in various cities of Russia. 
(Official webpage of Technopark 2013)  
 
At present, the Foundation has provided financial, technical (through external partners) 
and consulting support (assistance in cooperation with other academic and research 
institutions) to more than 500 start-ups (total amount of grants reaching 2.9 billion RUB 
(90 million USD). “Start-ups will be eligible to become residents of the Technopark, the 
main research centre; if their products have not been commercialized by the time the 
facility opens in 2014”. (Nielsen 2012) 
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The main functions of Technopark are claimed to comprise full-rang of services in 
business incubations, assistance in IP registrations, in providing contacts with 
international investors, facilitating the access to foreign markets and international 
expertise. (Efimoff 2012) 
 
4.3.3 Research Clusters in Skolkovo 
 
All activities of the companies-residents of Skolkovo are conducted within the 
frameworks of 5 clusters. As has been mentioned previously, the cluster policy of 
Skolkovo Innovation Centre strictly corresponds to the governmental priority areas 
within the innovation policy of Russia. These areas were determined by the former 
President Dmitry Medvedev and announced in his first presidential address to the 
Federal Assembly in November 2009. (Skolkovo Foundation Annual Report 2011: 44) 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Participants of research clusters in the Skolkovo Innovation Centre (Created 
        by the author on the basis of the data available on the official webpage of the 
        Skolkovo Foundation and its Clusters) 
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Clusters are responsible for “determining priority fields of research within the chosen 
areas (foresight) to be approved by the Scientific Advisory Council, attracting 
researchers, supporting start-ups in their work and promotion of research results”. 
(Skolkovo Foundation Annual Report 2011: 45) As it is shown in the Figure 8 above, 
the clusters differ significantly by the number of participants, with IT Cluster being the 
most numerous of them (315 companies) and Space and Nuclear Clusters counting the 
lowest number of participants (112 and 82 companies respectively). 
 
4.3.3.1 Cluster of Energy Efficient Technologies 
 
The biggest country in the world, Russia possesses abundant reserves of natural 
resources. “Russia has the largest known natural gas reserves of any state on earth, 
along with the second largest coal reserves, and the eighth largest oil reserves” 
(Wikipedia “Energy in Russia” 2013).  
 
From the year 2000 onwards under the presidency of Vladimir Putin the energy sector, 
seen as the main remedy to improve economic stability of Russia, has been almost 
entirely taken into the state ownership. In the result of nationalization process, the sector 
has been consolidated under the control of the three state corporations: GAZPROM 
(94% of Russia’s natural gas production; 16% of global natural gas production), 
ROSNEFT (12% of global oil production) and TRANSNEFT (transports 93% of 
Russian oil; the largest oil pipeline system in the world). (Goodrich & Lanthemann 
2013; Wikipedia “Energy in Russia” 2013)  
 
Russia is the main supplier of oil and natural gas to Europe and gradually increases its 
presence on the East Asian energy markets. Due to the dependency of European and 
most of CIS countries on Russian oil and gas, the energy sector has become a 
geopolitical instrument in the foreign policy of Moscow. Therefore, energy sector 
security has been raised by the Kremlin to the rank of “the primary issue for Russia's 
national security”. (Goodrich & Lanthemann 2013) 
 
The revenues from energy exports constitute the major income item of the Russian 
 86 
budget, which makes the country particularly vulnerable to oil and gas price 
fluctuations. Apart from that the Russian energy sector is faced with the disadvantages 
of the state monopoly over the sector. In absence of real competitors, state energy 
corporations are falling considerably behind their international counterparts in 
technologies and innovations, and are known for their hostility towards outside 
investors. (Goodrich & Lanthemann 2013) Moreover, corrupt practices constitute 
another bottleneck point. For instance, the Swedish economist Anders Åslund estimates 
that “50% of the state-owned Gazprom's investments are lost through corrupt practices” 
(Wikipedia article Energy Policy of Russia 2013).  
 
In an effort to break the vicious circle of technological inferiority resulting in high 
losses and low efficiency of the Russian energy sector, Skolkovo’s Energy Efficient 
Technologies Cluster supports “the development of the newest technologies of energy 
generation, transmission and accumulation, enhancement of consumption efficiency and 
“green” energy”. (Cluster of Energy Efficient Technologies 2012: 2) 
 
As a result of teamwork of Cluster’s management and the representatives of Russian 
energy business, academic institutions, government bodies, national and foreign experts, 
the following Energy Cluster priority directions have been approved:  
 
“ - Strengthening the existing areas of competitive advantage (gas-
steam plants, energy efficient materials, hydrogen technologies). 
  - Closing gap with mature countries (increase energy efficiency 
maturity, central heating networks, housing and industrial energy 
efficiency). 
  - Participation in global energy trends and innovation (biogas, bio 
coal, smart grid).” (Official website Energy Cluster: http://edu-
skolkovo.ru/en/energy/) 
 
As of May 2013, 229 innovative companies from 32 regions (Russia has 46 regions in 
total) have become the participants of the Energy Cluster and have registered more than 
200 patents. Skolkovo Foundation provided 1.9 billion RUB (57 million USD) in the 
form of grants, which matched over 2.2 billion RUB (67 million USD) raised from 
private investors. Most projects refer to the following areas: Renewable Energy (42), 
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Materials and Coatings (30), Production and Transmission of Oil and Gas (29), 
Chemistry and Petro-chemistry (28), Power Generation and Energy Transmission (26), 
Housing Services and Utilities Sector (23). (Cluster of Energy Efficient Technologies 
2013: 2-5) 
 
4.3.3.2 Cluster of Nuclear Technologies  
The 20th century has seen unprecedented scientific achievements in nuclear physics, 
fundamentally affecting the peace and security of mankind: the creation of the atomic 
bomb and development of the nuclear reactor. The starting point of the Russian nuclear 
industry is connected with an atomic bomb project, initiated in 1942 by the USSR 
Defence Committee in response to the US Manhattan Project. Four years later, Igor 
Kurchatov, a Soviet nuclear physicist, produced his first self-sustaining nuclear chain 
reaction. The first Soviet reactor for plutonium production became operational two 
years later. Urged by the nuclear rivalry with USA, the Soviet Union tested its first 
hydrogen bomb in 1953. In the meantime, the USSR pursued nuclear research projects 
for civilian purposes, which resulted in the construction of the world's first nuclear 
power plant in Obninsk in 1954. At present, 10 nuclear power plants operating in Russia 
provide 30% of all electricity on the European part of Russia and more than 40% in its 
Northwest part. Therefore, nuclear industry similar to the energy sector is equated with 
the national top priorities, crucial for national energy security. (Official Website of State 
Corporation ROSATOM 2013) 
Radiation technologies, namely radiation control and magnetic fields, have become the 
primary outcome of the nuclear industry development. Today radiation technologies are 
widely applied not only in energy sector, but also in various civil fields such as “nuclear 
medicine, sterilization and disinfection, safety and non-destructive testing, ecology and 
water treatment, mining and processing of mineral resources”. (Official webpage of 
Nuclear Cluster 2013) 
 
That is why the priority areas of the Skolkovo Nuclear Technologies Cluster are not so 
much focused on the nuclear energy in its general meaning as on the radiation 
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technologies, which possess a higher potential of market growth. The Nuclear Cluster 
perceives its mission as to provide assistance to Russian scientists and engineers, 
working in such a traditionally closed sector, highly dependent on government 
procurement, as nuclear industry, to take part in creation of technological businesses. 
For this purpose the Cluster helps scientists in finding businessmen, who would be 
interested to invest in their ideas. (Kotlyar 2013) 
 
As of August 2013, 82 companies from 301 applicants received the title of a “resident” 
of the Nuclear Cluster. The low number of residents can be explained by the fact that 
historically the nuclear sector has been associated with the defence industry in Russia. 
Its development has been little affected by competitive market conditions. That is the 
main reason why there are so few entrepreneurial initiatives in this field. Besides, the 
period of technology commercialization in this sector is considerably longer (average 5 
years) than in other clusters. (Kotlyar 2013) 80% of the projects originate from the 
regional centers of competence in nuclear technologies (St. Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, 
Novosibirsk, Tomsk, Dubna, Sarov). (Official webpage of Nuclear Cluster 2013) 
 
4.3.3.3 Cluster of Space Technologies and Communications  
 
Space industry belongs to the limited number of areas where Russian expertise retains 
its competitiveness. Traditionally the main few stakeholders in this sector have been 
large state agencies. However, there are several segments, mainly specialized in ground-
based application of space services, where Russian private companies can still 
participate, if only they withstand competition against foreign counterparts. Therefore, 
Skolkovo’s Space Technologies and Communications Cluster is meant to address the 
main problems of the Russian space industry and develop national competitive 
environment for cutting-edge R&D projects with subsequent commercialization of their 
results. (Cluster of Space Technology and Telecommunication 2012: 2–5) 
 
The Cluster is active in three particular areas. The first direction is assistance in 
“integrating of Russian start-ups into the “major” program for the development and use 
of space”, which means bringing together small and medium businesses within one 
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project focused on “upstream-technologies” (Sensor & Systems 2013). The second area 
is referred to as “downstream” and entails practical usage of the findings of space 
research. To this highly competitive area belong the projects in the field of navigation 
devices, chipsets, information receiving antennas, etc. The third sphere of action lies 
within the technical support solutions for both aerospace and related industries (in 
avionics, for example). (Sensor & Systems 2013; Cluster of Space Technology and 
Telecommunication 2012: 26–30) 
 
 Skolkovo Space cluster is specifically intended to provide financial and informational 
support to small and medium innovative companies, often established by university 
staff members, employees of laboratories and research centres. The main barrier, 
impeding the selection process that Cluster’s management is facing at the moment is the 
general rule of Skolkovo grant policy. It requires that the product commercialization 
should meet the 3-year deadline, whereas for the aerospace sector this timeline is too 
short due to the research intensity specific to space projects. (Sensors & Systems 2013) 
As Sergey Zhukov, the Cluster Director, underlined in one of his interviews, “The time 
for development of research intensive technologies may often stretch over 15 years, 
that’s why we strive to modify this eligibility criterion for our Cluster.” (Strelnikov 
2013)  
 
The Cluster has become the first Russian development institution to provide assistance 
to SMEs in the aerospace field with 112 participants as on November 2013. It also plays 
an active role of intermediate between the private companies and governmental 
agencies, through participation in the leading national and international conferences and 
exhibitions, proving open and independent expert evaluation to “space” start-up, 
encouraging international cooperation, stimulating networking and developing 
additional tools to promote innovations in space activities. (Cluster of Space 
Technologies and Telecommunications 2013) 
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4.3.3.4 Cluster of Biomedical Technologies  
 
Another focus area of Skolkovo is biomedicine. In the developed countries it is 
particularly the sector of biomedical research that receives the major part of financing 
and produces the highest number of extensively quoted scientific articles. In Russia the 
situation has been different for a very long time. Biology has been traditionally in the 
sidelines of physics and mathematics, whereas medicine is up till now separated from 
university education. In 1990s, during the years of a massive brain drain, many Russian 
biologists went abroad and achieved great success in their scientific carriers. In this 
connection Skolkovo’s Cluster of Biomedical Technologies sets targets to support the 
existing scientific potential of Russian biomedical companies and attract Russian 
specialists living abroad to join the project and build research partnerships. (Sterligov 
2011) 
 
The Cluster is headed by Igor Goryanin, Professor at University of Edinburgh (UK) and 
Head of the Laboratory of Biological System at Okinawa Institute of Science and 
Technology (Japan), and is one of the most dynamic in Skolkovo. By the end of 
November 2013, it accounted for 239 participating companies working in four key 
directions: biomedicine, bioinformatics, biopharmaceuticals and industrial 
biotechnologies. (Official webpage of the Cluster of Biomedical Technologies 2013)  
 
The management of the Cluster places a special emphasis upon scientific foresight of 
the current global tendencies in biology and medicine, as well as upon the challenges of 
the underdeveloped biomedical industry in Russia. From the perspective of the Cluster’s 
experts, the goal of replacing of foreign imported medicaments by domestically 
produced substitutes should not be a primary one (which slightly disagrees with the 
point of view of the Russian government). Skolkovo Biomed thus focuses on assisting 
Russian companies whose research projects may result in truly scientific innovations, 
and not in high quality coping. (Batenjova 2011) 
 
 
 
 91 
4.3.3.5 Cluster of Information Technologies (IT)  
 
IT Cluster is the largest one in number of participants: as of November 2013, in the 
result of careful selection from 1838 applications, 315 companies joined the Cluster. 75 
of them received research grants, subsequently creating 266 patents and IPs. In order to 
be chosen, a project should demonstrate its competitive advantages over global 
analogues, comprise a significant commercialization potential and accordingly qualified 
research team. Most of the IT projects account for such areas as new audio, video, 
image search and recognition solutions, processing and analysis of large data arrays, 
cloud computing and secure information technologies. (Efimoff 2013)  
 
As reported by the World Economic Forum (WEF), the index of competitiveness of 
national economies largely depends on the level of IT and communication technologies 
development in the country. According to the ratings of the Global Competitiveness 
Report 2011–2012 of 142 countries conducted by WEF (2011), Russia occupies the 66th 
place (Finland – 4th, Germany – 6th, China – 26th, India – 56th). In support of the above-
stated, the Global IT Report 2012 by WEF (2012) shows the following rankings: 
networked readiness index (propensity of a country to exploit the opportunities offered 
by ICT) of Russia is at 56th place (Finland – 3rd, Germany – 16th, China – 51st, India – 
69th), as for the laws relating to ICT, Russia is at 99th place (Finland – 6th, Germany – 
31st, China – 47th, India – 48th), Russia ranks 126th in the field of Intellectual Property 
Protection (Finland – 1st, Germany – 13th, China – 47th, India – 68th), Russian quality of 
education system is at 82nd place (Finland – 3rd, Germany – 17th, China – 54th, India – 
38th) and finally the impact of ICT on new services and products in Russia is at 112th 
place (Finland – 11th, Germany – 24th, China – 38th, India – 35th).  
 
Other factors hindering the development of Russian ICT sector include an aggravated 
deficit of skilled labour, low level of training of IT specialists, low number of world-
class R&D projects in IT sector, deficiency of institutional conditions for IT business 
and weak government market for IT. Due to the alarming performance of the Russian IT 
sector, the government has worked out a special development strategy for the period 
2014–2020. The Strategy was adopted in November 2013 and represents an integrated 
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systemic approach of the state towards the development of ICT sector. It is aimed at 
decreasing the dependency of national economy on export of raw materials through 
increasing of IT products export, increasing labour productivity by accelerating 
implementation of IT practices in the key fields of economy and improving of a general 
investment climate in Russia. (Ministry of Communications 2013) 
 
The national IT sector satisfies only 25% of a Russian market demand, which is mainly 
due to the IT services segment. Almost 100% of IT equipment and more than 75% of 
software are imported in Russia. Against this background, it is not surprising that many 
residents of Skolkovo’s IT Cluster are already successfully selling their new products 
abroad, since the local Russian market shows little interest and low demand for 
innovations. The IT Cluster pursues to change this situation and increase innovativeness 
of national business through development of working mechanisms to search, attract and 
retain innovative ideas and technologies in Russia. (CNews.ru 2013) 
 
4.3.4 Innocity 
 
The discussions on the architectural concept of the future Russian “Capital of 
Innovations” and the costs of its realization have drawn to it a considerable amount of 
public attention. In order to make Skolkovo an attractive place to live for international 
students, young researches, foreign entrepreneurs, employees of R&D centres of global 
companies, professors of SkolTech and their families, the Foundation strives to create a 
futuristic living environment (in comparison to the neighbouring Moscow realities) in 
compliance with the most recent engineering and architectural solutions.  
 
It is planned that a 400-hectare city will house 15 000 residents, 11 000 of which will be 
directly engaged in innovative activities. Around 7 000–9 000 people are expected to 
come down to Skolkovo daily to work. As confirmed by a number of Innovative 
Managers from all over the world, it is due to “compelling lifestyles” (personal safety, 
freedom, favourable environmental situation, good infrastructure, schools and hospitals) 
offered by global leading clusters that make talented people willing to move there. 
“People are willing to relocate to Cambridge because it has become a low-risk 
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environment to do high-risk things in.” (The Economist 2011: 12) Life quality matters 
the most. Committed to create the most favourable conditions for its residents, the City 
will feature not only administrative buildings and scientific premises, but also schools, 
hospitals, shops, restaurants, fitness centres, art galleries and a theatre. Property 
development costs are expected to reach 120 billion RUB (3.8 billion USD), half of 
which will be coming from the federal budget and another half being raised through 
private investors. Building and construction works of 1,6 million square meters of 
facilities will be preliminary completed by 2015. (Petrova 2011; Nielsen 2012) 
 
The new innovation city will be built according to the 4E principles: energy efficiency, 
ecological compatibility, ergonomics and economic efficiency, providing “maximum 
convenience with the minimum resources used”. (Skolkovo Foundation Annual Report 
2011: 17) The city infrastructure is planned to suit at best both investors and innovators 
in order to encourage fruitful “intellectual atmosphere”. (Skolkovo Foundation Annual 
Report 2011: 128) 
 
For instance, Skolkovo’s commitment to eco-friendliness can be proven by the city’s 
transport policy. Thus, all vehicles with combustion engines will be prohibited to enter 
its territory. Residents and guests will be allowed to get around on foot, by means of 
public transport (buses on biogas), by bicycles or in electric cars. (Buck 2013) 
 
The architects, engineers and landscape designers have been entrusted with a task to 
create “an image of the city as a laboratory”, a place for open communications and 
continuous interaction among members of its community, providing equal access to all 
public and common use facilities. (Annual Report 2011: 33) 
 
The unique city layout developed by the French company AREP is based on the 
principles of comfort, functionality and sustainability, uniting scientific and residential 
areas in one interconnected complex. According to the AREP’s Master Plan, the City is 
divided into four planning districts and two planning zones. In the result of numerous 
competitions and tenders several world leading architects, among them Pierre de 
Meuron (Switzerland), Kazuyo Sejima (Japan), Jean Pistre (France) and Rem Koolhaas 
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(Netherlands) have taken charge of the architectural design of each planning district. 
(Skolkovo Foundation Annual Report 2011: 33) 
 
Excessive focus of Skolkovo’s Management on architectural solutions and material 
infrastructure of the future innovation centre (to a great degree at the expense of 
Russian taxpayers) has been widely criticized not only by local media (GAZETA.RU, 
Vedomosti, RBKdaily), but also by the former Chief Operating Officer of Skolkovo 
Foundation, Steven Geiger. In his article on the occasion of his resignation after two 
years of working at Skolkovo he underlined:  
 
“A typical mistake of global innovation projects in various countries 
is the initial desire to announce themselves as an insanely costly 
super-city that incorporates all the new architectural and technological 
wonders of the world. They look spectacular <…> but almost always 
they have little to do with innovations development. What is even 
worse is that they distract from funding real innovations.” (Geiger 
2012) 
 
 
4.4 People of Skolkovo  
 
According to the report “Fostering innovation-led clusters: A review of leading global 
practices” (2011: 4, 10), human talent is the cornerstone of success in developing 
clusters. Clusters Executives who contributed to the report all agree that “the 
availability of specialist skills” accounts for the key factor in determining the location of 
a cluster.  This formula requires governments to ensure a constant disposal of high-
skilled human resources and, when its own reserves are insufficient, to create such 
attractive living and working conditions that they would persuade external specialists to 
relocate. “Attracting a star name in a given field can be a crucial catalyst” (The 
Economist 2011: 4).  
 
Moscow’s Skolkovo disposes more than a star. The people involved in the Project 
constitute the Russian and foreign leading experts in science, finance and politics. Thus, 
in March 2010 Dmitry Medvedev announced that Viktor Vekselberg, Russian 
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aluminium oligarch, the 4th richest businessman in Russia and 52nd in the world (Forbes 
2013), would be in charge of Skolkovo. Shortly afterwards, three advisory bodies were 
established to manage the Project (see Figure 9 below): Board of Trustees, Scientific 
advisory Council and Skolkovo Foundation Council. (LENTA.RU 2012) 
 
The Board of Trustees of the Skolkovo Foundation is chaired by the former President 
Dmitry Medvedev. The Board also includes the Minister of Education and Science 
(Dmitry Livanov), the Minister of Communications and Mass Media (Nikolay 
Nikiforov), the Minister of Finance (Anton Siluanov), the Minister of Economic 
Development (Aleksey Ulyukaev), the Mayor of Moscow (Sergey Sobyanin) and 
several other prominent figures of Russian science, business and politics. (Official 
webpage of Skolkovo Foundation 2013) 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Skolkovo Foundation Administration Chart (Geiger 2011)  
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The Scientific Advisory Council is co-chaired by the two Nobel Prize Winners: Zhores 
Alferov, Vice-President of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Principal of St. 
Petersburg Academic University and Roger Kornberg, Professor of Stanford University. 
Principals and Professors of the leading European Universities and global research 
organization are members of the Council, such as Detlev Ganten, President of the World 
Summit on Health and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the “Charité Foundation”, 
Richard Lerner, President of the Scripps Research Institute, Philip Frost, Chairman of 
the Board Teva pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd. (LENTA.RU 2012) 
 
Viktor Vekselberg and Craig Barrett, the former CEO of Intel Corporation, are together 
in charge of the Skolkovo Foundation Council. The Council resembles to a board of 
directors of a large corporation where decisions are taken by majority vote. Rank-and-
file members of the Council included at different times Esko Aho (Executive Chairman, 
Consultative Partner of Nokia Corporation), Anatoly Chubais (CEO of the Russian 
State Corporations of Nanotechnologies), Eric E. Schmidt (Executive Chairman of 
Google Inc.), John T. Chambers (CEO of the CISCO Systems Inc.), Peter Loescher 
(CEO of Siemens AG), Vagit Alekperov (CEO of LUKOIL). According to the 
comments of Viktor Vekselberg in the Russian media, the high profile of the Council 
members owes a lot to the connections of the Presidential Administration and 
personally to the involvement of Vladislav Surkov (Deputy Chief of Presidential 
Administration, Deputy Chairman of the Presidential Commission for Modernization), 
who was at the origins of the Project. As Vekslberg states, “all members of Skolkovo 
Foundation Council are appointed by the founding shareholders (see Government), and 
their candidatures are approved by the Presidential Commission.” (Butrin 2010; 
LENTA.RU 2012; Official webpage of Skolkovo Foundation 2013) 
 
Such starry cast of the Council members would be impossible without an active 
involvement of Conor Lenihan, the former Ireland’s Minister for Science, Technology 
and Innovation, who since 2011 has been Skolkovo’s Vice President for external 
economic relations. Initially hired as a senior advisor, he eventually took over the “key 
partners” department, in charge of attracting large international corporations to join the 
Project and locate their R&D offices at Skolkovo. The credit for Skolkovo having 
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partnership agreements with such giants as Samsung, Intel, Microsoft, Honeywell, 
Siemens, Johnson & Johnson, SAP and BP – all of which are either locating R&D 
centers or venture funding start-ups is mainly due to Conor Lenihan efforts. 
(Nikishenkov 2012) 
 
 
4.5 Skolkovo Communication Strategy 
 
Good PR support and a strong brand strategy is the 4th from 19 most success factors in 
creating an innovation centre. The society and particularly the target audiences should 
receive a clear explanation of the project’s mission, specialization and the development 
strategy. Recently, because of the growing number of innovation centres in the world 
and as a result “increasing vagueness of the base brand “science park”, the choice of a 
clear and effective brand positioning has become more complicated. Any innovation 
project is a long-term undertaking, whose image is easily affected by public 
expectations of its outcome in the future. The main danger occurs with the appearance 
of “negative feed-back” in the society, based on preliminary evaluations or comparisons 
with similar projects in other countries. This bottleneck can only be avoided by 
“constant explanatory work in the mass media”. (Creating and Developing Innovation 
Centres: Guide 2012: 65–66) 
 
There are two types of factors that are determinant in building a strong brand. The first 
type consists of environmental factors, which the innovation centre cannot influence 
such as science reputation of the base institute of higher education, academic institute, 
university; level of technological and infrastructural development of the region; level of 
socio-economic development of the region; level of the state support of the innovation 
economy. (Creating and Developing Innovation Centres: Guide 2012: 66) 
 
The second type includes manageable factors, which are subject to the communication 
strategy of a specific centre: involving of big international companies; stories of 
successful development of the residents; significant positive effect on the regional, 
national economy (employment, taxes); quality of resident company selection 
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procedures; quality of management of the operations; quality and range of services 
provided to the residents; presence of well-developed network of informal contacts with 
businesses; effective system of the brand promotion and spreading of information about 
the centre (publications in the mass media, organization of conferences and other events 
for exchange of experience). (Creating and Developing Innovation Centres: Guide 
2012: 66) 
 
It seems that the Skolkovo Foundation has followed closely the recommendations of 
“Creating and Developing Innovation Centres: Guide” and implemented its brand 
development strategy according to the main principles. First of all, Skolkovo 
communication strategy includes involvement of the key representatives of target 
audiences: the state (numerous press-conferences with than President Dmitry 
Medvedev, members of the Committee for Modernization and Innovations), education 
and science (involvement of Nobel Prize Winners Zhores Alferov and Roger Kronberg; 
involvement of the leading experts of the Russian Academy of Science and Higher 
School of Economics), businesses (partnership agreements with the global companies 
such as Intel, Microsoft, Siemens etc.) and residents (Skolkovo regularly organizes a big 
number of Start-Up Tours in Russia and Road Shows abroad; weekly lectures and 
events of Skolkovo Open University).  
 
Second, as it is mentioned in “Creating and Developing Innovation Centres: Guide”, the 
brand should clearly formulate a competitive advantage of the project for its positioning 
at home and abroad. Skolkovo Foundation has managed to ensure an unprecedented 
informational support for the Project both at home and oversees. “Skolkovo Is Where 
Innovations Meet With Investments” and “Future Starts At Skolkovo” are just a few 
examples of the rhetoric of slogans, which have been used in brochures, factsheets, 
billboards and exhibition stands of Skolkovo in Russia and all over the world. (Annual 
Report 2011)  
 
Below are several extracts from the speeches of the leading political figures about 
Skolkovo in the Russian media (Skolkovo Foundation Annual Report 2011: 6): 
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“Skolkovo should promote a new view, a new approach to 
understanding what an innovative product and what an innovative 
process is, and what kind of potential Russia has.” Viktor Vekselberg  
 
“Skolkovo is the largest project related to the modernization of the 
economy.” Sergey Stepashin  
 
“Skolkovo is an open project; it has a clear mission – to create an 
innovation environment, but along with that a very flexible strategy 
that will be determined not by officials, but by involving distinguished 
scholars, engineers, and entrepreneurs in the project.” Vladislav 
Surkov  
 
“Skolkovo is not a territory. Skolkovo is an ideology.” Zhores Alferov  
 
“Russia is building a new city where scholars, designers, engineers, 
and businessmen together with young researchers will develop and 
implement innovative projects with global impact.”  
 
“Skolkovo is a breakthrough into the future. The main asset of this 
city is <…> its unique innovation ecosystem capable of attracting 
scientists, engineers, students, and investors.”  
 
These extracts clearly demonstrate not only the overall importance of the project and its 
potential influence of the Russian modernization progress, but its political or 
“ideological” context as well. 
 
According to Skolkovo’s report on global communications, during the first year of its 
existence the Project has been promoted at both federal and regional levels through 160 
news agencies and networks, 117 central and local TV channels and 32 radio stations. 
The creation of Skolkovo and the interviews with people related to the Project were 
mentioned in 580 printed publications. The number of followers in social networks 
more than tripled. As of September 2014, Skolkovo had more than 12 100 followers on 
its Facebook page (Facebook account of Skolkovo Foundation 2014), 14 266 followers 
in the Russian social network Vkontakte.ru (Vkontakte account of Skolkovo Foundation 
2014) and 1 924 Readers on Twitter (Twitter account of Skolkovo Foundation 2014).  
 
For international promotions, Skolkovo Foundation organized a number of events in 
Europe: a presentation of Skolkovo and signing of the agreements with Alstom, EADS 
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and AREP in Paris (France); presentations of the Space Technology and Biomedical 
Technology Clusters in Berlin (Germany) as part of the Russian-German Economic 
Congress; the presentations of IT, Energy and Biomed Cluster at the “CEBIT-2011 
International Exhibition” in Hanover (Germany) and the “Science, Technology and 
Innovation Achievements of Russia 2011” exhibition in Madrid (Spain). The President 
of the Skolkovo Foundation, Viktor Vekselberg met with Prince Philippe of Belgium 
and a delegation of Belgian companies. Skolkovo also participated in the Russian Day 
at the annual Global Technology Symposium (CTS), where it initiated a discussion 
under the title “Russia: the cradle of innovation”. Viktor Vekselberg gave interviews to 
“Les Echo”, a leading French newspaper and the BBC channel. Craig Barrett, the Co-
chairman of the Foundation Board, gave an interview to the Russia Today TV channel. 
(Skolkovo in global public communications 2011)  
 
In December 2013 the Foundation Council adopted a new external communications 
strategy, aimed to be in line with the high world standards on one hand, and reflect 
specifics of the Skolkovo project on another. The new focus of the strategy has to be 
shifted from quantitative indicators of success and project’s infrastructure to its human 
side, people involved in the project: innovators, scientists, start-uppers, SkolTech 
students. At present, no press releases, news or analytical articles about the new 
communication strategy are available. (Nikishenkov 2013) 
 
 
4.6 Socio-Political Disputes around Skolkovo 
 
Right from the very beginning the Skolkovo Project caused controversy and polemics in 
the Russian media, social networks and Internet community. Politicians, journalists and 
scientists do not stop to express their concerns about its actual relevance and future 
impact. In the years 2010–2013 Skolkovo discussions were permanently in the columns 
of newspapers, magazines, Internet media. On the pages of only one state-owned 
newspaper Rossijskaya Gazeta more than 6300 Skolkovo-related articles can be found, 
dating from March 2010 till November 2013.  
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Between the years 2010–2011 the Project was continuously mentioned in the speeches 
of the top public officials, which made many experts consider Skolkovo as the strategic 
point of Medvedev’s prospective election agenda on the threshold of the presidential 
elections of 2012. Politicians-members of Medvedev’s modernization team were 
declaiming from a rostrum of all important international forums and conferences about 
the high purposes behind Skolkovo, which was destined to become the very foundation, 
indispensable for boosting the future modernization of Russia. (KM.RU 2011) 
 
The international nature of the Project and involvement of foreign experts has become 
the main characteristic of the vision of Skolkovo actively promoted by Medvedev. In 
his view Skolkovo should become “a place, where the categories of national and 
international are effectively elided and rendered irrelevant”, where there will be no 
difference “who is “ours” and who is an “outsider””. (Rowe 2013: 5) However, the 
international image of Skolkovo prompted political tensions between pro-Medvedev 
liberal supporters and patriotically oriented members of the Russian Academy of 
Science, large number of experts and members of the State Duma. (Rowe 2013: 5) 
 
On the other side of the political barricade, researchers and experts were perplexing the 
project proponents with the right question: why to copy a foreign, though a positive 
experience, while ignoring its own scientific facilities, created by strenuous and 
collaborative efforts of the great Russian scientists, engineers, thousands of talented 
specialists. Local scientific community was at a loss to understand why to build up an 
innovation centre from scratch, pumping in it enormous financial resources, while 
continuing a miserable funding of already existing scientific centres, formerly renowned 
not only in Russia, but throughout the world. (KP.RU 2011) 
 
This scepticism towards foreign experience can be generally explained by the 
foreseeable complications of copying any kind of best practices, whether economic or 
political ones. As Wilson Rowe puts it, adoption of foreign models is often hampered 
by “national pride or patriotism”. However, this distrust or resistance to any Western 
implication is particularly strong in Russia, “where many Russian politicians and 
citizens felt let down by models of ‘Western’ democracy and markets after the 
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tumultuous 1990s.” (Wilson Rowe 2013: 5) 
 
 Some politicians, including the deputies of the State Duma (Russian Parliament) 
publicly declared that Skolkovo would be used solely and exclusively for the personal 
gains of its founders and finally would turn into “interior offshore territory”, because of 
its special legal status and numerous financial privileges. The leader of the Communist 
Party Gennady Zyuganov publicly expressed his concerns about the feasibility of yet 
another scientific center, while dozens of already existing ones are underfinanced and 
underdeveloped. (LENTA.RU 2012) 
 
The main Kremlin ideologist and the “godfather” of Skolkovo, Vladislav Surkov, 
responded to the outbursts against the Project and its “overlapping with the existing 
science cities” by saying:  
 
“We have wonderful scientific centres, that were founded in the 
Soviet time in Siberia and around Moscow and many other regions. 
Brilliant specialists, high-skilled scientists work there. <…> However, 
our task is to reach another stage of development and not to make a 
quasi upgrade of our Soviet premises, but to build a new Russia with a 
new economy, and this sometimes requires to start from scratch. <…> 
We sincerely hope that our new innovation complex will be wholly 
integrated within all scientific centres of the country.” (Zarubin 2010) 
 
In April 2011 a much-debated Skolkovo Project became the topic of a special opinion 
poll, organized by WCIOM (Russian Public Opinion Research Centre). The results were 
the following: 44 % of Russians were informed about Skolkovo in one degree or 
another. In general, the Project enjoyed a positive public image: most often it was 
associated with a science city (10.6%), a centre of state-of-the-art developments (6.4%), 
a city for scientists (3.8%), a prototype of the Silicon Valley (2.6%). (WCIOM 2011) 
 
The share of “real audience” (those who had a clear idea of what Skolkovo is) 
accounted for 31,3% of the Russians. Another 1,8% of the respondents considered it as 
another “money laundering” project. 67,9% of the surveyed population was still among 
a “hard-to-reach audience” (those who are only familiar with the name or know nothing 
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about the project). Those 30% of the Russians would like to receive information about 
the project no more than once a month are younger than 45 years (34–36 %), well 
educated (36%) and wealthy (39%). Almost same number of people, 29% precisely, do 
not want to get any information about Skolkovo at all. (WCIOM 2011) 
 
Despite the relatively low level of awareness about the project, the Russians were 
generally positive about it. For example, 65% were convinced that Skolkovo would 
allow talented young Russian scientists to realize their ideas. 51% believed that the 
establishment of the Centre would provide conditions for a technological breakthrough 
in fundamental research. At the same time, 53% of respondents were concerned that the 
project would not be fully realized. 24% stated that Skolkovo was a failure a priori. 
According to the General Director of WCIOM, Valery Fedorov, such a high level of 
doubt is quite characteristic for the Russian population which is traditionally suspicious 
about the state and large governmental projects, due to corrupt practices prevailing in 
the public sector. (WCIOM 2011) 
 
In terms of importance, the Russians view Skolkovo less significant than the sport 
events that Russia is to host. Thus, Skolkovo was ranked by 22% of the respondents 
only the third among the most significant Russian projects of the XXI century: the 
Winter Olympic Games in Sochi in 2014 (74%) and the FIFA World Cup in 2018 
(42%). (WCIOM 2011) 
 
At the same time in April 2011, an independent Analytical Centre of Jury Levada 
(further Levada-Centre) also conducted a public survey among 1600 Russians aged 18 
years and older in 45 regions of the country on their attitudes about the newly created 
Skolkovo Centre and the process of modernization in the country in general. In contrast 
to the official findings of WCIOM, only 10% of respondents were familiar with the 
project (among them 28% of Muscovites). 53% of Russians heard something about it, 
but could not say anything specific. 67% believed that the funding invested in Skolkovo 
project will bring some effect. 36% claimed that the money will be spent ineffectively, 
27% insisted that the funds will be well spent, while 19% of the Russians presumed that 
the funds will be misused. Despite generally sceptical attitude of the Russians towards 
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the innovation zeal of Dmitry Medvedev, the Russian population displayed more 
favourable views about Skolkovo than about any other modernization projects of 
Medvedev. (“Russians about “Skolkovo” and modernization of the country” 2011) 
 
The pathetic rhetoric of the Foundation Annual Report (2011: 12) on “uniqueness”, 
“complexity” and “grandiosity” of its mission, as well as its ideological component, 
reflect the general tonality of political discourse about Skolkovo: 
 
“I would like for Skolkovo not only to become a good brand, because 
I believe that we have all the chances in that sense; but I would like 
for Skolkovo to become an ideology (my italics) that will penetrate 
our society’s life and will be understandable to both senior citizens 
and very young people. If we do achieve that, Skolkovo will have a 
tremendous impact.” President Dmitry Medvedev (Joint Meeting of 
the Commission for Modernization and Technological Development 
of Russia’s Economy and the Skolkovo Foundation’s Board of 
Trustees 2011) 
 
 
However, there exists a different understanding of Skolkovo’s ideological component 
expressed by the Head of its Scientific Advisory Council, Academic Zhores Alfyorov 
(Vice President of the Russian Academy of Science):  
 
“I have always been saying that Skolkovo is not a territory, but an 
ideology (my italics). This ideology should be spread in other science 
cities <…>. Skolkovo should not become an offshore territory, where 
large sums of money disappear and which grants provide certain 
benefits for certain organizations and individuals. Skolkovo should 
become the ideology (my italics) of the interdisciplinary ground 
breaking research.” Zhores Alfyorov at Press Conference in 
Yekaterinburg (Tabarintsev-Romanov 2013) 
 
Judging by the rhetoric employed by Russia’s top leaders while speaking about the 
Project, Skolkovo has been used as a certain public tribune to promote “a particular 
future for Russia”. (Wilson Rowe 2013: 7) It has been initially presented as much more 
than just innovations and new technologies, but as “a potentially social movement” 
(Wilson Rowe 2013) and “a testing facility of the New Economic Policy” 
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(RIANOVOSTI 2011). In one of his early interviews about the establishment of 
Skolkovo, Medvedev declared: “flexibility and adaptability are the words that have 
become more popular than stability and predictability. This does not make everyone 
happy, but the change will continue”. (Kuzmin & Kosheev 2010, quoted in Wilson 
Rowe 2013) Considering that Putin’s regime was mainly based on the contrary 
principles, that exactly of economic and political stability, Medvedev’s announcements 
on Skolkovo’s role for Russia’s development sound no fewer than revolutionary. 
(Wilson Rowe 2013) 
 
 
4.7 Overall Appraisal of the Skolkovo Innovation Centre  
 
Skolkovo’s fate has been challenging from the very beginning of its creation. Limited 
timeframe, involvement of top public officials and leading international corporations, 
political ambitions at stake, public scrutiny and initially high hopes set on the Project 
constituted the framework, which defined the development of Skolkovo. Its creation 
was pursuing the two key objectives: first, to promote innovative entrepreneurship in 
Russia, demonstrating “quick wins” through the number of technological start-ups 
nurtured by Skolkovo; and second, to create a testing site of a new innovative business 
environment, particularly attractive for foreign investors, that could be eventually 
introduced throughout Russia. According to Alexey Dolinsky, the second objective 
“made the project inherently political as it entailed changing a very broad range of 
regulations.” That is why the Project has often been associated with Russian politics 
rather than with innovations. (Dolinskiy, 2013) 
 
The first difficulty on the way toward achievement of the ambitious presidential 
objectives was “the lack of legislative foundations”. The situation required a difficult 
choice, whether to change the current legislation, risking to entail countrywide time-
consuming reforms or to create an unprecedented legislative oasis in Skolkovo. Despite 
the fact that the creation of special juridical and economic incentives on an isolated 
territory is compromising the very legislative framework of the Russian Federation, the 
Russian government advocated these special conditions for Skolkovo and thus officially 
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acknowledged the inadequacy of its own legislation. Given the short duration of a 
presidential term, the choice had been made, which turned Skolkovo into “almost an 
independent state inside a state”. (Dolinskiy 2013)  
 
Skolkovo’s special status and Medvedev’s endorsement could not but displease the 
almighty law enforcement agencies (usually associated with Vladimir Putin) and attract 
their particular attention. Series of criminal cases initiated by the Investigation 
Committee against Skolkovo have produced a shadow of doubt about the future of the 
Project. Many saw in it a behind-the-scenes political struggle; others regarded it as an 
evidence of endemic corruption and confirmation of pessimistic predictions. 
Involvement of the law enforcement agencies brought Skolkovo into challenge 
especially from the point of view of its foreign participants and investors, who do not 
particularly favour interventionist policies that Russian government is famous for. 
(Dolinskiy, 2013; Shelest 2013; Gorst 2013) 
 
However, the prosecutors’ allegations have not been proved. In November 2013, the 
accusations of misapplication of 125 billion RUB (3.9 billion USD) were finally 
removed. The Prosecutor General's Office announced that it had “no significant claims 
to the Foundation’s management” which demonstrated “exhaustive measures to remedy 
the violations detected by the prosecutors.” (RIANOVOSTI 2013c) Unfortunately, the 
power games against Skolkovo and numerous attempts to discredit it in mass media 
undermined general trust in it and injured the Project’s reputation. Besides, all these 
events have significantly damaged an already flawed image of Russia and its investment 
climate on the international level. (Shelest 2013) 
 
As any large-scale initiative, Skolkovo has supporters and critics. Those who are in 
favour of the Project claim that Skolkovo is already working and appeal to give it “at 
least a decade to prove its worth”, reminding that it has taken more than 70 years to 
make Silicon Valley the world’s leading innovation hub. (Gorst 2013) Thus, Kari 
Liuhto (2010: 99), Director of the Pan-European Institute of Turku School of 
Economics, characterises Skolkovo as one of “the best shots in Russia’s current 
modernisation arsenal”. Dan Grotsky (2011) calls it, “the most significant step that 
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Russia has taken toward modernization and innovation to date.”  
 
Yet, Skolkovo’s opponents tend to outnumber its proponents. One of the most 
distinguished of them is the scientific community of the Russian Academy of Science 
(RAN). It has been accusing Skolkovo for the lack of scientific approach and diverting 
of financial resources from the true science. Ilya Ponomarev, one of the proponents of 
Skolkovo, believes that the main reason of no confidence towards the Project on behalf 
of RAN is that Skolkovo does not convey its true rationale correctly to the public. The 
audience is expecting scientific inventions and breakthrough technologies from 
Skolkovo, although Skolkovo is not a scientific organization. It has been primarily 
conceived for providing financial and consulting assistance to technological start-ups in 
development and further commercialization of their new technologies. (Shelest 2013) 
 
Another aspect that refers to the often-repeated critics of Skolkovo is the choice of 
scientific areas of its clusters. Steven Geiger (2012), who worked at Skolkovo during 
two difficult start-up years as Chief Operation Officers before resigning in late 2012 
says, “One of the key criteria of success in development of innovations is the right scale 
and focus”. On a rather small territory of 400 ha (Silicon Valley 400 000 ha, Sophia 
Antipolis 2 400 ha, neighbouring Dubna Technopark 7 100 ha), Skolkovo has been set 
to develop 5 strategic areas: energy, IT, biotechnologies, space and nuclear 
technologies. Some experts consider this technological combination very obstructive, 
considering the fact that these areas differ drastically in terms of their capital costs, 
planning cycle, commercialization period, security measures and the level of security 
and control on the part of the regulatory agencies. Thus, Skolkovo should have followed 
the best examples and concentrate on a fewer number of research areas. (Gavrilov 2011: 
142; Geiger 2012)  
 
Despite the values of transparency, openness and internationalisation, actively promoted 
by Dmitry Medvedev and then Kremlin aide Arcady Dvorkovich, Steven Geiger claims 
that Skolkovo is still lacking foreign managers and foreign start-ups. If Skolkovo 
intends to become a revolutionary project in the innovation sector of Russia, it should 
attract the best ideas and people from all over the world regardless their citizenship. 
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Only an open and international platform can accelerate the transfer knowledge and 
technology, which is of vital importance for Russia, if it wants to stay competitive on 
the global level. Against this background the SkolTech, where the best Russian and 
foreign specialists are creating a potentially world leading research university, is a rare 
exception to the rule. (Geiger 2012) 
 
Skolkovo has often been interpreted as a projection of Dmitry Medvedev’s vision of 
future Russia, which is “a rule-of-law society of talented, highly educated and 
enterprising people <…> a society with high levels of social trust and unobtrusive, but 
effective government institutions.” (Frolov 2010a) In pursuit of this vision through 
Skolkovo, Medvedev has attempted to create “a high-trust society in a country plagued 
by low social trust”. (Frolov 2010a) It should be noticed that social trust appears only as 
the result of horizontal level of cooperation and never of the vertical structures of 
hierarchy. That is why experts are forewarning that without deep societal changes, 
political and administrative, and a nationwide fight against corruption “Skolkovo and 
Russian economic modernization are destined to fail”. (Gorst 2013)  
 
Another point of criticism is a frequent comparison of Skolkovo with earlier 
governmental initiatives, which did not prove their efficiency. Yet, none of the previous 
programs have been so strongly endorsed by the government both financially and 
politically. (Grotsky 2011) 
 
In order to summarize the above-mentioned facts, a SWOT analysis appears to be one 
of the best options available to evaluate various aspects of Skolkovo Innovation Centre 
and identify possible pitfalls of the Project to be avoided. SWOT analysis is commonly 
applied in marketing and business as a method to evaluate Strengths, Weaknesses, 
Opportunities and Threats of a company, business unit, campaign or initiative. Its key 
role is to help single out internal (Strengths and Weaknesses) and external factors 
(Opportunities and Threats) that may affect the achievement of project objectives or a 
new business strategy. While the internal factors (human, financial resources, current 
processes) are within the control of an organisation, externalities represent all facets of a 
general environment, which are social, economic, legal, regulatory, national and 
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international occurrences. SWOT analysis is especially helpful in “identifying possible 
areas for change in a program and refining efforts mid-plan”. (Goodrich 2013) 
 
Based on the analysis of the academic articles on Skolkovo, the information materials 
posted on the Skolkovo official webpage, numerous Skolkovo internal presentations 
available on www.slideshare.com, as well as English-language and Russian newspapers 
articles, reports and analytical essays of OECD, EBRD, the World Economic Forum 
about innovations in Russian and Skolkovo in particular, the following results have 
been obtained. 
 
Skolkovo’s Strengths encompass: 
- special legislative and economic incentives;  
- guaranteed governmental support and funding; 
- a conceptually new innovative ecosystem in Russia 
- a new framework, which unites business, education and venture companies; 
- international activities (agreements on cooperation with the leading world 
scientific institutions and innovative parks); 
- domestic activities (academic cooperation between SkolTech and leading 
Russian universities; institutional cooperation with Russian technoparks and 
R&D centers of state corporations); 
- high level of professionalism and reputation of the managerial team and 
scientific experts (scientific and business stars, Nobel Prize Winners, Ministers); 
- already functioning SkolTech established jointly with MIT (strong research and 
professorial chairs); 
- total expert anonymity of selection and granting processes (maximum 
objectivity and transperancy); 
- efficient PR activities: informative webpage, active participation in social 
networks, blogs, various Internet communities, virtual SkolTech, video lectures 
of Open University; 
- high level of innovation promotion activities: Road Shows in Russia and abroad, 
active participation in all leading innovative forums, exhibitions, conferences; 
- creation of Intellectual Property Rights Centre (IPR start-up support is very 
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seldom elsewhere in Russia); 
 
Skolkovo’s Weaknesses are: 
- political nature of the Project (endangered in case of confrontation of political 
groups Medvedev vs. Putin); 
- building from scratch instead of using already existing facilities, for instance, of 
Novosibirsk Academic City or Dubna ( as a result, extremely high construction 
costs); 
- closeness to Moscow (high costs of living); 
- top down initiative as opposed to Silicon Valley and to the general assumption 
that innovations can not be imposed;  
- excessive focus on architectural and engineering infrastructure (best European 
architects and high construction costs); 
- 5 various by nature and research requirements clusters in one relatively small 
location; 
- lack of experience in realization of similar projects; 
- burden of high hopes and expectations put on the Project; 
 
Project Opportunities comprise: 
- principles of openness and transparency announced by the top political figures; 
- close public attention to the Project; 
- foreign participation (learning from the best), promotion of internationalism and 
introduction of world class business standards; 
- integration into global innovation networks;  
- availability of resources;  
 
Threats to Skolkovo include: 
- high risks of corruption and misuse of financial and administrative resources 
(particularly during the construction phase of the Project) as Russia ranks 127 
among 177 countries, according to the Corruption Perception Index 2013 by 
Transparency International, and it is the most problematic factor for doing 
business in Russia, according to The Global Competitiveness Index 2011–2012;  
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- general scepticism and critics of the Project, mainly due to fact that the external 
conditions of the Project (high administrative barriers, ineffective tax and legal 
rules and the above mentioned corruption) are in conflict with the internal 
artificially created conditions of Skolkovo (tax and legal exemptions, efficiency, 
transparency and openness); 
- potential brain drain through R&D centres of foreign companies; 
- state interventionist policies;  
- low demand on innovations on behalf of Russian businesses; 
- interruption of public funding. 
 
Although Skolkovo has been very swift in building up its infrastructure, growing the 
number of its participants, residents, key-partners and completing academic cooperation 
agreements, it might take it decades to create the essential part of the ecosystem, an 
innovative culture. That entrepreneurial culture, which makes Silicone Valley unique, 
the culture of turning ideas into business, based on a critical mass of venture capitalists 
and enthusiastic businessmen. 
 
In 2010 Esther Dyson mentioned in her article in The Moscow Times that Skolkovo 
should be treated “as a garden rather than a construction site”. The analogy with the art 
of gardening was chosen for a reason as it implies “a combination of disciplined 
planning to create an almost self-sustaining ecosystem and the freedom of self 
expression.” (Aervitz 2010) However, the possibility of a nurturing approach of the 
government towards the Project with due consideration of the current socio-political 
environment is highly unreal. 
 
The urgent imperative of the modernization of the Russian economy and upgrade of its 
technological competitiveness leaves no room for doubts. However, many doubt, 
whether the modernization imperative should be solely concentrated on the Skolkovo 
Project, which since 2010 has been expansively dominating the public discourse on 
innovations. As the OECD Review of Innovation Policy in Russia 2011 concludes, 
Skolkovo has all potential “to provide an important boost to efforts to attract major 
overseas technology-based firms and promises to function as a useful <…> incubator 
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for policy experiments”. At the same time the experts alert that its high costs and 
pervasive presence in mass media “risks diverting attention and resources away from 
much-needed reforms in other critical areas” (OECD 2011: 249–250). 
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5 CONCLUSION 
 
The thesis analyses the challenges that the Russian innovation policy is facing at the 
moment and how these challenges are answered in the framework of governmental 
initiatives with the particular focus on one of them, namely, Skolkovo Innovation 
Centre. For this purpose, the theoretical foundation of national innovation systems 
(NIS) has been applied as the most appropriate concept, which unlike traditional 
technology-related analysis does not focus exclusively on inputs (among them research 
expenditures) and outputs (as, for instance, the yearly number patents) of the system, 
but on the linkages and interactions among all its elements.  
 
The concept of NIS is based on the premise that flows of information and knowledge 
among the actors of the system (firms, universities, governmental and private research 
institutions and organisations) have the biggest impact on the overall success of a 
country’s innovative development. Moreover, the concept reflects on historical, cultural 
and socio-political aspects of a country’s development, which are responsible for the 
character of NIS institutions and their interaction. Since there is no one universal match-
all model of a NIS, every country adapts a system, which reflects its political and 
economic traditions as well as socio-cultural peculiarities.  
 
The notion of Innovation Communication naturally complements the NIS approach as it 
acknowledges similar foundations of successful innovative ecosystems: shared 
knowledge via shared language, high level of trust, focus on reputation and 
interconnectedness of all elements of the system. It underlines that innovation is never 
driven by one single element whether science, or business, or politics, but by their 
interaction. Research articles on innovation communication emphasize the need for 
scientists and managers involved in innovative activities to change their approach 
towards innovations and take on an active position in communicating their innovative 
ideas and breakthroughs. If this step is not taken, any undertakings of governments to 
establish a supportive general framework and of media to promote innovations into the 
public discourse have little chance to make a difference. Innovation communication, if 
implemented on the active strategy basis, contributes to a better public awareness of 
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innovative services and products available and improves a general perception of how 
well and in which directions society is progressing or not. (Mast, Huck & Zerfass 2005: 
6) 
 
Drawing on the analysis conducted, it can be concluded that despite a turbulent 
transition period of the last two decades, Russia has managed to maintain its R&D 
capacity through affluent reduction and restructuring of its large S&T complex, which 
the country inherited from the Soviet times. While transition from the state controlled to 
the free market economy and, as a result, the drastic changes in political and social 
environment could not but profoundly affect the national science and technology (S&T) 
system. At the moment, the innovation policy of Russia seems to possess all types of 
policy instruments, also available in the developed countries; however, they fail to 
result in a smoothly functioning innovative system. 
 
Among the main reasons of Russian NIS inefficiency is a low connectivity and poor 
interaction among the system’s elements. To one of the biggest barriers, impeding 
technological development of the country, belongs an extreme formality of Russian 
innovative process and the nonlinear developmental character of innovations, which is 
often disregarded in the governmental strategies. Although it has been globally 
recognized that network connections between the government, science and business are 
of crucial importance for the innovative performance of a country, in Russia they 
remain underdeveloped. These connections empower participation of other smaller 
agents, such as SMEs, consulting agencies, service companies, engineering centres etc. 
In Russia these linkages are hampered by the lack of entrepreneurial initiative, 
corruption and the bureaucratization of all spheres.  
 
Consequently, the networking between public R&D institutions and private companies 
remain weak, which results in low demand for innovations on behalf of the business 
enterprises. Therefore, the poor innovation absorption capacity of the Russian business 
sector does not enable it to make any considerable impact on the country’s economic 
growth. Poorly enforced and unsolved issues of the intellectual property rights for the 
government-funded research is reflected in the low number of public research contracts 
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and patenting. As there is no sufficient knowledge of transferring technology and 
knowledge into business applications, the Russian scientific sector in its current state is 
unable to meet the requirements of the industry and provide technological solutions of 
the required standards. Although the public R&D system has suffered significant 
transformations during the last 20 years, it has managed to preserve its rather 
heterogeneous character. Research organizations remain primarily concerned with the 
developmental work and demonstrate weak linkages with both education and business 
sectors. (OECD 2011: 181)  
 
The situation requires a broad change in policy orientation and development of 
innovation-friendly business environment in the country. It goes both to the large firms 
and small innovative enterprises, which are an important NIS component, providing 
science with applications, taking risks of engaging in development of new products and 
technologies. Innovation activities at major state corporations are important, but cannot 
provide the critical mass effect, needed for the major changes in Russian innovation 
performance.  
 
Innovative development is a long-term process that requires constant investment and 
time for the new products and technologies to be developed and introduced on the 
global market, and for the local business to gain its competitiveness. Russian political 
leadership appears to realize the acute need of the modernization and diversification of 
the country’s economy. “Innovations” has become the buzzword in the modern political 
rhetoric. Russia has started to formulate its mid and long-term development strategies 
quite recently. The Strategy-2020 was initially adopted in November 2008 and one year 
later the programme Go Russia! was ratified.  
 
One of the most resounding projects, resulting from those programmes has become the 
Skolkovo Innovation Centre; a technological hub aimed at concentrating research 
capacitates and entrepreneurial competences to stimulate commercialization of Russian 
innovative technologies. The decision to create Skolkovo has triggered impassioned 
debates in Russian scientific and policy-making communities. From this point of view 
Skolkovo can be regarded as the first and one of most successful innovation 
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communication projects in modern Russia. It has managed to attract attention of the 
leading national and several foreign media channels. Its active media presence in 2010-
2013 was unprecedented. Before Skolkovo the word ‘innovation’ was a largely 
unknown term in Russian general public and political discourse. Skolkovo 
Communication team was the first to introduce it in the lexicon of print and mass 
media.  
 
Despite the image of a flagship project and the key element of the Russian innovation 
policy, Skolkovo has inherited general disbalances of the country’s innovation system. 
First of all, it is argued that most of the top-down initiatives such as technoparks, 
incubators and special economic zones are less effective than cooperative locations, 
naturally organized by the local business and scientific community. Such constructed 
clusters are often characterized by high innovative and entrepreneurial activities, 
although they tend to create more global than local linkages and, therefore, have 
insignificant impact on the local economy. Secondly, Skolkovo (as most of the 
innovative programmes initiated by the Russian government) disregards the innovative 
potential of the low-technology industries, being designed exclusively to support high-
tech companies. Thirdly, planned clusters are believed to be lacking natural procedures 
of tacit knowledge diffusion, which is essential for both cooperation and 
competitiveness. Besides, if such measures as enforcing the rule of law, eradicating 
corruption, overcoming the tendency to regulate national innovation system in a manual 
control regime (direct governmental involvement in economy and innovation), as well 
as fostering fare business competition and creating a favourable business climate in the 
country are not taken in the very near future, Skolkovo risks to be seen as another 
unsuccessful endeavour of the Russian government to get around rather than remove 
underlying bottlenecks hampering innovations. (Klochikhin 2012: 675; OECD 2011: 
235- 236)  
 
In general, it may be concluded that the current national innovation system of Russia is 
far from being well balanced. (Mindich 2012) Besides, the country needs to find a 
proper balance between adopting foreign models of development and working out its 
own, country-specific models, considering its historical heritage, strengths and 
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weaknesses. The analysis shows that further reforms and more efficient initiatives are 
required to improve the linkages between all the institutions involved in the knowledge 
generation, diffusion and its further commercialization. To reach that goal, the 
modernization programme should be regarded as a continuous process, engaging all 
spheres of life in the country. It is also important to design an innovative infrastructure 
in such a way that it meets the real needs of already existing innovative companies, both 
high- and low-tech, instead of being based on the assumptions of the governmental 
officials. Finally, the necessary transformations of Russia’s innovation system will not 
happen overnight, however, they should not be protracted either, if Russia wants to 
retain its competitive advantage on the global level. 
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Appendix 1. Russian Economy Profile (The Global Innovation Index 2013: 237) 
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NOTE: O indicates a strength;  a weakness; * an index; † a survey question.
Key indicators
Population (millions) ......................................................................................................... 147.0
GDP (US$ billions) ........................................................................................................... 1,953.6
GDP per capita, PPP$ .................................................................................................... 17,697.5
Income group ........................................................................................... Upper-middle income
Region.............................................................................................................................. Europe
 Score (0–100)  
 or value (hard data) Rank
Global Innovation Index (out of 142) ................................. 37.2 62
Innovation Output Sub-Index ..................................................................................30.6 72
Innovation Input Sub-Index .....................................................................................43.8 52
Innovation Efficiency Ratio.........................................................................................0.7 104
Global Innovation Index 2012 (based on GII 2012 framework) ................................37.9 51
1 Institutions ....................................................56.0 87
1.1 Political environment ..........................................................................42.9 117 
1.1.1 Political stability*....................................................................................44.7 113 
1.1.2 Government effectiveness* ............................................................27.3 90
1.1.3 Press freedom* ........................................................................................56.6 119 
1.2 Regulatory environment ..................................................................57.2 100
1.2.1 Regulatory quality* ..............................................................................40.3 102
1.2.2 Rule of law* ...............................................................................................26.2 113 
1.2.3 Cost of redundancy dismissal, salary weeks ........................17.3 82
1.3 Business environment ........................................................................68.0 55
1.3.1 Ease of starting a business* ............................................................83.6 69
1.3.2 Ease of resolving insolvency* ........................................................46.5 49
1.3.3 Ease of paying taxes* ..........................................................................73.9 53
2 Human capital & research ..........................44.1 33
2.1 Education ...................................................................................................62.0 42
2.1.1 Current expenditure on education, % GNI .............................n/a n/a
2.1.2 Public expenditure/pupil, % GDP/cap .....................................19.7 57
2.1.3 School life expectancy, years .........................................................14.3 48
2.1.4 PISA scales in reading, maths, & science .............................468.5 37
2.1.5 Pupil-teacher ratio, secondary .........................................................8.5 11 O
2.2 Tertiary education .................................................................................40.0 46
2.2.1 Tertiary enrolment, % gross ............................................................75.9 13 O
2.2.2 Graduates in science & engineering, % ..................................28.1 14 O
2.2.3 Tertiary inbound mobility, % .............................................................1.4 71
2.2.4 Gross tertiary outbound enrolment, % ......................................0.4 108 
2.3 Research & development (R&D)...................................................30.3 31
2.3.1 Researchers, headcounts/mn pop. ..................................... 2,580.6 32
2.3.2 Gross expenditure on R&D, % GDP ...............................................1.1 33
2.3.3 QS university ranking, average score top 3* ........................45.9 25
3 Infrastructure................................................37.2 49
3.1 Information & communication technologies (ICTs) ........59.6 28
3.1.1 ICT access* .................................................................................................66.9 34
3.1.2 ICT use* .......................................................................................................39.7 34
3.1.3 Government’s online service* .......................................................66.0 37
3.1.4 E-participation*.......................................................................................65.8 19 O
3.2 General infrastructure .........................................................................32.0 57
3.2.1 Electricity output, kWh/cap ..................................................... 7,309.5 28
3.2.2 Electricity consumption, kWh/cap ...................................... 6,459.6 27
3.2.3 Logistics performance* .....................................................................39.5 95
3.2.4 Gross capital formation, % GDP ...................................................23.5 63
3.3 Ecological sustainability ....................................................................20.1 115 
3.3.1 GDP/unit of energy use, 2000 PPP$/kg oil eq .......................2.9 113 
3.3.2 Environmental performance*........................................................45.4 101 
3.3.3 ISO 14001 environmental certificates/bn PPP$ GDP ........0.4 90
4 Market sophistication .................................45.4 74
4.1 Credit .............................................................................................................23.6 116 
4.1.1 Ease of getting credit* .......................................................................50.0 93 
4.1.2 Domestic credit to private sector, % GDP .............................46.8 71
4.1.3 Microfinance gross loans, % GDP ..................................................0.0 82 
4.2 Investment ................................................................................................37.1 32
4.2.1 Ease of protecting investors* .........................................................47.4 102
4.2.2 Market capitalization, % GDP.........................................................42.9 45
4.2.3 Total value of stocks traded, % GDP ..........................................61.7 17
4.2.4 Venture capital deals/tr PPP$ GDP ................................................0.0 39
4.3 Trade & competition ...........................................................................75.6 78
4.3.1 Applied tariff rate, weighted mean, % ........................................3.8 65
4.3.2 Non-agricultural mkt access weighted tariff, % ....................0.3 41
4.3.3 Intensity of local competition†.....................................................49.4 121 
5 Business sophistication ..............................36.1 52
5.1 Knowledge workers .............................................................................58.2 34
5.1.1 Knowledge-intensive employment, % ....................................40.7 10 O
5.1.2 Firms offering formal training, % firms ....................................52.2 24
5.1.3 R&D performed by business, % GDP ...........................................0.7 30
5.1.4 R&D financed by business, % ........................................................27.7 57
5.1.5 GMAT mean score ..............................................................................559.7 32
5.1.6 GMAT test takers/mn pop. 20–34 ...............................................66.7 72
5.2 Innovation linkages .............................................................................18.9 109 
5.2.1 University/industry research collaboration† ........................40.3 83
5.2.2 State of cluster development† .....................................................36.0 108 
5.2.3 R&D financed by abroad, % ...............................................................4.3 59
5.2.4 JV–strategic alliance deals/tr PPP$ GDP ....................................0.0 60
5.2.5 Patent families filed in 3+ offices/bn PPP$ GDP ..................0.1 47
5.3 Knowledge absorption ......................................................................31.2 52
5.3.1 Royalty & license fees payments, % service imports .........6.8 18 O
5.3.2 High-tech imports less re-imports, % ......................................10.3 45
5.3.3 Comm., computer & info. services imports, % .......................5.5 49
5.3.4 FDI net inflows, % GDP .........................................................................2.8 73
6 Knowledge & technology outputs ...........30.4 48
6.1 Knowledge creation ............................................................................34.6 25
6.1.1 Domestic resident patent ap/bn PPP$ GDP ........................11.3 13 O
6.1.2 PCT resident patent ap/bn PPP$ GDP ........................................0.4 42
6.1.3 Domestic res utility model ap/bn PPP$ GDP .........................5.3 9 O
6.1.4 Scientific & technical articles/bn PPP$ GDP .........................10.6 72
6.1.5 Citable documents H index .........................................................308.0 20 O
6.2 Knowledge impact ...............................................................................33.0 77
6.2.1 Growth rate of PPP$ GDP/worker, % ...........................................4.4 21
6.2.2 New businesses/th pop. 15–64 .......................................................0.8 72
6.2.3 Computer software spending, % GDP ........................................0.3 45
6.2.4 ISO 9001 quality certificates/bn PPP$ GDP .............................5.3 63
6.2.5 High- & medium-high-tech manufactures, % ....................22.3 46
6.3 Knowledge diffusion ...........................................................................25.7 68
6.3.1 Royalty & license fees receipts, % service exports ..............1.6 28
6.3.2 High-tech exports less re-exports, %...........................................1.1 75
6.3.3 Comm., computer & info. services exports, % .......................6.0 72
6.3.4 FDI net outflows, % GDP .....................................................................3.6 19 O
7 Creative outputs ..........................................30.8 101
7.1 Intangible assets ....................................................................................27.0 125 
7.1.1 Domestic res trademark reg/bn PPP$ GDP ..........................21.4 63
7.1.2 Madrid trademark registrations/bn PPP$ GDP ......................0.6 38
7.1.3 ICT & business model creation†...................................................43.6 121 
7.1.4 ICT & organizational model creation† ......................................43.6 103 
7.2 Creative goods & services ................................................................32.2 81
7.2.1 Audio-visual & related services exports, %...............................0.6 21
7.2.2 National feature films/mn pop. 15–69........................................2.3 55
7.2.3 Paid-for dailies, circulation, % pop. 15–69 ................................7.5 67
7.2.4 Printing & publishing manufactures, %......................................1.6 59
7.2.5 Creative goods exports, % ..................................................................0.2 93 
7.3 Online creativity .....................................................................................37.1 44
7.3.1 Generic top-level domains (TLDs)/th pop. 15–69 ...............4.1 68
7.3.2 Country-code TLDs/th pop. 15–69 ............................................50.9 36
7.3.3 Wikipedia monthly edits/mn pop. 15–69 ....................... 2,864.5 47
7.3.4 Video uploads on YouTube/pop. 15–69 .................................76.8 55
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Appendix 2. Innovation policy: types of regulation and concrete measures 
            (Innovative Development: National Report 2008: 82–83) 
 
Types of regulation Concrete measures 
1. Improvement of innovation support 
activities with the focus on diffusion of 
knowledge and technology transfer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Creation and development innovative 
instruments, networks and incubators, 
uniting universities, R&D institutes and 
enterprises, on regional and local levels as 
well.  
 
 
 
 
 
3. Fostering of networking, via foreign 
direct investments as well 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Creation of Special Economic Zones 
 
Creation of Technoparks in high-tech 
sectors 
 
Tax incentives for the companies 
performing R&D projects, assistance for 
small innovative enterprises 
 
Decree on Introduction of temporary 
import tariffs on certain kinds of technical 
equipment 
 
Technical standards Reforms – Regulation 
on Technical Standards dated 2002.  
 
Creation of Special Economic Zones 
 
FTP “Electronic Russia” (2002–2010) 
 
Creation of Technoparks in high-tech 
sectors 
 
Support for R&D within SMEs – Program 
START 
 
Creation of Special Economic Zones 
 
Creation of Technoparks in high-tech 
sectors 
 
Creation of Russian Venture Company 
 
Creation of Open Joint Stock Company 
“Russian Investment Fund of Information 
and Communication Technologies 
 
FTP “National technological base for the 
years 2007–2011” 
 
FTP “Development of Civil Aviation 
Technologies in Russia for the period 
2002–2010 up till 2015” 
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4. State procurement focus on innovative 
products and services  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Access facilitation to the local and 
foreign financial resources  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Improvements in Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPR) legislation 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Reinforcement of innovative capacity of 
small innovative enterprises  
 
 
FTP “National technological base” for the 
period 2007–2011 
 
FTP “R&D in priority areas of Russian 
science and technology development for 
the period 2007–2012”  
 
Federal Space Program for the period 
2006–2015 
 
FTP “Electronic Russia” for the period 
2002–2010 
 
FTP “Development of Civil Aviation 
Technologies in Russia for the period 
2002–2010 up till 2015” 
 
FTP “Ecology and Natural Resources for 
the period 2002–2010” 
 
Blueprint of a plan of measures to promote 
the development of consumer industry 
 
Creation of Russian Venture Company 
 
FTP “National technological base” for the 
period 2007–2011 
 
FTP “R&D in priority areas of Russian 
science and technology development for 
the period 2007–2012”  
 
Creation of Open Joint Stock Company 
“Russian Investment Fund of Information 
and Communication Technologies 
 
Measures to ensure the legal protection of 
the rights to intellectual property, which 
was created at the expense of the state 
budget 
 
IV Part of the Civil Code of RF 
 
Co-financing of R&D projects performed 
by small innovative enterprises 
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 Support for R&D within SMEs – Program 
START 
 
Tax incentives for the companies active in 
the field of IT 
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Appendix 3. Russian innovation policy stages of development (OECD 2011: 183)   
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Appendix 4. Key measures to promote science and innovations (Strategiya-2020 2012: 
             87– 88) 
 
I. Fostering of large-scale innovations in all sectors of economy, assistance in creation 
new innovation markets. 
 1. Introduction as obligatory sections on innovations in national, sectorial and 
 regional strategies.  
 2. Introduction within federal and regional authorities as well as within the 
 companies of public ownership a new job position of Deputy director on 
 innovations; their recruitment among the members of the National Council with 
 the function of examination of the laws and regulations drafts to evaluate their 
 impact on the innovative development. 
 3. Development of the mechanisms to enforce innovations in the companies 
 (monitoring the programs of innovative development; implementation of 
 innovative technical regulations; strengthening of ecology, sustainability, quality 
 and safety requirements). 
 4. Introduction of the benchmark of “innovativeness” in the practices of 
 Government procurement and large scale infrastructural projects; their 
 obligatory process audit and evaluation of their innovative capacity).  
 5. Systematization of tax incentives in innovation sector and improvement of 
 their  administration.  
 6. Boosting imports of new technologies (search system for the best available 
 technologies for priority sectors, customs and tax regime, state guarantees). 
 7. Development of a program to attract foreign investors of brand technologies. 
 8. Promotion of long-term programs of subsidy assistance for the high-tech 
 productions with suspense conditions of prolongation (in the frameworks of 
 cooperation of enterprises with universities and scientific organizations). 
 9. Creation of the national network of experts for long-term science and 
 technology forecasting with participation of a wide range of interested players 
 (big companies, leading Universities and R&D centers, business associations, 
 innovation-driven territories). 
 
II. Increase the effectiveness of innovation policy. 
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1. Develop the system of technological platforms in partnership with business 
structures, science and academic institutions, as well as the network of 
centers of open innovations and technology brokers. 
2.  Create the network of service and educational centers in the sectors of 
engineering, design and prototyping. 
3. Introduce the system of innovative vouchers to stimulate the outsourcing of 
innovative services.  
4. Create the national database of new products and technologies, the network 
of industry expertise centers of scientific and technical information. 
5. Support innovation-driven territories (Skolkovo Innovation Center, regions 
active in innovations, special economic zones (SEZ), science towns). 
6. Organize competitions among innovative solutions for social, infrastructural 
and ecological problems on the city and regional levels.  
7. Develop self-regulatory organizations in the sector of innovations and 
support business associations (preparation of standards, expertise, 
representation of interests of the participants etc). 
8. Develop the system of informing the authorities and government companies 
about the available innovations and the advantages of their implementations 
(internet portal, departmental expert councils, working groups); 
demonstration of capabilities of the most advanced technology solutions in 
order to promote them within big companies). 
 
III. Upgrading innovations quality. 
1. Support the creation of centers of excellence and of the program of growing 
competitive teams within the promising sectors; continuous technological 
audit of all governmental research institutes and construction offices and 
optimization of their networking. 
2. Scaling operations of governmental funds for science. 
3. Formation of the national program of fundamental research to be open for all 
participants. 
4. Develop the system of a compulsory assessment of activity for all 
governmental research organizations and non-mandatory for other 
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organizations, which carry out R&D activities based on the internationally 
recognized practices.     
5. Create a development program for pre-competitive R&D activities focused 
on the real sector of economy (technological platforms, cooperative 
institutes, open innovations centers). 
 
IV. Implementation of the social functions of innovations. 
1. Formation of support programs for innovative ventures, promotion of 
scientific and innovative activities. 
2. Support for internships of young researchers and engineers in the leading 
scientific centers, universities and companies. 
3. Implement up-to-date standards of rendering of innovative services in 
education, healthcare, social services and governance, and specifically in the 
interests of vulnerable populations; provide support measures to ensure their 
access to innovative products and services.   
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Appendix 5. Geography of the Skolkovo Participants 
  (Skolkovo Foundation Annual Report 2011: 20) 
